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Introduction:
Unwritten Constitution, Invisible Government
Anthony Chase*
What surprised everybody, including Mao Zedong, was
that none of the conspirators attempted suicide. Instead,
in the limited time available before being arrested they
tried to destroy as much incriminating evidence as
possible.
YAO MING-LE, THE CONSPIRACY AND
MURDER OF MAO'S HEIR 179 (1983)
Even the history of science, as philosopher Georges Canguilhem
observes, is not itself a science.' Thus, it comes as no surprise that the
history of law, and its construction in both academic and popular literature,
should be denied characterization as a form of science or scientific activity.
Nevertheless, legal history and theory, sometimes labeled Jurisprudence in
law school seminars, a discipline even Langdell was not always prepared to
denominate the science of law,2 can be said to achieve discoveries or
breakthroughs. Whether one follows Bachelard and Canguilhem or, on this
side of the Atlantic, Thomas Kuhn, some notion of epistemological break,
of a sharp separation from previous theory, is essential in order to describe
those moments in the history of theory when radical reformulation actually
becomes a possibility.'
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center.
I. GEORGES CANGUILHEM, A VITAL RATIONALIST: SELECTED WRITINGS FROM GEORGES
CANGUILHEM :52 (Francois Delaporte ed. & Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1994).
2. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE LAW SCHOOL,
FIFTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF HARVARD COLLEGE 1876-1877
(1878).
Law has not the demonstrative certainty of mathematics; nor does one's
knowledge of it admit of many simple and easy tests, as in [the] case of a dead
or foreign language; nor does it acknowledge truth as its ultimate test and stan-
dard, like natural science; nor is our law embodied in a written text, which is to
be studied and expounded, as is the case with the Roman law and with some
foreign systems.
Id. at 96-97.
3. CANGUILHEM, supra note I, at 31-35; PARADIGMS AND REVOLUTIONS: APPRAISALS
& APPLICATIONS OF THOMAS KUHN'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, (Gary Gutting ed., 1980).
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Two such instances can be cited from the development of twentieth-
century jurisprudence: The first discovery was that of the unwritten
constitution, the second was of invisible government. Each of these break-
throughs represented the potential, at least, for a dramatic rewriting of
contemporary legal theory. During a critical juncture in twentieth-century
United States political history, the first discovery produced such a change.
The second, not yet made general to the field of legal thought in the United
States, at least could become a common assumption of ongoing legal
studies, indeed of popular legal consciousness as a whole. Whether it will
depends largely on the same kind of historical and political factors which
not only shaped the reception of legal realism and its systematic exposure
of the unwritten constitution but, necessarily, grounds the success or failure
of any theoretical innovation in philosophy or natural science.
The social context within which the discovery of the unwritten
constitution took place should by now be familiar. The liberal capitalist
road to modernization (represented by Britain, France, and the United
States) had increasingly come into conflict with the authoritarian capitalist
model (Germany and Japan), as sociologist Barrington Moore describes in
his classic study of the social origins of dictatorship and democracy.4
When President Franklin Roosevelt assumed office in 1933, he confronted
a situation where, according to world-systems theorist Immanuel Wallerstein,
the liberal capitalist approach was challenged sharply from the right by
Germany and, equally disconcerting to those whose task it was to manage
the state apparatus, from the left by the Soviet Union. Both the New Deal
program engineered by Roosevelt and the Nazi program led by Hitler were
carried out within the confines of a capitalist political economy. But the
rise of the Nazis in Germany (and, to be sure, emperor-system fascism in
Japan) facilitated, as Wallerstein observes, Roosevelt's development of "the
New Deal as an alternative type of political solution," one that was liberal
rather than authoritarian in Moore's terminology, "centrist" rather than
"rightist" in Wallerstein's.' Once the international right wing, the Axis
powers, had been defeated (and the Red Army was in Berlin), the United
States shifted from a left of center strategy (aimed at defeating authoritarian
forms of capitalist rule) to a right of center strategy, becoming as Wal-
lerstein puts it, "the leader of a 'free world' alliance against the world left
4. BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY:
LORD AND PEASANT IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD (1966).
5. IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, The USA in the World Today, in THE POLITICS OF THE
WORLD-ECONOMY 69, 70 (1984).
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... " This volte-face in United States policy (identified as a postwar
response to communist expansion by some historians but as already taking
place early in the war by critics like Gabriel Kolko) 7 provides an essential
historical boundary alongside of which to locate legal realism's rise and
relative decline.
Thus, diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union by the Roosevelt
administration and equally unprecedented unemployment figures claimed
center stage at the same time that Karl Llewellyn, at the political margin
represented by professional culture, published his realist manifesto on the
Constitution. "I am not arguing," he declared,
that the United States ought to have the sort of constitution loosely
designated as "unwritten." I am arguing that they have such a constitu-
tion, and that nobody can stop their having such a constitution, and that
whether anyone likes that fact or not, the fact has been there for
decades, and must be dealt with by any theory that purports to do a
theory's work.'
What troubled Llewellyn, of course, and other realists at that moment was
the Supreme Court's obstruction of the New Deal; specifically, the
roadblocks in the path of liberal capitalism's reconstruction (under new and
transparently dangerous circumstances) thrown up by a judiciary clinging to
the conservative apologetics of substantive economic due process. If the
Court ruled that laissez-faire had been written into the Constitution, the
realists, echoing Holmes' famous Lochner dissent,9replied that the con-
stitution to which the Court should turn was, in fact, essentially unwritten
and therefore no economic philosophy could be designated as permanent,
unalterable, fixed.'0  The Constitution itself, following Llewellyn's
6. Id. at 71.
7. See GABRIEL KOLKO, THE POLITICS OF WAR: THE WORLD AND UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY 1943-1945 (1968); JOYCE AND GABRIEL KOLKO, THE LIMITS OF POWER:
THE WORLD AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-1954 (1972).
8. Karl Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 n.5
(1934).
9. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see HAROLD
J. LASKI, The Political Philosophy of Mr. Justice Holmes, in STUDIES IN LAW AND POLITICS
146 (Archon Books 1969) (1932); HAROLD J. LASKI, THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: A
COMMENTARY AND AN INTERPRETATION (1948).
10. See Robert W. Gordon, The Elusive Transformation, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 137
(1994):
The specific Realist project [Morton Horwitz] most admires, as I do, was the
work demolishing the Classical categories, breaking the link between rights and
19941 1705
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paradigm, was a kind of artifact, a reflection of social and historical
circumstances, something put to use for particular purposes by a specific
society at a given point in time. And if ever there was a context which
cried out for a new constitutional verdict, it was the suddenly worldwide
economic depression.
The cumulative weight of social and political events-from the
instability in government precipitated by spectacular economic dislocation
to the alarming cartelization of world markets, from the reelection of
Roosevelt in 1936 to his bold, court-packing maneuver--effectively pro-
duced capitulation by the Supreme Court. Michael Ariens has recently
described how, initially, it was taken for granted that politics, not some
autonomous unfolding of constitutional principle, had caused the judiciary
to change its tune. This theoretical reformulation of constitutional doctrine
starkly revealed by the notorious "switch in time that saved the nine" was
uniformly regarded as an adjustment by the Court, in the nick of time as far
as most observers were concerned, to social and economic facts which were
simultaneously new and inescapable." An epistemological break within
the history of American legal and constitutional theory was thus provoked,
ultimately, by an evolution in forces and relations of production and by that
transformation's necessary political corollary.
The focus of Ariens' essay is on the way in which the theoretical
understanding of what had happened during the constitutional crisis of 1937
was subsequently revised to fit new social needs. The breakthrough of
realism was thus remanded, using a lawyer's term, for further review in the
light of cold war exigencies. Just as the left of center strategy described by
Wallerstein was, in the postwar period, converted to one right of center, and
just as the United States abroad pursued what in Japan was actually called
"the reverse course,"' 2 by the 1950s, American legal culture was also being
reoriented by key figures such as Felix Frankfurter who knew precisely what
remedies, disintegrating the concept of property, trashing the public-private
distinction and the presumptions that state action was normally 'coercive' and
market relations normally 'free,' and above all, recognizing that the capitalist
economy has a socially contingent constitution that is neither natural nor
necessary, but alterable by deliberate collective action ('policy choices').
Id. at 159-60.
II. Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, Or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REv. 620,
622-23, 631-33 (1994).
12. MICHAEL SCHALLER, THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF JAPAN: THE ORIGINS OF THE
COLD WAR IN ASIA 122 (1985); see THEODORE COHEN, REMAKING JAPAN: THE AMERICAN
OCCUPATION AS NEW DEAL (1987); J.W. DOWER, EMPIRE AND AFTERMATH: YOSHIDA
SHIGERU AND THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE, 1878-1954 (1988).
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they were doing. "What is most important," concludes Ariens regarding
Frankfurter's turnabout, is that "his revised history of the constitutional
crisis of 1937 became the accepted history in legal academia. This new
version allowed legal academics to conclude that the decisions of Justice
Roberts in the spring of 1937 were the product of legal reflection, not
political pressure.I3 Not for nothing does Canguilhem emphasize the
social origins of knowledge.
Given this background, it becomes easier to understand why the second
critical discovery of modern jurisprudence, that of invisible government, has
managed to make so little headway when it comes to redrawing the road
map of even academia's conception of legal reality. Just as historical events
conspired to bring forward and then rudely cast aside the progressive legal
realism of the 1930s, the late twentieth-century critique of invisible
government has been pressed forward by a quite contradictory ensemble of
historical circumstances, only the outline of which can presently be
identified. This special issue of the Nova Law Review contributes to an
urgent charting of that outline as its definition takes form against the
horizon of contemporary legal theory.
Before proceeding to this second dramatic innovation within modern
jurisprudence, however, we must be sure to understand what legal realism
did and did not represent. Certainly it challenged those legal notions which
placed law in a privileged position above, or at least outside, the realm of
politics. Just as Llewellyn had relied upon Bryce, Beard, and Bentley, the
last of whom "saw and said in 1908 all that should have been necessary to
force constitutional law theory into total reconstruction,"' 4 another writer
whose work appeared in the United States in 1908, upon whom Llewellyn
apparently did not rely but certainly could have, made transparent the extent
to which legal theory had been seeking a new paradigm for decades. Italian
political philosopher Antonio Labriola observed that "legislating has become
an epidemic; and reason enthroned in legal ideology has been dethroned by
parliaments .... [N]ew legislation has more than once been revised, and
the strangest oscillations may be observed in it . . . .
During the momentous transition from a mercantilist to a capitalist
political economy in the United States, 6 the legal system and its rules had
13. Ariens, supra note 11, at 652.
14. Llewellyn, supra note 8, at 1.
15. ANTONIO LABRIOLA, ESSAYS ON THE MATERIALISTIC CONCEPTION OF HISTORY 198-
99 (1908).
16. See WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS, THE CONTOURS OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1961);
MAURICE DOBB, STUDIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM (1947); Mitchell Franklin,
1994] 1707
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been turned inside out. By the end of the nineteenth-century, it was evident
that the notion of law as immutable, "reason enthroned," was no longer
acceptable even to those in power. Why, then, should it be passively
accepted by those seeking admission to the circle of citizenship, access to
power itself? Although the realists, as a result of their challenge to con-
ventional legal ideology ("a government of laws and not of men," in the
popular reference) were sometimes accused of moral relativism or of
harboring anti-democratic sensibilities, the charge was groundless. The
crucial point to make was that constitutional democracy had never been
secured in the first place merely through deployment of the myth of legal
certainty, the idea that legal rules could somehow be made impervious to
manipulation by power. The real constitution, the real guarantee of
democracy was something that could not be protected by language standing
alone, no matter how sacred, even if memorized by every elementary school
student and recited, hand on heart, by each newly sworn citizen. Even when
men and women rule through law, it remains nevertheless men and women
who rule, as political theorist Franz Neumann, among others, has so
persuasively demonstrated. 7 Equating realism, simple recognition of the
true political face of law, with anti-democratic or totalitarian sentiment was
a total fraud, but a shrewdly intelligent one from the perspective of those
devoted to insulation of the status quo from all criticism. No African-
American, the legendary civil rights attorney and Dean of Howard Law
School, Charles Hamilton Houston, was fond of observing, needed to be
reminded of the difference between law in the books and law in action. But
others, without such direct personal experience of the disparity between the
system's claims and its performance, could fall victim to precisely the
ideology which realism sought to derail.
If not legal certainty, stare decisis, original intent, the elaborate
rigmarole of law review footnotes and turgescent casebooks-on which little
reliance should ultimately be placed according to the realist critique-what
are the irreducible components of political freedom, the minimum structure
of constitutional democracy? The three essential elements are popular
Legal Method in the Philosophies of Hegel and Savigny, 44 TUL. L. REv. 766 (1970);
Mitchell Franklin, Dialectical Contradictions in Law, in DIALECTICAL CONTRADICTIONS:
CONTEMPORARY MARXIST DISCUSSIONS 149 (Erwin Marquit, Philip Moran, Willis H. Truitt,
eds., 1982).
17. See FRANZ NEUMANN, THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE: ESSAYS
IN POLITICAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1957); FRANZ NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW: POLITICAL
THEORY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN MODERN SOCIETY (1986); OTTo KIRCHEIMER & FRANZ
NEUMANN, SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND ThE RULE OF LAW (1987).
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sovereignty (and an inevitably hard won universal suffrage), civil rights and
liberties, and public government."8 The historic struggle to establish the
power of parliaments and legislatures against kings and dictators and to
secure such basic liberties against state power as the right to speak or
organize trade unions has proved essential to the construction of modem
democracy. But the guarantee of public, rather than secret, government
remains on a par with the first two components of a free society and may,
indeed, have become the most precarious of the three pillars supporting
constitutional rule in the United States. The reason, once again, arises from
historically specific political conditions.
It was, to be sure, the first two aspects of constitutional government
which Hitler and the Nazis, in the 1930s, went after with a vengeance.
Their hatred for parliamentary sovereignty was of a piece with Bismarck's
assault on the Social Democratic and liberal parties in the nineteenth
century. In the 1860s, Bismarck had advanced the notorious Luecken-
theorie, or "theory of the gap," to provide what Gordon Craig calls "a
spurious legal justification" or legal cover for defiance of the Prussian
Chamber of Deputies and, decades later, Bismarck offered a further
argument which could be used to dissolve the Reichstag: "It can very well
happen," he boasted in 1886, "that I will have to destroy what I made."' 9
The linkage between Bismarck and the fascist period is made explicit by
Fritz Fischer who observes that the rise of Social Democracy to the
"position of strongest party in the German Reichstag in January 1912 served
as an alarm signal," precipitating a demand by the big industrialists and
great landowners, the alliance of steel and rye, that "the Reichstag be
neutered and the trade unions suppressed, for it seemed to them that their
economic and social position could be guaranteed only in an authoritarian
corporate state: here the nexus with Papen's ideas of 1932, even with the
year 1933, becomes palpable. 2 °
Early in February, 1933, taking full advantage of a presidential decree
drafted by those who held power prior to Adolf Hitler and designed to
18. See IMMANUEL KANT, KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS (Hans Reiss ed. & H.B. Nisbet
trans., 2d ed. 1991); ANTHONY ARBLASTER, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF WESTERN LIBERAL-
ISM (1984); Anthony Chase, The Rule of Law and the Capitalist State: Bills of Rights in
Jeopardy, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 85 (1991).
19. GORDON CRAIG, GERMANY 1866-1945, at 174 (1978).
20. Fritz Fischer, FROM KAISERREICH TO THIRD REICH: ELEMENTS OF CONTINUITY IN
GERMAN HISTORY, 1871-1945, at 42 (1986); see SEBASTIAN HAFFNER, THE AILING EMPIRE:
GERMANY FROM BISMARCK TO HITLER (1989); HANS-ULRICH WEHLER, THE GERMAN
EMPIRE 1871-1918 (1985).
19941 1709
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control the Nazis themselves, Hermann Goering initiated massive censorship
of newspapers, public meetings, and radio broadcasts which "abused, or
treated with contempt," organs or leading officials of the government. At
the end of that month, the Reichstag building was burned to the ground,
probably by Heydrich's SA/SS, while "Hitler and Goering wasted no time
in laying the deed at the doorstep of the Communist party and in using this
charge to justify a crippling blow at what was left of the democratic
system."21  Hitler promised in a newspaper interview that individual
liberties would be restored once the Communist menace had been liquidated
but this was, of course, immediately followed by an assault on all enemies
of the Nazi party.22 The next step was a full-scale Gleichschaltung, putting
into the same gear the whole of society, which meant purging the adminis-
trative apparatus, incorporation of trade unions, dismantling of governmental
structures in the federal states, destruction of the Weimar political party
system, finally abolition of the Reichstag as a "genuine parliamentary
chamber, and, after July 1933, an independent speech from the floor on any
subject would have caused the very pictures to fall from the walls. 23
It is precisely these techniques, striking against civil liberties and the
elimination of parliamentary opposition (hopefully even of the legislative
body itself), which have proved so tempting and yet elusive to more recent
politicians uncomfortable with democratic institutions. Of course the desire
to provide some sort of legal justification, however strained, for official
conduct remains. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, President John Kennedy
turned to Richard Nixon, a bitter adversary, for advice as to what course of
action to follow next. "I would find a proper legal cover and I would go
in," Nixon recommended. "There are several justifications that could be
used," he continued, "like protecting American citizens living in Cuba and
defending our base at Guantanamo. The most important thing at this point
is that we do whatever is necessary to get Castro and Communism out.'"24
Thus a perceived need to provide some semblance of "legal cover" for
governmental action (however illegal the action may be) remained strong,
as did willingness to employ the standard, all purpose justification of anti-
communism, at least until recently when western rulers were denied that
excuse by an internal collapse of the Stalinist system. President Ronald
Reagan and his secret government used their commitment to saving
21. CRAIG, supra note 19, at 572, 574.
22. Id, at 575.
23. Id. at 582.
24. Richard M. Nixon, quoted in RICHARD REEVES, PRESIDENT KENNEDY: PROFILE OF
POWER 99 (1993).
1710 Vol. 18
11
: Nova Law Review 18, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Chase
Nicaragua from communism, their support for the United States-manufac-
tured Contra army whom Reagan dubbed the moral equivalent of our
Founding Fathers, as justification for trading American arms for hostages
held by Iran (contrary to stated United States policy) and for bankrolling
and equipping Contra "freedom fighters" (contrary to United States law).25
The deployment of retroactive as well as "mental" Presidential Findings
during Iran-Contra (ultimately no more credible than outright, illegal
destruction of documents, which also occurred) carried the effort to fabricate
legal cover stories to a pathetic, perhaps tragicomic extreme. 6
But to whatever lengths contemporary politicians seem willing to go in
an effort to evade democratic accountability, abolition of the legislature
itself (at least in the United States) appears beyond their grasp. Admittedly,
Eisenhower and Kennedy transformed the national security bureaucracy into
a new and competing branch of government. Lyndon Johnson created his
own Gulf of Tonkin incident and prosecuted a savage and unpopular "police
action" in Vietnam without a Congressional declaration of war. Richard
Nixon had his enemies list, bugging devices, and successfully conspired to
run against the opposition candidate of his choice. Reagan's "can do" NSC
staffer, Lt. Colonel Oliver North, bragged of his willingness to lie to
Congress if he felt the end justified the means. But actually dissolving the
legislature seems a political gambit about which American authoritarians can
only fantasize. In the 1930s, President Franklin Roosevelt unsuccessfully
sought to pack the United States Supreme Court and in Gabriel Over The
White House, a Hollywood film made during Roosevelt's first year in office,
the President in fact suspends a deadlocked United States Congress for the
duration of the Great Depression.27 But by the end of the twentieth-
century, if riot by the 1930s themselves, such extreme alternatives as
25. Not only did anti-communism drive United States policy in Nicaragua but, as
Theodore Draper points out, United States fear of Soviet influence in Iran at least contributed
to the Reagan administration's desire to become convinced that there were anti-terrorist
"moderates" in the Iranian government who could be won over by sophisticated weapons
supplied first by Israel, then the Pentagon and CIA; see THEODORE DRAPER, A VERY THIN
LINE: THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIRS (1991).
26. Id. at 212-16. For the bottom line conclusion drawn by the Iran-Contra Independent
Counsel, see LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR
IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS, VOL. I: INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS (1993). "President
Reagan, the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, and the director of central intelligence
and their necessary assistants ... skirted the law, some of them broke the law, and almost
all of them tried to cover up the President's willful activities." Id. at 561.
27. See ANDREW BERGMAN, WE'RE IN THE MONEY: DEPRESSION AMERICA AND ITS
FILMS 110-20 (1971).
17111994]
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outright redesign or elimination of a branch of government (or rescinding
of the franchise) had apparently been declared off limits by the ground rules
of the liberal capitalist state. It is for this very reason, this historical shift
in "the rules of the game," that the third component of constitutional
democracy has become absolutely crucial to the maintenance of a free
society: Public government is critical if secrecy is to be prevented from
providing the cloak by which those who seek democracy's subversion can
achieve their main aims without actually having to risk construction of a
police state or straightforward abolition of the legislature. Nixon may have
engineered the Saturday Night Massacre, George Bush may have stolen the
Presidency in 1988 through "flagrant misrepresentations" of his part in Iran-
Contra, 29 but Nixon could not abolish the courts and Bush could not avoid
an eventual confrontation with the record (and the electorate) in 1992, unless
he chose (like Lyndon Johnson) not to run again. Where contemporary
authoritarians have done their greatest damage to the democratic state is in
secret, not in public where they realize they could actually lose.3 ° What
brought down Nixon's regime was the bungled burglary of the Watergate
complex. What Reagan and his co-conspirators did not count on was
Nicaragua shooting down the Hasenfus plane. Even Rodney King's
assailants ended up being convicted of felonies for one reason-someone
had a video camera, ready and able to make public the secret brutality of the
Los Angeles Police Department. Without the videotape, the beating simply
did not happen.3 Secrecy is a final refuge within modem constitutional
democracy for the totalitarian impulse.
In spite of thousands of pages of law reviews and legal textbooks
devoted to constitutional law and its practice as well as tens of thousands of
law school classroom hours devoted to separation of powers analysis and the
28. Though not, of course, liberal capitalism's sponsorship of such "extreme alternatives"
in someone else's country; see, e.g., WILLIAM BLUM, THE CIA: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY,
U.S. GLOBAL INTERVENTIONS SINCE WORLD WAR 2 (1986).
29. Peter Kombluh & Malcolm Byrne, Iran-Contra: A Postmortem, 27 NACLA REPORT
ON THE AMERICAS 29, 33 (Nov./Dec. 1993).
30. Bill Moyers, in his excellent Iran-Contra television documentary exploring reasons
why the Reagan administration opted for secret government and against democracy, says to
key Reagan official Michael K. Deaver: "You didn't want the campaign for reelection [in
1984] to be fought out around Central America." "Absolutely. Never," replied Deaver,
"because if we'd have fought the campaign on Central America, we might have lost." Bill
Moyers, Frontline: High Crimes and Misdemeanors (Corporation for Public Broadcasting,
Nov. 27, 1990).
3 1. See JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE
EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE (1993).
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endless parsing of Supreme Court cases, only during the last two decades
has this public/secret dichotomy been thrust onto the stage of national poli-
tics in such a way as to virtually compel its introduction within the canons
of modem political theory. Thus only now can we acknowledge the
discovery of the invisible state as one of the key breakthroughs of twentieth-
century jurisprudence, poised to force a dramatic paradigm shift in legal
knowledge.32 Will this startling insight be used to transform the discipline
or, on the contrary, will it be suppressed because of the threat it poses to
normal political science, to law teaching (and law school casebooks) safely
locked within a uniformly obscurantist doctrinalism? It is against such a
resolute preservation of knowledge itself as one more guarantor of the status
quo that this special issue of the Nova Law Review is published. Along with
Judge Walsh's "sober and thoughtful" report on official United States
government involvement in Iran-Contra,33 and Jim Sheridan's Academy
Award-nominated film, In the Name of the Father (revealing an "extraordi-
nary climate of fear and censorship perpetrated by the British government
in relation to the affairs of the North of Ireland"),3 4 this issue of the Nova
Law Review constitutes one of the year's most significant contributions to
exposure of the secret state, to the developing critique of invisible govern-
ment.
Matthew Kaplan's article takes as its focus one of the most important
and yet least understood aspects of the Iran-Contra scandal: The way in
which the executive branch of government was able to give an impression
it was cooperating in the investigation at the very moment it was placing
drastic limitations on the Independent Counsel's ability to secure criminal
convictions. President Bush's notorious post-election defeat pardons,
described by special prosecutor Lawrence Walsh as the final act in the Iran-
Contra cover-up, received wide publicity and provided Christmas Day
32. See NORBERTO BOBBIO, Democracy and Invisible Power, in THE FUTURE OF
DEMOCRACY: A DEFENSE OF THE RULES OF THE GAME 79 (1987); BILL MOYERS, THE
SECRET GOVERNMENT: THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS (1990).
33. Theodore Draper, Walsh's Last Stand, 41 N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS 26, 29 (March 3,
1994).
34. Michael Mansfield, Jurassic Justice, 4 SIGHT AND SOUND (n.s.) 7, 7 (March, 1994);
see GERRY CONLON, IN THE NAME OF THE FATHER (1993); Ronan Bennett, Criminal Justice,
15 LONDON REV. OF BOOKS 3 (June 24, 1993); STEPHEN DORRIL & ROBIN RAMSAY, SMEAR!
WILSON AND THE SECRET STATE (1991). For films (available on video) which similarly
attempt to cast light on Britain's secret government, see A VERY BRITISH COUP (WGBH
Educational Foundation 1992); HIDDEN AGENDA (Hemdale Film Corp. 1991); DEFENSE OF
THE REALM (Hemdale Film Corp. 1986).
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headlines across the nation." Even Democratic Congressmen have
admitted that the legislative investigation of Iran-Contra was curtailed in
order to protect Ronald Reagan and to prevent the development of evidence
which might necessitate his impeachment or damage the Presidency at a
time when Reagan administration posturing supposedly had the Soviet Union
on the ropes. Yet it is still possible that the cover-up would have collapsed
but for skillful deployment of a national security justification for limiting
evidence available to the Independent Counsel. "Though Walsh was
appointed at the initiative of the Reagan administration," observes Theodore
Draper, "his investigation was not welcomed by it or by the Bush adminis-
tration. They put various obstacles in his path, especially when it came to
getting classified documents."36 It is just this particular obstacle's legal
twists and turns which Matthew Kaplan provides careful scrutiny in his
detailed examination of the law of state secrets.
Stanley Kutler, author of the definitive historical account of the
Watergate scandal, warns us that the "Iran-Contra affair perhaps represented
a greater threat to the American constitutional order than had Water-
gate. . .""' and Theodore Draper, reflecting on Iran-Contra, adds that "[i]f
ever the constitutional democracy of the United States is overthrown, we
now have a better idea of how this is likely to be done."38 Watergate itself
seems to have lost some of its cutting edge over the past twenty years.
During the 1994 network television broadcast of the Superbowl, a cleverly
written and directed soft drink commercial presented a Woodstock-like
celebration staged in a farmer's field and featured aging rock stars (playing
themselves) commenting, more or less, on the vicissitudes of time. A small
boy watching the odd event from a hillside above informs his mates that
"this is the anniversary of a historic event." "What event?" another inquires.
"Watergate," he replies solemnly.39
But for those Americans, now aging themselves, who shared the
existential experience of living through the scandal day to day, Watergate
35. See Owen Ullmann & Mark Thompson, Bush pardons 6 in Iran-contra, MIAMI
HERALD, Dec. 25, 1992, at Al.
36. Draper, supra note 33, at 26.
37. STANLEY 1. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD
NIXON 609 (1990).
38. Theodore Draper, Foreword, in THE IRAN-CONTRA SCANDAL: THE DECLASSIFIED
HISTORY xiii, xiii (Peter Kornbluh & Malcolm Byrne eds., 1993).
39. This television spot was created to be shown during the Superbowl football game
by the advertising firm of BBDO in New York and has since been shown during the Grammy
Awards and as part of other programming. Telephone Interview with Maria Amato, Assistant
Producer, BBDO Advertising (Mar. 13, 1994).
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is likely to remain an indelible illustration of official misconduct and
lawbreaking, having constituted an appalling (and at the time, almost
unimaginable) demonstration of the capacity of those in power to govern
through lies and deceit. In a word, what Watergate had was Nixon. It has
subsequently influenced popular perception of political scandals, even helped
name them as Professor Kutler records. Though Watergate did not have an
"off-the-shelf, self-financing, stand-alone, full-service covert operation," like
Iran-Contra,4" it did have Cointelpro and the Plumbers and bagmen and the
"White House horrors," as Attorney General John Mitchell famously called
them.4 And, like Iran-Contra, it did suggest that the Constitution belonged
in the office document shredder. A retrospective collection of essays on
Watergate could not bring together a more interesting group of authors than
this one. Samuel Dash provides the most analytical and informed of
insider's views while Stanley Kutler updates the historical portrait which
previously earned him professional acclaim among Watergate aficionados.
Stephen Ambrose proposes his own intriguing answers to those annoying
Watergate questions which continue to puzzle journalists and historians (e.g.,
why did Nixon fail to burn the tapes?) and Mark Tushnet provides scholarly
reflection on Watergate's impact on separation of powers doctrine.
Steven Richman's meditation on the legal and moral dimensions of
Maxwell Anderson's 1935 verse play, Winterset, may at first seem an odd
companion piece to essays on Iran-Contra and Watergate. But as Richman
shows, Anderson's play takes its theme from the Sacco and Vanzetti case
and the issues raised by that prosecution and by Anderson's drama are as
meaningful today as ever. Curiously enough, the Sacco and Vanzetti case
(and Roscoe Pound's failure to speak out publicly about it at the time) may
have had an independent influence on Karl Lewellyn's growing commitment
to reform and his increasing dissatisfaction with efforts to idealize the status
quo.42 And that, of course, brings us back to where we began, to the
realist critique of the unwritten constitution. It is the subsequent (and
equivalently iconoclastic) discovery of invisible government, however,
which is given pride of place in this issue of the Nova Law Review, to
which the reader seeking a certain intellectual provocation as well as legal
and political critique may now confidently turn.
40. DRAPER, supra note 25, at 530.
41. KUTLER, supra note 37, at 365-66.
42. See MORTON J. HORWiTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 175 (1992).
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WATERGATE ERA SYMPOSIUM
On March 26-27, 1993, the Watergate Era Symposium was
held at Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center in Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. Participants in this Symposium included
Samuel )Dash of Georgetown University Law Center, Stanley
Kutler of the University of Wisconsin, Mark Tushnet of George-
town University Law Center, and Stephen Ambrose of the
University of New Orleans. All are recognized authorities on this
period in U.S. history. The four essays which follow comprise the
edited remarks, or were the basis for remarks, delivered by these
participants at the Symposium.
[1994] 1717
18
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss3/1
Congress' Spotlight on the Oval Office: The Senate
Watergate Hearings
Samuel Dash*
It is the twentieth anniversary of the Senate Watergate hearings, and I
think it is both remarkable and commendable that the Shepard Broad Law
School at Nova University is holding this Watergate conference.
The exposure of Watergate was a very special event in our history. It
was a turning point, when we began to look at our government differently.
When we began, perhaps, to grow up and implement, as we have from time
to time in our history, what the Framers wanted America to do, the people
to do-and that is to hold their government accountable.
It's a great time to remember what happened twenty years ago, to
rethink it, and to learn again some of the lessons that we gained from it. I
know that there are students who, when they hear Watergate, at least know
generally what that is about, but not very specifically. However, even those
who watched the hearings, and have some sort of memory of what they
were all about, have forgotten many of the details. I still hear references to
things that came later in the press that sort of memorialized Watergate, but
that really had nothing to do with Watergate.
When I now come to class to teach my students (I think they were
about four or five-years-old at the time of the Watergate hearings), some of
them come up and say, "My mother told me that you had something to do
with Watergate." They don't know what I had to do with Watergate, and
* Sam Dash, a graduate of Harvard Law School, is Professor of Law and Director of
the Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure at Georgetown University Law Center. He has
been a federal prosecutor, state prosecutor, criminal defense attorney, and appellate lawyer.
He founded the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and chaired the Criminal
Justice section of the American Bar Association. Professor Dash was the Chief Counsel of
the Senate Watergate Committee.
In addition to the Senate Watergate investigation, Professor Dash has performed a number
of significant investigations and international missions: he conducted undercover
investigations of the Chicago municipal courts; he investigated the actions of British
paratroopers in Northern Ireland; he served as Chief Counsel to the State Senate impeachment
proceedings against the Governor of Alaska; and he was appointed Special Counsel to the
President of the Senate of Puerto Rico for a political murder investigation. Professor Dash
also assisted with the exit of a Russian dissident from the former Soviet Union, and he was
the first American allowed by the South African government to interview Nelson Mandela
while in prison.
This essay comprises the edited remarks of Professor Dash delivered at the Watergate
Era Symposium held at Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center in Fort Lauderdale,
Florida on March 25-26, 1993.
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so I have to remind them that I didn't go to prison. I was asking the
questions, not answering them.
Watergate was much more than a break-in. But the break-in was the
thread that began to unravel the whole ordeal. There was a burglary of the
Democratic National Committee ("DNC") headquarters at the Watergate
office complex. Nixon called it a "third rate burglary." It looked like the
Keystone Cops; they didn't even know their way around, and they got
caught.
The man who directed the burglars, G. Gordon Liddy, is now a radio
celebrity and has a large audience in Washington, D.C. He regales his
listeners with stories about his will and his strength, and he calls me the
"hapless Sam Dash," who was so incompetent that he couldn't find his way
to the Watergate Hotel itself. On the twentieth anniversary of the break-in
this past June 17, 1992, Gordon Liddy took his microphone, went down to
the Watergate, and interviewed the cops who arrested him. Only in
America!
The burglars actually broke into the Watergate twice. When they went
in the first time and placed their bugs, apparently, they weren't getting good
reception. Liddy told White House counsel John Dean that Attorney
General Mitchell had called him into the office and said, "It isn't worth
[expletives deleted], I want you to go back in there again and put them in
a better place." Liddy said to Dean, "It's my reputation at stake, we gotta
go back in again."
So they went back in again. There is a very funny story, which is not
well known, that shows Watergate also involved providence. We would
never have known about the break-in, we would never have conducted the
hearings, and we would never have known about Nixon's involvement, but
for a very strange quirk of history.
When the burglars went in the second time, in order to keep going back
and forth with their tools, Jim McCord (the wire-tap expert and former CIA
agent) put tape around the door latch so that the door that otherwise locked
automatically would not lock. The Watergate security guard, who became
very famous in the newspapers, was coming down on his route and he saw
the tape. That didn't really alert him because he said there were carpenters
in the building earlier who were doing some construction work, and he
thought they must have put the tape on. So the guard took the tape off.
McCord came back and saw the tape was off, and he rushed back to Liddy.
"We've been found out! We gotta get out of here!" he said. Liddy replied,
"No. Mitchell told me I had to do the job right, we're staying. Put more
tape on." Well, McCord put more tape on and when the guard came back
the next time around he saw the tape on the door lock again. The guard
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knew that couldn't be from the carpenters-it had to be a very current
event-so he called the police.
This is when providence intervened. The call went out to a uniform
police patrol in a marked car, and they were supposed to come and search
for the burglars. They ran out of gas, however, and they radioed, "Is there
any other car in the area?" A nearby drug investigation team dressed in
dirty jackets and caps and sitting in an unmarked car (undercover, of course)
answered, "We're just around the comer." And they responded.
Across the street from the Watergate, in the Howard Johnsons Hotel,
was a lookout for the burglars. He was a man named Baldwin who, while
the burglars were inside, was supposed to see if any cops were coming. He
had a walkie-lalkie so he could call ahead and say, "Get out! The cops are
coming!" But, all he saw was this beat-up car, and guys getting out wearing
these dirty jackets and caps. He didn't think they could possibly be the
cops. He didn't get alarmed until he saw the lights go on as the undercover
detectives began to search the building from the ground floor up.
When Baldwin saw the undercover officers reach the 7th floor where
DNC headquarters was located, he became concerned that there may be
something wrong. Baldwin watched the detectives come out on the balcony,
close to the burglars who were just inside the offices. So he radioed Liddy
and said, "Are our people in plain clothes, or are they in formal street
wear?" Liddy said, "formal street wear." Baldwin could only respond, "Ah-
Oh!"
Right at that point the burglars were apprehended by the police, who
had their guns drawn. It was too late. But for the marked police-car
running out of gas, and the plain clothes team coming on, we would have
never learned of Watergate. The burglars would have been alerted if a
marked car had shown up, and they would've gotten out. This is just one
of a number of fascinating examples of providence, luck, fate-whatever
you want to call it-which include, perhaps, our finding of the Oval Office
tapes.
But, as I said, Watergate was more than the break-in. It was about the
pervasive abuse of power, and not just the burglary of the Watergate. The
White House that Richard Nixon ran had a fear of dissent and a fear of
demonstration. His coterie of aides believed that the only person who was
good for America and could save America from subversives was Richard
Nixon.
These were men who wore little American flags on their lapels. These
were men blinded by a terribly distorted sense of patriotism. Mitchell
testified that, "I would've done anything to keep Nixon in power and to
keep McGovern out, who would've destroyed our country." I remember
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one of the Senators asking Mitchell, "You say 'anything'? Would you
commit murder?" And Mitchell smoked his pipe and said, "That's a hard
question, Senator."
Gordon Liddy recently told Larry King on a radio program that he had
been commissioned by the White House to rub-out investigative journalist
Jack Anderson. Anderson had somehow received a leak from a national
security staffer and had published it in his column. Liddy said, "He
deserved to die, and I was the hit-man." King, who was somewhat taken
aback, said, "Well, you didn't do it. He's alive now." "Yes, yes," Liddy
said, "The White House chickened out. I think that he should have been
killed, and I would've killed him. But they chickened out."
There's another funny little story about Liddy. When the burglars were
caught, he had not been in the DNC offices with them. He and Hunt were
in a suite of rooms in the Watergate Hotel. Liddy immediately ran the next
day to Dean to tell him everything had gone wrong. He said to Dean, "I
screwed up. I was not supposed to get involved because I could be
identified with the Committee to Re-elect the President. Therefore, I
deserve to be executed. I'm a Catholic. I can't commit suicide. So I will
stand on any street corner in Washington you want, and you can come
around in a black car and shoot me with a machine gun." Dean told me,
"That's got to be crazy. He thinks I'm gonna come around and shoot him
with a machine gun."
These were the people who were involved; the Keystone Cops.
Nevertheless, although the stories are amusing now, they reflect a shocking
willingness by those misguided men to abuse the powers of the presidency.
In order to ferret out dissenters, the Nixon Administration authorized
burglaries all over the country-the "black bag" jobs.
Liddy and Hunt were sent out to break into the office of Daniel
Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Ellsberg had leaked the Pentagon Papers. They
broke into the publisher of the Las Vegas Sun's office to get what they
thought were incriminating documents against Nixon. They wire-tapped,
they bugged, and they blacklisted dozens of people who had done nothing
more than criticize the president.
These men also planned to set up a boat outside Miami on the water,
just when the Democrats were holding their national convention in the city.
The boat was to be equipped with concealed cameras, microphones, and
hired prostitutes. Then, they would lure democratic candidates and big-wigs
onto the boat to photograph them in all kinds of compromising scenes. And
that wasn't the end of it. They actually had a plan to kidnap dissenters all
over the country, put them on a plane, and drop them in the jungles of
Central America.
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Gordon Liddy had devised a master plan incorporating all these
schemes. The principal operation (code-named "Gemstone") was to
burglarize the DNC office files at the Watergate. Liddy had a proposed
budget, detailing how much each operation would cost. Mitchell's only
response was, "The budget's too big." He did not say, "You can't do that.
That's criminal." No, his concern was the expense, "Cut it down, cut it
down." Finally, they narrowed down their options, and they only had
enough money to break into the Watergate.
It is an almost inconceivable image: Mitchell, the Attorney General of
the United States-the chief law enforcement officer in the nation-sat in
his office at the Department of Justice and listened to Liddy present a
briefing with an easel and charts outlining these unlawful plans to harass,
embarrass, and undermine the Democrats. Mitchell would later refer to
these actions as "the White House Horrors."
There was a secret police agency inside the White House. The
President's men didn't trust the FBI or the CIA, and they used their own
small police agency called the "Plumbers" in the basement of the White
House. They were called the Plumbers because Nixon was driven to
obsession over the leaks coming out of the White House, and these guys
were going to plug the leaks. But they were also doing much more. They
were burglarizing, wire-tapping, and doing everything else.
The cover-up was not to cover up the break-in itself. Rather, the White
House palace guard was worried that if the Watergate burglars actually were
convicted and went to jail, they would disclose their involvement in all these
other "black bag" jobs. They would reveal the White House Horrors-this
persistent, pervasive criminal activity that Nixon and the Plumbers were
involved in.
The exposure of these outrageous actions through the Senate Watergate
hearings had a tremendous impact on the public. It really changed how we
perceived our government. The ripples of Watergate, even twenty years
after it happened, are still felt today. As we are looking back after twenty
years, we should ask the question: "Why? Why did it provoke such an
enormous response?" There have been other congressional exposures of
government wrong-doing in the past without this impact. However, because
of the Senate Watergate hearings, we had a unique, classic demonstration
of what the Framers expected in the operation of the separation of powers.
Congressional investigations are not new in America. During the time
of Watergate, some people said, "Well here it is. A Democratic Senate is
exploiting political power to embarrass a Republican president," as though
congressional investigations were invented by the Watergate hearings. Some
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complained that it was an exploitation of power-raw partisan politics rather
than the proper utilization of a constitutional prerogative.
Even though the power of Congress to investigate, to call witnesses,
and to hold hearings is not explicit in the Constitution, the Supreme Court
has held, over and over again, that the investigative power of Congress is
an inherent part of both its legislative function and its public-informing
function. Watkins v. United States' is one of the leading cases which
established this concept. That case came up during the House Un-American
Activities Committee hearings and shortly before the McCarthy hearings.
Those hearings represent the great potential for abuse of the congressional
power to investigate. Under the pretext of Executive branch oversight, the
committees tried to impose a philosophy of life on all Americans. They
wanted to find out who the communists were in Hollywood, in government,
in newspapers, and in business. It was a terrible exploitation of congressio-
nal power and a tragic misuse of the constitutional powers of Congress.
In Watkins, the Supreme Court found the purpose of that congressional
investigation was exposure for exposure's sake. The Court said that,
although the power of Congress to investigate is broad, it does not include
the power to call citizens before its committees simply to expose them.
Congress has to base whatever it does in the legislative power or the public-
informing function.2
The Court's opinion quoted Woodrow Wilson when he was an
academic at the turn of the century. This quotation is constantly invoked
to identify the powers of Congress in holding such investigations:
It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into
every affair of government and to talk much about what it sees. It is
meant to be the eyes and the voice, and to embody the wisdom and will
of its constituents. Unless Congress have and use every means of
acquainting itself with the acts and the disposition of the administrative
agents of the government, the country must be helpless to learn how it
is being served; and unless Congress both scrutinize these things and sift
them by every form of discussion, the country must remain in embar-
rassing, crippling ignorance of the very affairs which it is most
important that it should understand and direct. The informing function
of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function. The
argument is not only that discussed and interrogated administration is
the only pure and efficient administration, but, more than that, that the
1. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
2. See id. at 199-201.
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only really self governing people is that people which discusses and
interrogates its administration?
That was a foundation which the Court has restated many times. The
Congress has the important responsibility to inquire into how the govern-
ment works and to talk about it to the people.
Wilson's essay was written before radio and before television. The
kinds of hearings that Wilson was discussing were hearings that only a few
people could attend and maybe the newspapers would report. We've gone
much further than that. Picking up on what Wilson wrote and what the
Court said in Watkins, with television today we can become once again a
town meeting. During the Watergate hearings, millions and millions of
people all over this land, and in every town and city, were glued to the
screen as though they were sitting in the Senate Caucus room watching the
hearing. They actually had a better seat because there were close-ups, and
we were so crowded in the Caucus room that the people in the rear couldn't
necessarily see the witnesses.
Through television, we have enabled the philosophy Wilson set forth
to work on a grand scale. We should take full advantage of this tool so that
the people can be instructed. It will only work, though, if the committee
that is conducting the investigation knows what its function is, knows how
to accomplish that function, and knows how to communicate to the public.
Congress has been investigating the Executive ever since George
Washington was President of the United States. In 1792, Major General St.
Clair, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Army, was sent by Washington to
quiet the Indians in the Ohio area. Five tribes out-maneuvered the U.S.
Army and decimated the troops. St. Clair came back in tatters to Washing-
ton. A House Select Committee wanted to find out how the Indians could
so destroy the American Army (this was the Army that beat the British in
the Revolution). How could the Indians do this to our army?
General St. Clair claimed that he had been given wet powder, leaky
tents, and-believe it or not-no bells for his horses. In one of the more
interesting notes about this episode, it seems that the army needed bells on
its horses at night because they would stray, and the soldiers couldn't find
them quickly without following the sound of the bells. So the army was in
a vulnerable position when the horses could not be corralled.
The House in 1792 subpoenaed the War Department, the first subpoena
of the Executive by the Congress. The War Department secretary ran to
3. JAMES HA MILTON, THE POWER TO PROBE 127-28 (1938) (quoting WOODROW
WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 303 (Houghton, Mifflin & Co. (1900)).
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President Washington and said, "Do we have to honor a subpoena of the
Congress?" Washington called in Jefferson and Hamilton, and they said
there surely must be occasions when they don't have to reveal executive
information to the Congress. But they said something then that presidents
have said over and over again, up until this time: "We don't want to look
like we're holding things back from the public [a cover-up], so this time let
us give it to them."
They didn't have duplicating machines at that time, and the House
clerk had to come up with quill pen and ink to copy the records of the War
Department. Unfortunately, the inquest was not very successful. There was
an investigation, witnesses were called, and the newspapers played up the
controversy. But St. Clair never was vindicated because politics entered in
and the Executive branch didn't want to have the War Department
embarrassed too much. So, even though the evidence was pretty clear that
they had been very negligent in equipping the troops, the investigation
concluded without much result.
In 1808, General Wilkenson, another Commander in Chief of the
Army, entered into a treasonous pact with the King of Spain. The general
and the king planned to organize a separate army, cut off the western lands
of the United States, and claim the Louisiana Territory for Spain. Aaron
Burr was somewhere involved in this conspiracy. The House began an
investigation, but General Wilkenson burned all the evidence. So, well
before Watergate, there was destruction of evidence to block a congres-
sional investigation. The House couldn't prove anything, and Wilkenson
died a very rich man in Mexico, still wearing his uniform to impress the
Mexicans.
In 1818, Old Hickory, Andrew Jackson, invaded Spanish Florida. The
issue then was-to borrow a question made famous during Watergate-what
did the President (Monroe) know and when did he know it? The congres-
sional committee sought to learn whether President Monroe had authorized
Jackson's invasion. They weren't able to prove it; they weren't able to
show anything.
Of more recent fame, there was the Teapot Dome scandal in 1924, and,
at the close of World War II, Congress conducted an investigation to
determine how the Japanese were able to surprise us at Pearl Harbor. In the
1950s, as noted earlier, there was the shameful spectacle of the McCarthy
hearings and the House Un-American Activities investigations. As this list
demonstrates, there has been a long, colorful history of congressional
investigations prior to Watergate.
The Senate Watergate Committee hearings were not the first to target
a president. The first time a president was targeted was in 1814, and the
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target was James Madison. The British had burned Washington, D.C.
during the War of 1812, and Congress wanted President Madison to be held
to account for his negligence in failing to provide an effective military
defense of the city.
In 1860, President Buchanan was exposed for corrupt activities.
Although Congress was considering impeachment, most congressmen did
not think they could get the necessary votes. This was one case, however,
in which a congressional investigation had the same effect as Watergate.
Buchanan was defeated by Honest Abe Lincoln, who rode the wave of
public sentiment against Buchanan generated by the congressional investiga-
tion. One can see again the separation of powers working.
In 1910, there was an investigation of President Taft, again for
corruption. In 1912, Theodore Roosevelt was attacked and defeated for a
third term partly on the ground of illegal campaign financing from
corporations. Time and time again, presidential conduct was the subject of
congressional investigations.
Finally, in this brief historical review, the Senate Watergate Committee
was not the first to investigate criminal charges. Throughout Watergate
there was a complaint: If Congress investigates, Congress should investigate
broad areas for legislative remedial purposes. These critics said Congress
did not have the right to sit in judgment as if it were a criminal case. They
protested that Congress could not bring before it a person already charged
by a grand jury and waiting for trial, and require that person to give
testimony, or others to give testimony, on those same charges. Obviously,
this would embarrass and prejudice criminal trials.
But, in 1962, the Supreme Court decided Hutcheson v. United States,4
and held that Congress had the power to do exactly that. A labor union
president had been indicted and was then called before the McClellan
Committee in Congress, which was looking into labor racketeering activities.
This man was asked the same questions he was going to have to respond to
(or take the 5th Amendment) at his trial. 5 He said, "You can't do this to
me.
'6
His contempt citation was upheld by the Supreme Court on the ground
that Congress has a separate public-informing function and legislative
function, and Congress can look into the same activity which was the basis
for the criminal prosecution.7  Obviously, Congress cannot prosecute,
4. 369 U.S. 599 (1962).
5. Id. at 602.
6. He refused to answer the questions on due process grounds. Id. at 611.
7. Id. at 622.
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Congress cannot convict, and Congress cannot punish. It can, however,
conduct an inquiry into matters within its legislative jurisdiction.
The Senate Watergate Committee was really, in 1973, the culmination
of this history. In a sense, it was not extraordinary. It was not extraordi-
nary for the Senate to appoint the Senate Select Committee for Presidential
Campaign Activities.!
Although in light of history, it was not unusual to appoint such a
committee, what was unusual was that the vote of the Senate was unani-
mous. The Republicans in the Senate were worried that it was a Republican
Administration being investigated by a Democratic majority of the Senate.
Therefore, the Administration ought to have had at least somebody
overlooking what the Committee was doing to insure that it was fair and to
protect the Administration as best as possible. The Republicans wanted to
designate a minority counsel, and named Fred Thompson to the position.
Senator Ervin, who was the Chairman of the Senate Watergate
Committee, and I readily agreed to this proposal. We certainly welcomed
the particular person involved, Fred Thompson, who was a remarkable
lawyer (although he is better recognized today for his talent as an actor in
a number of major Hollywood films). Fred is a man of integrity, and I
enjoyed working with him, although, as he said, we kept things from each
other when we knew he was following a different agenda than mine.
In light of this long history of congressional investigations involving
presidents, I wondered why none of them had the impact of Watergate. The
Watergate hearings captured the people's attention and brought them back
into the role that the people are supposed to play in a democracy: The
people are the sovereign, calling on their Executive to be accountable to
them.
None of those other investigations had that impact. Why? Why
Watergate? Not Watergate itself, but the Watergate Committee. I give
primary credit to the chairman of that Committee. You can look at
chairmen of investigating committees all through our history and not one of
them was anything like Senator Sam Ervin.
By the time he was appointed, Sam Ervin was an elder statesman. He
had been a Justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina. He was a
devoted constitutional scholar. He kept a little copy of the Constitution in
his back pocket, and he could quote it word for word just as he could quote
poetry and the King James Version of the Bible word for word. Many
8. That name was too long for the newspaper reporters, and so they referred to it as the
Senate Watergate Committee. That's what it is called all the time now.
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people saw him do this at the hearings and thought that this was a kind of
contrived display or political show on his part. But this was no affectation.
It was authentic Sam Ervin in his office or on the telephone. He was a
person who just was able to punctuate everything he said with quotations
from the Bible, quotations from the Constitution, or various little poems that
were dear to him. He was a man of great integrity who believed in the
fundamental, sacred purpose of our Constitution. I think Sam Ervin would
have been at home with the Founders. To him, this investigation was a
mission. He strongly believed in our separation of powers and the role of
the Congress in checking and balancing the Executive.
Of course, he once said, "President Nixon, I believe, also believes in
the separation of powers. From what I see, he wants to separate the
Congress from all its powers." Those were some of the little things that
Ervin would say from time to time.
I don't want to put halos over every member of the Committee. The
only halo I want to hand out is to Ervin. There were three other Democrats
on the Committee and three Republicans. The three other Democrats were
so-so, and they were not as committed to the exposure of the facts and the
separation of powers as Sam Ervin. If it weren't for the strength of Sam
Ervin as a leader and a towering figure in the Senate, we wouldn't have
been able to accomplish what we did. The other senators were constantly
trying to pull the rug a little; constantly saying, "Haven't we stuck our neck
out too far?"
One thing you learn about senators and congressmen when you are
working on the Hill: they're all cowards, with some exceptions to that rule.
They're scared, and they run scared. One has to only read a ripple of a
rumor, and they're all running around to find a shadow to hide in. They
were so afraid of projecting themselves out too far and getting a backlash.
They were continually saying, almost after the first day or two, "Haven't we
done well enough? Can't we cool it off? Let's close it down."
When Fred Thompson and I first met in March of 1973, we went to
lunch together at the Monocle Restaurant on Capitol Hill. I asked, "Is your
family coming up? Where are you living?"
Fred said, "I'm staying at a hotel."
I said, "All the time we're going to be working?"
He said, "What do you mean all the time? Senator Baker told me I'm
going home in June."
I said, "Going home in June?"
"Well," he said, "We're gonna have a couple of weeks of investigation
and hearings and close it down."
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I said, "You must be wrong. We're going to be here maybe a year or
two." And Fred was shocked.
The original plan of the minority was to go through the motions and
do nothing. That, perhaps, was also the thought of some in the majority.
But Sam Ervin stood straight. Instead of doing what was usual in picking
a Chief Counsel, Sam Ervin went outside the Congress to look for
somebody he could trust, who would be able to do this investigation on the
merits. He told me that he turned down anybody who applied for it. He
said he had hundreds of people, judges and lawyers, some wanting to do it
for nothing. He said, "You know what you get for nothing. Nothing. I
don't know what their motives are, I need a lawyer who will know what the
job is all about and have the courage to go forward in it and the ability to
do it."
After using me for a while as a consultant, Senator Ervin telephoned
me out of the blue. He said that he had checked me out, I had the
qualifications, and he'd had the committee approve it, and then asked if I
would be willing to serve as Chief Counsel.
At that time, I was beginning my spring semester at Georgetown. I
had to tell him I could not do it, I had my classes. He got very upset and
said, "I'll talk to the president of the university." I said, "No, I'll talk to the
dean."
When I talked with the dean, he asked me, "You said yes of course?"
I said, "How could I do it? I have to teach my classes."
He said, "Hell, we can get any professor to teach your classes! Call
him back before he changes his mind."
I had been district attorney, and I had been involved in controversial
investigations. I knew that this was a major challenge I would be undertak-
ing. And I had conditions. First condition: I hire my own staff. No one
on the Committee should dictate who would work for me, and my staff
should not be people out of the Senate staff. Not that they weren't capable
people, but I didn't want anyone loyal to any of the political people on the
Hill. The second condition: I had to have sufficient resources, budget.
And the third condition: I had to be permitted to take the investigation as
far as it would lead me, without any restriction or limitation by the
Committee.
Ervin said to me, "If you hadn't asked for those conditions, you
wouldn't be good for me. Do you want it in writing?" I was embarrassed,
but I said, "Well, yes." He gave me a letter with all of those conditions and
said, "If I ever go back on any of them, come to my office and throw it in
my face."
1730 Vol. 18
30
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss3/1
Dash
That never happened. I was able to pick some of the finest young
lawyers (mostly former prosecutors) and investigators. I had a staff of one
hundred. These were people who had come from some of the best
prosecutors' offices in the nation, such as Robert Morganthau's in the
Southern District of New York. He was one of the great United States
Attorneys. They had worked on white collar crime and complex organized
crime cases. They were used to dealing with complicated legal issues which
involved hundreds or thousands of documents. Because so many of them
wanted to work on this investigation, I was able to get the best.
There were no restrictions from Senator Ervin or the committee. Our
charter was simple and direct: we had to make a thorough and complete
investigation.
Congress has many powers to conduct an investigation. Don't ever
believe a congressional committee that tells you that it's too difficult to
investigate something or find out what happened-don't believe it. A
congressional investigating committee has as much power as a prosecutor.
The committee has subpoena power and the power to hold people in
contempt, which the Justice Department enforces in a criminal prosecution.
If it decides not to refer a case to the Justice Department, a congress-
ional committee even has the power to call uncooperative witnesses (who
refuse to respond to a subpoena or answer a question) before the Senate,
hold them in contempt, and imprison them in a dungeon in the basement of
the Senate. That is the separation of powers. That jail is still there, but I
don't remember when it was last used. Congress today prefers to send the
matter over to the Justice Department to prosecute under an indictment for
contempt. But the congressional committees still have that power. They
have the power to grant immunity as well. These committees exercise
awesome powers of Congress when they subpoena and bring before them
witnesses and demand an explanation for various actions.
You have to be in the position of a witness called before the Congress
to know the awe and (sometimes) solemnity of that process. It usually will
produce infornation. Good investigators, utilizing all of the strategies,
techniques, and tools of investigation will be able to ascertain the facts. It
is a cop-out when a congressional committee says it can't get the facts.
Before we could begin to make a thorough and complete investigation,
we first had to define our role and function. Many of us had not worked
on the Hill or in congressional investigations. It was a different role, a
different function, and a different style than a trial lawyer has in a
courtroom. You do not collect and present your evidence in the traditional
way an attorney would prosecute a case.
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I realized uppermost, that if we were going to serve the public-
informing function Wilson had praised, we had to be able to reach the
minds of the American people in such a way as to win their confidence.
Therefore, underlying everything we did, there had to be fairness and
objectivity. If we were seen as persecutors, if we were seen as unfair, no
matter the facts that we presented, the reaction of the American people
would be to reject us. The only way I knew to get the support of the
American people was to convince them that we were doing an honest job
and that we did not have an agenda to "get Richard Nixon."
There was a hope on my part and on Senator Ervin's part that the
President of the United States was not involved. Whether you approved or
disapproved of Richard Nixon, he was still our President. Nobody really
wanted the President of the United States to be involved in crime, and we
were hoping the evidence wouldn't go that far. He was not our target.
We began with a very systematic method I called the "vacuum cleaner
approach." We swept up everything, every piece of information related to
Watergate. Then we began to sift and analyze them.
We were the first Senate Investigating Committee to utilize the
technology of computers. Committees before us were frightened of
computer technology, even in 1973. The staff at the Library of Congress,
which worked with computers to sort all of their documents and books,
offered us their services. I readily accepted the offer. We developed a
computer system so that every piece of information that came into our
investigation-whether it was a newspaper clipping, a summary of an
interview, or other investigative material-first had to be entered into a
computer databank. The system was of remarkable value. When we began
to put things together to prepare for hearings or prepare for a witness
interview, we could request a chronological printout on John Mitchell, for
example. The computer would then produce everything our files contained:
every significant date, event, and witness associated with Mitchell. Imagine
the great difficulty we would have encountered if we had to search the files
by hand for this information. We were dealing with thousands and
thousands of documents. There was some comfort in knowing that you
could pull all this research back-and actually be surprised, because
sometimes I reviewed important information that I had forgotten. I would
say, "Do we know this? The computer must be wrong."
We also copied every one of our documents and newspaper clippings
onto microfilm. So, if the abstract from the computer printout told us that
there was a news story on that matter, there was a corresponding document
on microfilm. We went to the microfilm machine, punched in the number,
and printed the document or newspaper article. We could get it in minutes.
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I remember one instance when Attorney General Mitchell was before
the Committee, and he was being asked about a very important event.
Mitchell was the original stonewaller, who would smoke his pipe and say,
"I just can't recall, I don't remember."
I asked him, "Wasn't that clearly on the front page., that event in which
you participated, of the Washington Post?"
"Well," he said, "I don't remember."
A phone call was made to our computer staff and within minutes a
clerk came up with a printout of the clipping. Just imagine trying to find
by hand that one item in hundreds of files in time to cross-examine the
witness. The clipping was handed to me, and I handed it to another staff
member who showed it to Mitchell. He then conceded, "Oh yes, I
remember that." We looked great, we were so prepared. It was the
computer and the retrieval system that allowed us to do such remarkable
things with the Watergate investigation. In addition, after the appointment
of the special prosecutor, we gave his office all of the evidence we had
assembled on our computer databank. We also presented the House
Judiciary Impeachment Committee with all these thousands of documents on
computer tapes.
The challenge to the Senate Watergate Committee was not the
investigation because, as noted earlier, with all the powers that a congres-
sional committee has, it can make a good investigation. The challenge was
the hearings. How do you present all the facts that you collect in a way that
you can communicate it to the viewing public so that they understand in the
same way you understand it?
We all know the problems of communication. You can know things
and try to communicate them to another, but what the other person hears
and receives may not be the message you intended to convey. As there is
an art form in telling a story, there is a special art form in telling a story on
television. They do it all the time in the detective stories and entertaining
shows that we watch everyday. It was important for us to be able to
produce that kind of a "show"-but for educational purposes rather than
entertainment.
I was immediately challenged by the networks who were going to cover
the Watergate hearings on television. It was going to be very expensive for
them, and they wanted to make sure they had an audience. In the beginning
they didn't think we'd have an audience because congressional hearings
were considered boring, even though the facts of the Watergate investigation
were far more compelling than the routine congressional hearing. Some of
their top executives met with me, and they said, "Of course we gotta talk
about who your first witnesses are. You're gonna put on Haldeman and
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Ehrlichman, the principal conspirators." They said, "You gotta put on a
sexy witness so the public will watch."
"Well," I said, "I wasn't planning to do that. They're the accused, and
I don't plan to put the accused on before I put on the accusers. First, it is
usually done that way. Second, I want to teach the American people a
civics lesson on how this all started."
I wanted to begin with the re-election campaign. It all started from
what was called CREEP, the Committee to Re-elect the President. Many of
the campaign staff that were involved, like Liddy and Hunt, had been in the
White House. Magruder, who directed the re-election committee, had been
a White House aide working for Haldeman. I wanted to show how they had
been shifted out of the White House and how they developed this Commit-
tee to Re-elect the President. This cast of characters was going to reappear
as burglars and conspirators. That's the only way I had to show it.
They said, "What does this mean?"
I said, "My first witness is going to be a man named Odle?"
"Who is Odle?"
I said, "He's a little staff guy at the Committee to Re-elect the
President, and he's going to have an easel. On television, he's going to
show the chart of the White House staff and show how these people ended
up on the Committee to Re-elect. He will explain what their roles were."
"Ugh-gh-gh, boring!! We're gonna lose the public," the television
executives began to complain to Ervin. "This is going to cost us, and this
guy Dash is going to put on a boring set of hearings!"
Through a good part of the hearings we presented, the media in the
well of the Caucus room would yawn in an exaggerated gesture to express
that they were bored. The American people, however, were riveted to their
television sets, listening to the story evolve as each witness testified. That's
what I wanted to achieve. I wanted to begin by educating the American
people as to the political process: examining the re-election committee,
demonstrating the movement of the staff from the White House to this
committee, then showing the burglary plan.
Figuratively speaking, we had to bring the public into Mitchell's office
to hear the illegal plans Liddy briefed to the then Attorney General. So we
had McCord, who had worked closely with Liddy, testify to all those
activities. In front of the cameras, he explained how to tap a phone and
how to place a bug. Then we focused on the burglary and the arrest at the
Watergate DNC office. We brought the cops in to reconstruct how they
caught the burglars. Then we moved on to the cover-up.
John Dean was our principal witness. But he was only one little
person-although a very ambitious little person-who had accused the
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President of the United States. If it were his word against Nixon's, I don't
think the American people would have come down against the President on
the basis of that testimony alone. Therefore, our concern all along was to
find corroborating evidence to support what John Dean said.9
How could you corroborate such a secret set of meetings in the Oval
Office? Who else was there but the President and his top aides? The
President wasn't going to tell us what happened. Haldeman wouldn't tell
us what happened. Ehrlichman wouldn't tell us what happened. Fortunate-
ly, during a private session in his home, Dean recalled that in a meeting in
the Oval Office, as he was talking to the President about "hush money" for
the burglars, Nixon suddenly stood up and went over to a bookcase and
whispered in the bookcase, "I guess I was wrong in telling Colson that he
could go ahead and pay Hunt."
Dean said to me, "I wondered why he [Nixon] whispered into the
bookcase." Could he have been recording this meeting and not wanting to
get that part onto the tape?
I said, "Oh my god, if he was, we would have corroboration. You
would have an ear witness at least, the tape."
Dean wasn't sure. He said "I don't know, I don't. It's just a guess on
my part. But, I don't know."
Without telling Dean, we then developed a strategy for my staff to find
out if there could be any kind of recording in the Oval Office. We used a
very interesting system we called "satellite charts." We knew that, when
people worked among others in the White House, there were always eyes
and ears watching. Especially if you are the President, or even if you're
Haldeman or Ehrlichman, there are a lot of little eyes and ears watching
you, they are so delighted to be in your presence. You don't notice them
if you're the President, but they notice everything because it is something
they want to remember for the rest of their lives-and they keep records.
So, we took each of the targets (Nixon, Haldeman, Ehrlichman) in the
White House, and then we charted who were the people around them
everyday: who transcribed and typed interviews, who purchased equipment
for the Executive Office, who made the coffee, or anything. We actually
developed over a hundred satellites. We called them all in and had a team
of lawyers ask general questions not obviously aimed at the taping. But
embedded into the questions were points concerning purchase of tapes,
transcription of tapes, and maintenance of recording machines.
9. After weeks of cross-examining him, and preparing him for his testimony, I believed
that John Dean was credible.
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Only three people in the White House knew about the taping system:
Haldeman; his staff assistant, Higby; and Butterfield, who was in charge of
the Secret Service detail in the White House and had his office and desk just
outside of Haldeman's office. Dean didn't know about it. Rose Mary
Woods, Nixon's secretary, didn't know about it. Ehrlichman didn't know
about it-and he got angry as hell when he found out that he had been
bugged. Mitchell didn't know about it. Kleindienst didn't know about it.
This was a tightly held secret. We didn't think Butterfield knew anything,
but the dragnet approach we designed proved invaluable.
With a congressional investigation, there is no threshold standard of
probable cause or reasonable suspicion to bring in anybody. It's called a
grand inquest. It is like the grand jury in a sense. You can call anybody
and ask any question if it is relevant to the inquiry delineated in the resolu-
tion. Butterfield was just one of a number of witnesses we had called in.
Fred Thompson's staff gets the credit for this revelation because it was one
of his young investigators who actually put the question to the White House
aide. Butterfield already knew that Haldeman had been called before the
Committee, but he didn't know what Haldeman told us. He also knew that
Higby had been called; but again, he didn't know what had been disclosed.
Butterfield was under oath, and he wasn't going to take a chance of
committing perjury. So when the question was asked about a particular
recording (we knew nothing about a system), he said, "Well, you probably
already know this, but it's not one recording. I put in a system that has
been recording every conversation in the Oval Office for the last two years."
It was a very sophisticated, automatic system. Wherever the President
was, the Secret Service always followed him through a lighting system on
a chart. The light would go on when he entered the Oval Office, the
Cabinet Room, etc. In each one of these rooms, particularly the Oval
Office, they put in a recording system. It was triggered by the lighting
system when the President walked into the room. It only started to record
when somebody spoke, because it was voice activated. That explained why
the President incriminated himself-when you have an automatic taping
system, you forget. In the Cabinet Room, the President had to move the
switch himself, so he knew when he was recording. But in the Oval Office,
it was automatic, and he frequently forgot about it. He said things I don't
think he would have wanted to go on tape. There are other times, however,
that you know he's speaking for the record.
That was the strategy that got us the taping system. We got to
Butterfield. On that remarkable, historic Monday, July 16, 1973, we
replaced the witness who was originally scheduled to testify with Butterfield.
No one knew who Butterfield was. He was then Director of the Federal
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Aviation Administration. He had refused, by the way, to be a witness
because he said he was on his way to Russia to sign a treaty. Senator Ervin
said it was more important that he talk about the taping system than sign a
treaty in Russia. Ervin actually threatened that he would be jailed if he
didn't come. He came.
As a courtesy, I turned over the microphone to Fred Thompson. Since
his staff member had first asked the question which brought this stunning
information to light, Fred had the right to open the questioning of Butter-
field. He called on Butterfield to talk about the recording of conversations
in the White House. When Butterfield mentioned that there was an
automatic taping system in the Oval Office of the President of the United
States during all these events John Dean had recounted, the scene blew up!
Just like in the movies, reporters scrambled for their phones. Imagine the
heads of state all over the world who learned that their meetings with the
President were recorded. That's when everyone said he should have burned
the tapes. I will leave that issue for another time.
My objective has been to highlight the strategy and techniques of an
independent staff backed completely by a strong chairman. When I was
investigating John Dean, his counsel told me that Dean could not come to
the Senate Office Building because he suspected Senator Baker, who had
been having private meetings with Nixon at the time he served on our
Committee, was taking instructions from Nixon on how to destroy our
investigation. If he came to the Senate Office Building to talk to me, Dean
feared it would be leaked to Baker. Baker would then report it to the
President, and he would be murdered. Dean was quite scared. So I agreed
that I would come to his home (usually around midnight or 2:00 a.m.), and
we would talk. The only person I would report these meetings to was
Senator Ervin. The Senator agreed not to tell the other members of the
Committee.
The purpose of those meetings on my part was to know whether Dean
had enough information to justify granting immunity. After listening to him
and seeing the documents he had secretly removed from the White House,
I concluded that he did. I went back to Ervin and I said, "We have to grant
immunity." Such a grant required a two-thirds vote of the Committee. By
that time, Senator Weicker had joined us (the only Republican to do so),
and he was voting however the Chairman would vote. That gave us five
members voting with the Chairman, and that was the necessary two-thirds.
I said, "You've got to present Dean for immunity, but you cannot tell
them what Dean is saying."
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Imagine-those of you who know the word "chutzpah"-telling a
United States Senator that he has to vote for immunity, but the Chairman
and Chief Counsel won't tell him what the witness is going to say.
Of course, Senator Baker and Senator Gurney blew up and said,
"We're the elected Senators. Who the hell is telling us that we've got to
rubber stamp an immunity vote?"
Ervin said, "I've listened, I know what it is, I can't tell you." Then
Ervin, who always had a humorous and pithy remark, said, "My daddy used
to say that when you hire a lawyer, you ought to listen to him or fire him.
Since we're not about to fire Sam Dash, let's listen to him."
Everybody laughed out loud, and it sort of broke the ice. We got the
two-thirds vote without the Committee knowing what Dean would say.
Since there was no executive session for all the Senators and their staffs to
hear Dean's statements, we did not have to confront the serious risk of a
calculated leak by the Republicans. We did not have to face the possible
consequences of the White House attempting to undercut Dean and destroy
him before his testimony was presented in open hearings.
With the backing of Senator Ervin, my staff had complete indepen-
dence and virtually unlimited investigative authority. We were able to get
to the truth and conduct the hearings in a way that we could tell the public
the truth. By the end of the summer of 1973, the break in and cover-up had
been exposed. We presented those hearings and dramatized them in a way
that the public understood what we were saying. And they were outraged.
That's what brought the unprecedented response of the American people to
Washington. Letters-millions and millions of letters-were written from
every little town and city in the country. Families signed off: the mother,
the father, the kids. Their messages were filled with blessings, support,
outrage. These were genuine and spontaneous, not the result of orchestrated
lobbying. Never before in the history of America did the American people
talk back to its government the way they did after the Watergate hearings.
Nixon had called the American people "the Silent Majority." He
thought they didn't care; he thought they were apathetic. Well, he was
wrong. If you inform the American people, and they understand what's
going on, and you can reach their sense of outrage, they talk back. And I
think that spirit has endured. I think Watergate had a tremendous impact on
the American people. They found their voice again, and they demanded
accountable government.
The Chief Counsel of the House Judiciary Committee came to see me
and said that the Committee was getting a flood of letters from constituents.
Nixon had said, "I don't worry about impeachment. The House doesn't
have the guts to impeach me." That's true, they didn't. They were
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frightened. Yet, when their constituents wrote and when the hearings took
place, they suddenly realized they had to hold impeachment hearings. They
couldn't avoid it.
But for the Watergate hearings in the summer of 1973, there would
have been no impeachment. But for the Watergate hearings, there would
have been no aroused public sounding off. But for the hearings, there
would not have been such an overwhelming response to the "Saturday night
massacre," Nixon's firing of special prosecutor Cox. That, ordinarily, would
have just been the President firing a prosecutor. What was the big deal?
Having watched the Senate hearings, the people understood in October 1973
what was going on. They realized the meaning of it, and they hit back so
strong that the White House had to change its position and bring in Leon
Jowarski as special prosecutor.
Watergate was a unique event. It doesn't always work that way. After
Watergate, we had Iran-Contra. People sometimes ask, "If you did the job
so well, why Iran-Contra?"
As any student of history knows, you never win the fight for liberty
through one battle. It is a constant war. The lesson of history is eternal
vigilance. You must continue to watch.
I've always used this analogy because I think it's apt. If you have
roaches in the kitchen, you don't spray once and get rid of them forever.
One extermination doesn't mean they won't come back. You've got to keep
spraying. The goddamn crooked politicians are roaches in the kitchen;
they'll always come back. Corruption always comes back. Unfortunately,
many good people don't have the stamina to continue the fight.
When the Iran-Contra scandal emerged, Congress didn't have the will
or the stamina to fight. Congress also didn't have Sam Ervin. Many of the
committee members were worried and scared about Reagan's standing with
the public, so they limited their investigation. They limited their witness
list. They limited what they wanted to find out. They didn't enforce their
investigative powers, like the use of their executive sessions against North.
They exposed themselves to a terribly messy situation, in which, far from
informing the public about the scandal so that the American people
understood what happened, the message they conveyed was a very
ambiguous one. The public couldn't tell who wore the White Hats and who
wore the Black Hats. As a matter of fact, many came to view the
congressmen themselves as the Black Hats. The Hill took a lot of heat on
that one. Consequently, there was no follow-through, no culminating action,
no real impact. In the eyes of most observers, it was a disaster.
This led, of course, to the investigative activity of the Independent
Counsel. The Independent Counsel is a product of Watergate, part of the
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Ethics in Government Act of 1978,0 which was one of our first recom-
mendations for reform. Madison said, if men were angels, we wouldn't
need government. But men are not angels. We need this check and balance
for protection. This was an additional safeguard Congress created to take
care of those rare situations-and they are rare-when criminal charges are
brought against the President of the United States, the Vice-President, or
cabinet officers.
The Justice Department, under the Attorney General, should not
prosecute because there is a potential conflict of interest. There is the
perception that the White House may be able to exercise undue influence
over the investigation. Not that the men and women who serve as Attorney
General will be thieves or crooks. They usually are very honest people.
But they shouldn't be put in that awkward position because there is
obviously a conflict of interest. Some Justice Department prosecutors, who
would want to ensure that there was no possible charge of a cover-up, might
bend over backwards to take measures that would leave no doubt as to their
independence. This could have unfair consequences for the subject of the
investigation where an Attorney General went forward with a weak
prosecution just to demonstrate his or her integrity. The history of the
Independent Counsel Act has shown that most of the independent counsel
investigations (there have been about 12) have not found sufficient evidence
to prosecute.
If the Department of Justice had made that finding in Meese's case,
there would have been a cry of whitewash and coverup. Yet, when Jacob
Stein, who was the first of two independent counsel to examine Meese's
conduct, found no basis to prosecute Meese, there was no adverse reaction.
There wasn't a column in the newspapers, there wasn't a letter to the editor;
nobody complained, everybody accepted it. Why? Because the American
public had confidence in that decision. It was an objective decision by an
independent lawyer. No critic suggested that the Attorney General or the
Justice Department was paying off favors to the President.
It was an act of cowardice on the part of Congress to let that legislation
die on December 15. My guess, however, is that the Independent Counsel
statute will be re-enacted. Unfortunately, the new legislation will probably
have some restrictions because there has been criticism that Lawrence Walsh
abused his powers. In an ironic sense, Walsh has been the victim of the
targets of his investigation. He has been maligned by Executive branch
10. Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 601(a), 92 Stat., 1824, 1867-73 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 591-598).
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officials and by President Bush, who didn't like him. They've smeared him.
He had an absolutely impossible task when Congress granted immunity to
North and Poindexter, an action that tainted the whole prosecution effort.
The executive branch pulled the rug from under him every time they could.
Walsh has been condemned for the great expense and time his
investigation cost. These critics compare the Walsh prosecutions with what
the Justice Department does, pointing out that United States Attorneys don't
spend that kind of money or take that time. You cannot compare an
ordinary criminal case the United States Attorney prosecutes with the
investigation of the Iran-Contra scandal that the Independent Counsel had
to undertake. You can more accurately compare it, for instance, to
something like the Noriega prosecution. I assure you that the Justice
Department spent more time and money investigating Noriega than the
Independent Counsel did investigating Iran-Contra.
I think that at the end Walsh lost his temper and lost his judgment. I
think there are some things he said towards the end that no prosecutor ought
to say publicly with regards to the pardon and other related subjects. It was
understandable but not acceptable for a professional prosecutor.
I believe that it is absolutely essential that we have the Independent
Counsel. It is one of the achievements that we were most proud of
recommending in Watergate.
There is good reason to remember the exposure of Watergate and to
remember the Senate Watergate hearings. There is good reason to
remember a public servant like Sam Ervin, who played the role that a
Senator was expected to play by the Framers of our Constitution. Watergate
was a classic. It had impact. It rearranged government power and brought
Congress back into power. We redefined for ourselves, who we are as the
American people, and what we expect from our government. And I don't
think we're going to forget it for a long time-regardless of the scandals
that we will continue to have and regardless of wishy-washy congressional
committees in the future.
The example of Watergate and the Watergate Committee has to remain
a model for future committees. I believe that there will be future scandals.
There will be abuses of power by high officials, including the President.
The American people must ensure that Congress has its feet held to the fire
to do its job when that happens.
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In The Shadow of Watergate: Legal, Political,
and Cultural Implications
Stanley I. Kutler
Sometimes Watergate seems doomed to be trivialized or, at best, only
memorialized on "significant" anniversaries. Richard Nixon has sought
desperately to induce national amnesia, but being Richard Nixon he can
succeed only in part. Indeed, his very presence has the perverse effect of
eventually reminding us of what he did.
Richard Nixon eventually will leave us, and then what do we do to
commemorate and learn from Watergate? For nearly two decades, the
record has been dismal. In 1992, the media was awash in an orgy of
recapitulation, speculation, and inevitable inaccuracy, as it marked the
twentieth anniversary of the burglary. Convicted felon G. Gordon Liddy,
who has made a career implicating the criminality and involvement of
others, seems to be a required presence in any of these memorializations-
illustrating once again that the media does not recognize what is anything
but a fine line between news and entertainment. The usual suspects ap-
pear-Colson, Ehrlichman, and Haldeman, for example-to put their special
twist on past events. Never mind that they use such occasions to backstab
one another (carrying on a fine old Nixon White House tradition), but they
also manage periodically to make new allegations, much of it grist for
publishing proposals. Did Nixon have advance knowledge of the break-in?
The writings and public comments of the late H. R. Haldeman will give you
a wide array of answers. Yes, Nixon knew; no, he did not-whatever it
takes to sell. After all, Haldeman made his fortune in advertising (while
being the heir to a plumbing fortune).
If the media is to be believed, Watergate's most enduring impact seems
to be the legacy of a suffix. References to Nixon's deeds and the Watergate
controversy soon became a shorthand for amorality, abuse of power, and
official criminality. "Watergate" provided a ready suffix for a range of
public scandals. And thus: Koreagate, Irangate, Iraqgate, Debategate, and
even more recently, Nannygate and Whitewatergate. The language became
global when the Japanese used "Recruitgate" to describe a government
scandal in the late 1980s. Watergate encouraged a routinized response to
official breaches of public law and confidence. I am disappointed, but not
* Stanley I. Kutler is the E. Gordon Fox Professor of American Institutions and Law
at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Part of this essay is adapted from his book, THE
WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRisis OF RICHARD NIXON (1992).
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surprised, by the media's incessant trivialization of an event of such
transcendent importance.
Watergate, in fact, served as a prescription to alter the political and
legal landscape (not always successfully, of course) in the United States, and
it became a standard for analyzing political behavior. It did not halt or
decisively reverse the long-term trend toward greater executive power and
responsibility. Eight years after Nixon's resignation, the Supreme Court
upheld presidential immunity in civil cases, and warned against the "dangers
of intrusion" on presidential authority and functions. But the perceived
abuses of power during the Nixon presidency led to various "reforms,"
ranging from attempts to institutionalize the special prosecutor, to curbs on
presidential manipulation of executive agencies for personal political gain,
to new campaign-financing laws. Watergate had a substantial influence on
the political parties and political ideology. It also profoundly affected the
foreign policy of the Nixon Administration, with consequences for the future
as well.
As symbol and memory, Watergate shaped public discourse even when
distorted or exaggerated. In 1980, Ronald Reagan attacked a federal court
ruling against abortion restrictions as "an abuse of power" as bad as
Watergate. Senator Edward Kennedy criticized President Reagan in 1987
for reaching into the "muck of Watergate" to nominate Judge Robert H.
Bork to the Supreme Court. Bork was never able to shake his image as a
bloody accomplice, however innocent, to the events of October 1973; he
had, Kennedy charged, executed 'the unconscionable assignment" of firing
Archibald Cox, "one of the darkest chapters for the rule of law in American
history." In 1986, Richard Nixon, serenely confident that he had been
"rehabilitated," suddenly found Watergate alive and well, hauntingly
compared to the Iran-Contra affair that erupted that fall. Watergate proved
to be more than the "dim and distant curiosity" that one historian de-
scribed.'
We have an abiding interest in the "lessons" of history. In this case,
that would center on whether Watergate provided any enduring changes or
reforms. The verdict at best is mixed. Perhaps, then, it is best to focus on
how Watergate touched American society, and what it meant, in an
immediate sense.
Watergate's impact involved a sweeping range of so-called reform
legislation. But Watergate is, as I said, an event of transcendent importance;
1. Watergateis Alreadya Dim and Distant Curiosity, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug.
13, 1984, at 59; N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 22, 1980, at ]; see also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,
754 (1982); 133 CONG. REcs. 9188-89 (daily ed. Jul. 1, 1987) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
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it consumed the nation's attention for nearly two years. Inevitably, the
events of Watergate affected the nation's institutions, politics, and percep-
tions of itself in a variety of areas, foreign as well as domestic.
Watergate profoundly shaped struggles for leadership and ideological
control in the major political parties. Richard Nixon's fall from grace
strengthened the claims of Republican conservative ideologues, who had
captured the party in 1964 only to find their goals frustrated by the rise of
the "pragmatic" Nixon. At the same time, Watergate spurred the elections
of Democrats bent on a reform agenda for the political process, yet who had
virtually no cohesive program for national policies. Perceived at first as a
Democratic triumph and a Republican debacle, Watergate, in reality,
facilitated the conservative takeover that reinvigorated the Republican Party,
and although the Democrats temporarily profited, they left unattended the
fissures in their old coalition and ignored the need for fashioning programs
that would reverse the corrosion of that coalition.
Barry Goldwater's 1964 defeat left the Republican conservatives no
alternative but Nixon in 1968. Yet, when President Nixon reached out for
rapprochement with China and as his domestic programs mounted deficits
and produced inflation, conservatives found themselves politically estranged.
For conservatives, Watergate discredited Nixon personally; it also dealt a
blow to the "middle ground" in the Republican Party that Nixon had
preempted in the 1960s between the liberal Rockefeller forces and the
Goldwater Right. With Nixon's departure and Ford's defeat in 1976, the
conservative movement captured the field against the relatively feeble
challenges from its intra-party foes.
Except for the brief Ashbrook insurrection in the 1972 primaries, con-
servatives had muted their criticism of Nixon, confining it to occasional
attacks on isolated policies. But with Nixon's resignation, conservatives
launched an ideological assault on his overall policies, and excoriated Ford
for maintaining them. William Buckley assailed Nixon for the "humiliating
defeat" in Vietnam, for a budget deficit "larger than any Democrat ever
dared to endorse," and for the "baptism of d6tente" with its attendant talk
of the "peace-loving intentions of the Communist superpowers." Other
conservatives blamed Nixon for passing strategic superiority to the Soviets,
for sowing the seeds of economic destruction because of his inability to
make difficult choices, for dismantling the American Navy, and for
expanding the Great Society contrary to his campaign promises. Foolishly,
according to such sources, Nixon believed that if he appeased the Left on
policy matters, he would have a respite from his Watergate difficulties.
As President Ford continued the same policies, conservatives disdained
party loyalty and spurned an incumbent they had once admired. In May
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1975, Ronald Reagan condemned Ford for a projected fifty-one million
dollar budget deficit. Conservative Digest reported a poll in June of 1975
claiming that seventy-one percent of its readers thought Ford was doing a
"poor" job, and ninety-one percent opposed his nomination for the 1976
election.'
The conservative fury nearly resulted in denying the 1976 Republican
nomination to Ford, an event that would have been unprecedented in the
twentieth century. Senators James Buckley and Pat Buchanan called for an
"open convention." The conservatives massed behind a Reagan candidacy
and failed to carry it through only by a scant margin; many believed that a
second ballot would have given the nod to the former California Governor.
When Reagan spoke to the 1975 Conservative Political Action Conference,
he invoked the sacred appeal of the "Mandate of 1972," a mandate that
conservatives believed had been given to them to implement their political
and social agenda, and not to be used by Nixon personally. The election,
they claimed, had emphatically repudiated the ideology of "radicalism" and
"social permissiveness" that had captured the Democratic Party. "The
mandate of 1972 still exists," Reagan proclaimed. "The people of America
have been confused and disturbed by events since that election, but they
hold an unchanged philosophy." Reagan and his advisers held to that faith.
In the 1980 campaign, they used the conservative indictment against Nixon
and Ford to telling effect against a Democratic President. Ironically, as
President Reagan concluded his second term in 1988, conservative
spokesmen, such as Buchanan, once more assailed the nation's continued
"leftward drift."'3
Richard Nixon's Republican opponents finally enjoyed a measure of re-
venge. Periodically, he invoked conservative slogans and labels, but he
remained a distrusted and embarrassing figure, even to his own party. The
former President had the unique distinction of not being invited to the four
Republican presidential nominating conventions that followed his leaving the
White House. When President Clinton invited Nixon to the White House
in March 1993, the press was given no access.
Watergate swelled the ranks of congressional Democrats in the 1974
2. William F. Buckley, Jr.,ReaganforChallengerNAT'L REv., Sept. 12, 1975, at 1008;
HUMAN EVENTs, Dec. 7, 1974, at 14; CONSERVATIVE DIG., May 1975, at 3, June 1975, at
39; Interview with Howard Phillips (Aug. 23, 1985); Interview with Barber Conable (May
28, 1985).
3. Patrick Buchanan, A Long March Unfulfilled, WASH. TIMEs, Apr. 4, 1988, at 18;
HUMAN EVENTS, June 21, 1975, at4, July 19, 1975, at 7, Nov. 24, 1974, at 3, Mar. 1, 1975,
at 5; Interview with David Keene (Aug. 14, 1985).
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and 1976 elections. In 1974, at the height of interest in the scandal, the
Democrats added seventy-five new members to the House, most of whom
promised electoral reform. In the meantime, however, the attention given
to procedural reforms ignored the growing schisms in the Democratic Party,
schisms that reflected changing social and economic concerns among the
electorate. The 1972 election pointed to the growing strains within the
party; Watergate, however, obscured, then postponed, any real understanding
or reckoning of the party's dilemmas. "The Real Majority," political
analysts warned, no longer consisted of the "have-nots" who had formed the
basis for Democratic coalitions for more than forty years. The "haves" had
new concerns, which made the Democratic Party's "politics of inclusion"
paradoxical, even contradictory.'
Many of the new Democrats represented marginal districts, often subur-
ban, middle-class, and domesticated to the politics of affluence. The
programmatic concerns of the AFL-CIO, minority coalitions, and women's
groups had limited appeal in such districts. The reform-minded new repre-
sentatives struck a Faustian bargain: the Democratic leadership gave them
their "reform" proposals but demanded that they toe the line on policy
concerns originating in the party's traditional constituencies. The newcom-
ers' support for the leadership's desired social and economic policies only
aroused organized opposition in their local districts from pro-business or-
ganizations, as well as from ideological groups demanding a reduced welfare
state and support for anti-abortion measures.
Jimmy Carter rode to victory in 1976 on promises of greater morality
and efficiency in government. "We were responsible for Jimmy Carter,"
Richard Nixon admitted in 1977V The historical accident of Watergate
produced President Carter, but unlike the Great Depression, Watergate by
itself was not an issue that could sustain power. Carter seemed to offer little
in the way of a program that would broadly appeal to the nation; his
seeming aimlessness reflecting the Democrats' lack of cohesiveness and
purpose. Altogether, the situation was a prescription for disaster, particular-
ly as inflation corroded the earning power of the Democrats' electoral base.
Meanwhile, the Republicans united behind Ronald Reagan, a candidate who
attractively expressed the conservative ideology which had been dominant
4. RICHARD SCAMMON & BENJAMIN J. WATTENBERG, THE REAL MAJORITY (1970);
KEviN P. PHILLIPS, POST-CONSERVATIVE AMERICA (1982); JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS
OF TiE PARTY SYSTEM (1983), and especially, THOMAS B. EDSALL, THE NEW POLITICS OF
EQUALITY (1984), offer useful insights into the dilemmas of the Democrats.
5. DAVID FROST, "I GAVE THEM A SWORD": BEHIND THE SCENES OF THE NIXON
INrERVIEWS 62 (1978).
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in the party since 1964 but which had always lacked a charismatic leader.
Reagan led his party to two presidential triumphs and a six-year control of
the Senate, and he successfully transferred his aura and image to George
Bush in 1988. Three consecutive presidential defeats left the Democrats
floundering in search of their identity as a party. Watergate diverted the
party from that quest and left it in disarray for nearly two decades.
Watergate spurred demands for "reform" to prevent future abuses of
power, as scandals inevitably do; paradoxically, however, the affair also
produced assertions that 'The system worked." In the spring of 1974, a
distinguished academic panel headed by Yale Law School professors
Alexander Bickel and Ralph Winter warned that Watergate was a "poor
vehicle" for addressing major reforms. The panel's report contended that
both existing law and legal institutions had responded adequately to the
crisis. The Watergate scandal had been that of an individual and not of the
political-legal system itself. Yet the panelists warned that reducing
presidential power required Congress to reform itself and to accept its proper
responsibilities for shared governance, rather than damaging the institution
of the presidency. Watergate, they concluded, might result in "history less
in danger of being ignored than misunderstood."6
Still, the temptation to rectify lawbreaking with more law was
irresistible. Ethical standards, guidelines for institutional behavior, restraints
on power, and the enforcement of the new rules flowed from Congress in
the aftermath of Watergate. The results produced years of bickering over
the meaning of the reforms and the willingness to follow them. Samuel
Johnson once characterized patriotism as the last refuge of a scoundrel.
Roscoe Conkling, a scandal-plagued nineteenth-century Senator, added that
Johnson had "underestimated the potential of reform."
In the years since Watergate, Congress has flirted with reform
legislation essentially focusing on ethical considerations or on the nature of
the political process. For the latter, it seems nothing has been as futile as
campaign financing legislation, ironically, the original subject of the Senate
Watergate investigation.' The 1992 elections ended the partisan division
6. RALPH WINTER, JR., WATERGATE AND THE LAW: POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS AND
PREsIDENTLAL POWER 1-4, 83-85 (1974).
7. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Federal Election Comm'n v. National
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985); Public Financing of Federal
Elections: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Privilegesand Electionsof the Comm. on Rules
and Administration, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 23, 33, 35 (1973); Congress Clears Campaign
Finance Reform, CONG. Q. ALMANAC 611-33 (1974); HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING
THE 1972 ELEcnoN (1976); GILLIAN PEELE, REVIVAL AND REACTION: THE RIGHT IN
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between the Executive and Legislative branches, offering some prospect that
the two-decade long gridlock on this subject might be broken.
The institutionalization of the Independent Counsel, formerly known as
the Special Prosecutor, probably is the most visible and controversial
remnant of Watergate. The reality of divided government in 1973 forced
Richard Nixon to accept the idea of a Special Prosecutor, who was to be
independent of the Justice Department, free to carry on his own investiga-
tions. After the President summarily dismissed Archibald Cox, Congress
and Leon Jaworski pushed for firmer guarantees of independence for the
Special Prosecutor. When the Nixon Administration raised substantial
constitutional objections centering on separation-of-powers doctrine, the
move to some observers seemed to be merely a ploy to limit the authority
of the Special Prosecutor.8
One year after the House Judiciary Committee had voted to impeach
Nixon, Congress first considered institutionalizing the Office of Special
Prosecutor and codifying ethical standards. In 1978 Congress passed the
Ethics in Government Act, a law that perhaps more than any other
symbolized the lingering concerns of Watergate. When Congress first
considered the bill in 1975, Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D-CT) declared that
Congress had the responsibility to prevent future Watergates. In a
subsequent hearing, a Justice Department official acknowledged, "in the
shadow of Watergate . . . the appearance of justice is almost as important
as justice itself."
The 1978 ethics law required financial disclosures by executive and
judicial branch officials, although not by members of Congress. The law
restrained the "revolving door" through which public officials readily moved
into the private sector and immediately used knowledge and contacts gained
in their previous positions for private gain. The act established the Office
of Government Ethics to monitor its financial disclosure and conflict-of-
interest provisions.
Demands for such reforms antedated Watergate. But Watergate
specifically inspired the creation of mechanisms for judicial appointment of
CONTEMPORARY A.MERICA 60 (1984); Gregg Easterbrook, What's Wrong with Congress?
THE ATLANTIC, Dec. 1984, at 57; see also Paul Huston, Fat Cat Contributions in the 1988
Campaign, L.A. TMEs, Dec. 9, 1988. The disclosure requirements of the 1974 legislation
have remained largely intact and have provided useful information as to the source of
campaign funds.
8. ROBERT NISBET, THE PRESENT AGE: PROGRESS AND ANARCHY IN MODERN
AMERICA 105-06 (1988); Leon Jaworski, Oral HistoryMemoir, in THE TEXAS COLLECTION,
5 BAYLOR UNIV. 764-65.
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a special prosecutor to investigate allegations of wrongdoing by officials of
the Executive branch. The 1978 law required the Attorney General to
investigate such allegations and then to report to a three-judge panel within
ninety days on whether the charges were unfounded or whether the judges
should appoint a special prosecutor. The judges defined the prosecutor's
jurisdiction. Once selected, the prosecutor had authority to perform the
investigative and prosecutorial functions of Justice Department officials.
Finally, the prosecutor could not be removed, except by impeachment,
conviction of a crime, physical incapacity, or by the Attorney General in the
event of extraordinary impropriety. The Attorney General must justify such
action to the Senate Judiciary Committee; moreover, the prosecutor might
appeal to the courts for review. The Ethics Act institutionalized the memory
of the Saturday Night Massacre.
The measure passed both houses overwhelmingly. Congressman
Charles Wiggins, however, sounding what some viewed as irrelevant sour
notes from the past, led a corporals' guard of resistance in the House. He
was joined, interestingly enough, by Robert McClory and Caldwell Butler,
both of whom had voted to impeach Nixon. The minority contended that
the government's prosecutorial machinery had not broken down, that
Watergate was exceptional and did not justify the creation of a new
mechanism. "If an attorney general cannot be trusted to enforce the law
against the executive," the minority contended, "tfhe remedy is impeachment
and not the cloning of an additional attorney general to do the job of the
first." The responsibility, in short, rested with Congress. Henry Petersen,
who regretted his "slowness" in recognizing the necessity for a special
prosecutor in 1973, nevertheless opposed the bill as well, believing that
"political safety" too often would result in narrowing prosecutorial
discretion, with unfair consequences to the accused.9
Two Carter Administration officials became the first targets of the
Ethics in Government Act, as a result of allegations of drug use and
conflicts of interest. The lengthy, predictably sensational investigations
resulted in no charges. Doubtless, their ordeals impaired the reputations and
undermined the effectiveness of both men. When Congress reviewed the
operation of the law in 1981, disenchantment was apparent, particularly
marked by complaints that the special prosecutor provisions were too easily
9. Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act of 1975: Hearings Before the Comm. on
Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1 st Sess. (1975); Public OfficialslntegrityAct of 1977:
Hearings Before the Comm. on Government Affairs, 95th Cong., 1 st Sess. (1977); Carter
Signs Government-Wide Ethics Bill, CONG. Q. ALMANAC 835-45 (1978); Interview with
Henry Petersen (August 23, 1975).
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triggered. Former Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti, who had served
under Carter, warned that "we have selected a weapon which must be used
with greater care." He argued that the Justice Department could have
conducted the necessary investigations of Carter's men and that applying the
law against 480 Executive branch officials was simply too broad and
expensive.
The Reagan Administration opposed the Ethics in Government Act as
well, and focused on constitutional and cost objections. Judicial appoint-
ments of prosecutors, the Justice Department contended, involved executive
functions but did not allow executive control, an unconstitutional arrange-
ment. But the need for a special prosecutor to provide the "appearance of
justice" still had a powerful appeal. The Reagan Administration eventually
dropped its opposition, although it proposed a wider latitude for removal of
the prosecutor. Interestingly, the Justice Department suggested adding the
President's friends and family as objects of attention of a special prosecutor.
Two years of wrangling produced a series of amendments to the Ethics Act
in 1983. The changes renamed the Special Prosecutor an "Independent
Counsel" (a less "inflammatory" title, one Senator suggested). The changes
gave the Attorney General more discretion in the decision to name a
counsel, reduced the list of officials who might be investigated, provided for
reimbursement of attorney's fees for the subject of an investigation if no
indictment was brought, and allowed the Attorney General to remove the
counsel for "good cause." 10
Four years later, the legislation again had to be revised. By then more
than half a dozen independent counsel investigations had been launched.
Now the Reagan Administration openly opposed continuation of the office.
Attorney General William French Smith assailed the independent counsel
process as "probably unconstitutional." He believed it negated the ends of
justice and that it was "cruel and devastating in its application to individuals,
falsely destroying reputations and requiring the incurring of great personal
costs." The investigations, he contended, resulted in media circuses and had
yielded little at high cost to the taxpayers. Democratic senators accused the
Administration of "re-interpreting" and weakening the law when it refused
to apply the act on several occasions. For its part, the Administration
10. SpecialProsecutorProvisionsofEthicsin GovernmentAct of1978: HearingsBefore
the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of the Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of the Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982); Revision of Special Prosecutor Law
Cleared, CONG. Q. ALMANAC 386-89 (1982).
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stressed the unconstitutionality of the system. But pending investigations
only strengthened the opposition to changes. Meanwhile, the Administration
offered regular Justice Department appointments to the then-acting
independent counsels on a dual basis, pending the settlement of court
challenges to the constitutionality of the position.
Watergate reverberated as Congress debated extending the Ethics Act
in 1987. The bill's chief Senate sponsor, Carl Levin (D-MI), had no
illusions about the Reagan Administration's real attitudes. The Reagan
Justice Department, he complained, "would have us return to the days of
Watergate and Nixon's 'Saturday Night Massacre' when public trust in our
criminal justice system hung in the balance. We don't want to go to the
brink again." On June 17th, the fifteenth anniversary of the Watergate
break-in, the Justice Department reiterated its opinion that all prosecutors
must be responsible to the President. During the Senate debate in October,
Levin reminded his colleagues that Watergate had raised doubts about the
integrity and independence of criminal investigations directed at the
President and his entourage. Since then, the statutory arrangements for an
independent counsel, Levin insisted, had won wide acceptance from the
American people. The ready support for an independent counsel in the
pending Iran-Contra affair contrasted sharply with the "public's consterna-
tion over the Watergate investigation," demonstrating that the arrangement
had restored "public confidence in the integrity" of the criminal-justice
system. 'That is an invaluable achievement," Levin concluded.
The renewal measure passed overwhelmingly by a margin making it
vetoproof and Reagan signed it on December 15, despite Justice Department
opposition. Given four pending investigations of the President's actions as
well as those of his advisers, the "appearance of justice" compelled him to
sign the bill. Coincidentally, one day later, an Independent Counsel secured
the first conviction under the Ethics Act when a jury found Michael Deaver
guilty of perjury. Michael Deaver was a former White House aide who had
close personal ties to President Reagan and his wife. After Deaver's
conviction, Independent Counsel Whitney North Seymour complained that
the Ethics in Government Act had too many loopholes and exemptions.
Whatever its inadequacies, the law nevertheless remained imperative, he
said, because there was 'too much loose money and too little concern in
Washington about ethics in government." Seymour assaulted the Reagan
Administration's failure to instill an ethical sense throughout the govern-
ment. Critics from another direction used the occasion to chastise Congress
again for having immunized its members from outside investigations for
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violations of ethical standards."
With the open support of the Reagan Administration, individuals under
investigation pursued a constitutional challenge to the Office of Independent
Counsel. Three former Attorneys General and the Solicitor General lent
their considerable prestige to the campaign. The issue boiled down to
differences over the power of the Executive branch to conduct all criminal
prosecutions, on the one hand, and the significance of constitutional
language authorizing Congress to vest in the Judiciary the appointment of
"inferior officers," on the other. Left largely unspoken in the formal briefs
was any recognition of the importance of the "appearance of justice."
In January, 1988 the Court of Appeals, divided two-to-one, invalidated
the Independent Counsel provision as an unwarranted intrusion on Executive
authority. Speaking for the majority, Judge Lawrence Silberman articulated
a strict construction of separation of powers. The decision came down amid
growing doubts whether the independent counsel statute was workable.
Critics charged that the Counsels' investigations had become at times
outright harassment of public officials. Predictably, former Nixon aides
assailed what one called an "orgy of investigation" and "prosecutorial
politics." But even former members of the Cox and Jaworski staffs noted
that the independent counsel operations had become elephantine, given the
large expenditures and resources required for investigations, maintenance,
and security. Still, public support for the probe of the Iran-Contra affair
remained strong. Meanwhile, independent counsels secured convictions of
two more former Reagan aides, lending some weight to the idea that only
a disinterested prosecutor could proceed against the Executive branch.
The Supreme Court put its imprimatur on the independent counsel
statute in a surprisingly firm and broad decision.' 2 Reversing the appellate
court, Chief Justice William Rehnquist led the Court in rebuffing the
Administration. The Justices found no violation of separation of powers
doctrine. The Court held that the Ethics Act in no way inhibited the
President from performing his constitutionally assigned duties. 3 Unlike
the lower court, Rehnquist rejected any notion that the law constituted
11. SpecialProsecutorProvisionsofEthicsin GovernmentActofl978: HearingsBefore
the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of the Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of the Comm. on
Governmental Ajftairs, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982); Revision of Special Prosecutor Law
Cleared, CONG. Q. ALMANAC 386-89 (1982).
12. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
13. Id. at 657.
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"Congressional usurpation" of executive functions. In a lone dissent, Justice
Antonin Scalia bitingly referred to "our former constitutional system," as he
lamented the Court's refusal to uphold what he believed to be a proper and
absolute scheme of separation of powers. 4
The Independent Counsel nevertheless remained the bane of both the
Reagan and Bush Administrations which made no secret of their desire to
abolish the office. Congressional Republicans kept up a steady drumfire of
criticism, particularly scoring the alleged excesses of Lawrence Walsh, who
headed the Iran-Contra investigation. Walsh was accused of lavishing
excessive amounts of money and, in effect, pursuing a vendetta against
President Bush and other figures. During the 1992 campaign, Walsh
presented new charges against former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger,
infuriating Bush and his party.
The Independent Counsel Law expired on December 15, 1992. Still,
three Independent Counsels remained in office continuing their investiga-
tions. Besides Walsh, Arlin Adams headed an investigation of Reagan's
Department of Housing and Urban Development and Joseph diGenova, who
was appointed just before the law expired, was exploring the State
Department's involvement in the search of President Clinton's passport files
during the election campaign. Subsequent disclosures of Clinton's possible
involvement in unethical business dealings prompted Republicans to demand
(and receive) an independent counsel to investigate the matter, but at the
same time, made it difficult for them to resist renewed pressures for the
Independent Counsel Reauthorization Bill.
The charges that President Nixon had abused his office by improperly
using such powerful executive agencies as the FBI, the CIA, and the IRS
produced a sharp reaction in Congress and in the nation. Loosening
presidential controls, however, conceivably could enlarge the independence
of those same groups, a prospect that gave pause to those who had watched
the practically unbridled power of the bureaucracies.
The Watergate years brought into sharp relief the practices and
14. Id. at 697; see also In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Leonard
Garment, Does America Really Need This Orgy of Investigation? WASH. POST, May 10,
1987, at B 1; Leonard Garment, The Guns of Watergate,COMMENTARY, Apr. 1987, at 20-23;
L. Gordon Crovitz, Independent Counsels: Quo Warranto? WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1988, at
38. In one article, the authors criticized the lack of accountability and excesses of the
Independent Counsel. See Andrew L. Frey & Kenneth S. Geller, Better Than Independent
Counsels, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1988, at C7 One author responded to the criticism. See
Lovida H. Coleman, Jr., The Case for the Independent Counsel, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1988,
at All.
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behavior of almost sacrosanct institutions. Questions and challenges to
authority invariably raised the issue of accountability. In the years
following Nixon's resignation, Congress periodically wrestled with that
problem, but it often backed away from fundamental reforms affecting the
structure or the role of the FBI, CIA, and IRS. That reluctance reflected the
prevailing views, either that the abuses discovered in the Watergate years
were mere aberrations, or that later transgressions were so minor that reform
might do more harm than good.
Clarence Kelley, who became FBI Director in 1973, thought that the
Watergate "nightmare" had served "as a much needed cleansing agent for
the Bureau," one that enabled him to initiate "long overdue reforms."
Responding to criticisms of the FBI counterintelligence program of the late
1960s and early 1970s, as well as to other allegations of misconduct often
sanctioned by J. Edgar Hoover, Kelley supposedly reduced the Bureau's role
in domestic intelligence probes and instituted wide-ranging organizational
changes. Kelley and the Carter Administration also sought a posthumous
verdict against the practices of the previous era when they brought criminal
indictments for unauthorized burglaries against two high ranking Hoover
aides. The FBI officials were convicted and fined in December 1980, but
they appealed the decision, and Reagan pardoned them. The President
contended that the officials had acted in the belief that their actions were
authorized at "the highest levels of govenment," and cited Carter's
"unconditional pardon" of those who had violated the Selective Service laws
during the Vietnam war.
Congress, in its fashion, sought to retaliate against Hoover when, in
1976, it established a ten-year term for future FBI directors. The impetus
for the limitation came from congressional concern both over Hoover's
excessive independence, developed over his nearly fifty-year reign, and over
the cooperation which Acting Director L. Patrick Gray had given to Nixon's
blatant political manipulation of the Bureau. The conflicting motives for
imposing the limited term passed almost unnoticed."5
15. See ATHAN G. THEOHARIS, SPYING ON AMERICANS: POLITICAL SURVEILLANCE
FROM HOOVER TO THE HUSTON PLAN (1978) (best account of FBI's abuses of power);
CLARENCE KELLEY, KELLEY: THE STORY OF AN FBI DIRECTOR 152-53 (1987). Mark Felt,
one of the indicted agents, bitterly assailed Kelley and the reformist spirit, in THE FBI
PYRAMID: FROM THE INSIDE 345-51 (1979) ("The FBI wouldn't be in this predicament if
Clarence Kelley were alive," was, according to Felt, a favorite observation among FBI
personnel); see also Robert Pear, PresidentReagan Pardons 2 Ex-F.B.I. Officialsin 1970's
Break-Ins, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 16, 1981, at Al; RICHARD G. POWER, SECRECY AND POWER:
THE LIFE OF J. EDGAR HOOVER 487 (1987); Watergate Revisited: A Legislative Legacy,
CONG. Q. ALMANAC 387 (1982).
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Congressional investigations in 1975 had dramatically illustrated the
extent of FBI abuses of power and had demonstrated Hoover's willingness
to serve the political goals of different presidents, to ingratiate himself, and
to augment his power. But Congress failed to develop a legislative charter
defining proper FBI activities. Instead, in March 1976, Attorney General
Edward Levi established a series of guidelines to restrain FBI domestic
security investigations and prevent questionable activities.
Less than a decade later, the nation learned that the more things
changed, the more they remained the same. Attorney General William
French Smith announced that he had relaxed rules governing domestic
spying by the Bureau and claimed that the changes had enabled the
government to successfully combat domestic terrorism. A special American
Bar Association committee, composed of lawyers who had served on various
intelligence agencies, praised Smith's revisions of the Levi guidelines for
their "healthy degree of balance" between First Amendment rights and the
demands of domestic security. Yet it recommended some changes in
Smith's rules to "ensure that while the security goals ... are met, the civil
liberties of all of our citizens are protected." In a pointed eulogy, the report
praised Levi's work. Smith brushed off any implied criticism, claiming that
the ABA report merely reflected "issues of policy and style rather than
fundamental disagreements on matters of law." His assessment probably
was correct. The American Civil Liberties Union, however, thought that the
Administration's interpretation of the guidelines granted "overly broad
authority" to the FBI.
1 6
In December 1974, Seymour Hersh's New York Times articles accused
the CIA of wholesale violations of its charter and of the law, as a result of
its massive involvement in domestic political-intelligence activities. Hersh
based his disclosures on the CIA's internal inquiry into some questionable
operations, an inquiry ordered by Director James Schlesinger in 1973.
Those activities, subsequently dubbed the "Family Jewels," included not
only domestic intelligence activities, but also such questionable legal and
moral policies as the assassination of foreign leaders.
The Hersh revelations were eagerly seized upon by the newly-elected
members of the Ninety-fourth Congress, who felt committed to restoring an
16. The Levi Guidelines are reprinted in STAFF OF SENATE COMMITrEE ON THE
JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS. REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY 383-402; ATiAN
G. THEOHARIS & JOHN STUART Cox, THE Boss: J. EDGAR HOOVER AND THE GREAT
AMERICAN INQUISITION 431-35 (1988); AP DISPATCH, IN WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL, Oct.
14, 1984; Leslie M. Werner, Lawyers'Panel Would Limit F.B.I 's Inquiries into Groups,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 13, 1985, at A13.
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ethical compass to governmental affairs in the wake of Watergate. Many
of the new congressional members, as well as the veterans, had campaigned
against abuses of official power and had promised a new direction. William
Colby, Schlesinger's successor, perceived that the "radically altered nature
of the Congress" gave focus to increasing demands to harness and control
his agency. President Ford attempted to preempt Congress when he
appointed a commission, chaired by Vice President Rockefeller, to in-
vestigate CIA activities. But three weeks later, the Senate and the House
each authorized a select committee to conduct an investigation of CIA op-
erations.
'The Year of Intelligence had begun," a Senate staffer wrote, and the
long, cozy relationship between Congress and the CIA came to a halt. "All
the tensions and suspicions and hostilities that had been building about the
CIA since the Bay of Pigs, and had risen to a combustible level during the
Vietnam and Watergate years, now exploded," Colby remarked. 7
Years later, in seeming innocence, Nixon praised Richard Helms, the
CIA Director he had so summarily sacked for, among other things, his
failure to fully cooperate in the Watergate cover-up. Nixon deplored Helms'
subsequent criminal conviction for lying to Congress-"great injustice,"
Nixon called it-for Helms, he said, simply had been carrying out a
presidential assignment. Nixon went on to denounce the "attempt to castrate
the CIA in the mid-seventies [as] a national tragedy." But Helms dismissed
Nixon's hypocrisy, for the former Director had "no doubt that the whole
Watergate business fueled" the CIA's difficulty with Congress. Nixon's
attempt to entangle the CIA in Watergate, Helms contended, had been 'the
battering ram" for the subsequent congressional inquiry.18
The Rockefeller Commission, the Senate investigation headed by
Senator Frank Church (D-ID), and the House inquiry chaired by Otis Pike
(D-NY), highlighted the "black" side of CIA activities. But the image that
most clearly emerged in the public eye was Howard Baker's depiction of the
CIA as a "rogue elephant," an agency that had operated without authoriza-
tion or audit, either by Congress or the President. Baker's characterization
seemed innocent; yet to put all the blame on the Agency masked the reality
that if neither Congress nor the President knew what the CIA was doing, it
17. Hersh's articles first appeared in the New York Times on December 22, 1974. The
best account of the politics of the Senate hearings, and the Senate's findings, is in LOCH K.
JOHNSON, A SEASON OF INQUIRY: THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION 9-11 (1985);
Interview with William Colby, Director (Oct. 9, 1987).
18. Interview with Richard Helms, Director of the C.I.A. (July 14, 1988 & Sept. 23,
1988).
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was because neither wanted to know.
The resulting uproar over the revelations led to two results. First, the
CIA itself now had an excuse to institute an internal housecleaning. Both
Colby and his successor, Admiral Stansfield Turner, forced the resignation
and retirement of bureaucratic barons who had built great power bases of
their own, often independent of the Director. Second, Congress developed
a greater interest in oversight and established the institutional means to that
end.
Hersh's reports spurred Congress to pass the Hughes-Ryan Amendment
at the end of 1975, requiring the President to approve and report all covert
operations to Congress. Two years later the Senate formalized the
procedure by establishing a standing committee for oversight of the
intelligence agencies, and the House followed a year later. Executive orders
by President Carter tightened the guidelines on domestic intelligence
activities, including a requirement that the CIA obtain warrants from the
Attorney General to carry on surveillance activities within the United States.
In October 1978, Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Law, which, among other things required that the CIA obtain court orders
to wiretap. Two years later, the Intelligence Oversight Act provided new
requirements that the CIA report to Congress on its covert activities.
Executive orders are subject to new executive orders, however;
relations between the CIA and the Attorney General are subject to the
compatibility of their interests; and congressional oversight is dependent,
first, on what information the CIA or the President chooses to provide, and
second, on the extent of Congress' own vigilance and interest. President
Reagan's Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981, substantially
weakened Carter's 1978 directives and restored a large measure of discretion
to CIA activities. (That order also upset the Levi Guidelines on the FBI
and, in general, "unleashed" the intelligence agencies, as the President
noted.) The Iran-Contra affair in 1986-87 demonstrated that the CIA and
the Administration had acted without congressional consultation and hence
lacked that degree of consent that might have provided some cover of
legitimacy to what clearly was a dubious enterprise. The result was
predictable; renewed demands to force full CIA disclosure of its activities
were followed by expressions of concern that the CIA not be inhibited or
compromised in its activities.
When FBI Director William H. Webster moved to head the CIA in
March 1987, he remarked wistfully that the "post-Watergate period ...
included some very searching and at times devastating inquiries that affected
not only us [the FBI] but the other components of the intelligence communi-
ty." Reagan's CIA Director, William Casey, undoubtedly agreed, and when
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he proceeded to act on the premise that congressional oversight inquiries and
their conclusions mattered not a whit, no one effectively challenged him.
During his tenure, Casey readily secured presidential authorization for
aggressive covert operations, and he consistently proved uncooperative with
congressional oversight committees. Only the Iran-Contra fiasco and
Casey's death emboldened critics to demand more effective control again.19
In an immediate sense, Watergate altered public perception of the
presidency and the relationship between the executive and other institutions.
How much of those changes has endured, however, is questionable.
Watergate transformed and reshaped American attitudes toward government,
and especially the presidency, more than any single event since the Great
Depression of the 1930s, when Americans looked to the President as a
Moses to lead them out of the economic wilderness. World War II and the
Cold War, with their attendant dangers to the physical and ideological
security of the nation, only exalted that faith. Professor Woodrow Wilson,
who often expressed his low opinion of Congress, wrote in 1908 that the
presidency "must always, henceforth, be one of the great powers of the
world.... We have but begun to see the presidential office in this light;
but it is the light which will more and more beat upon it . "...20
Intellectuals, liberal and conservative alike, celebrated Wilson's
prophecy. "The President is not a Gulliver immobilized by ten thousand
tiny cords nor even a Prometheus chained to a rock of frustration," political
scientist Clinton Rossiter wrote in the late 1950s. "He is rather a kind of
magnificent lion, who can roam widely and do great deeds, so long as he
does not try to break loose from his broad reservation .... He will feel few
checks upon his power if he uses that power as he should." John F.
Kennedy's election in 1960 made that a canonical doctrine of the liberal
faith. But by the end of the decade, such glorifications of the presidency
seemed embarrassing (when they were not forgotten), and Rossiter's
restraints, largely written in as an afterthought, became the new gospel.2'
Watergate bestowed a new vulnerability on the presidency. Americans
19. JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 195-96, 252-56, 263; Stansfield Turner, A Letter to
WilliamH. Webster, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1987, at A35; Ronald J. Ostrow, WebsterChosen
as C.L.A. Director; President Picks F.B.L Chief to Head Agency Under Fire for Iran Role,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1987, § 1, at 1; see generally STANSFIELD TURNER, SECRECY AND
DEMOCRACY (1985).
20. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 78
(1908).
21. GODFREY HODGSON, ALL THINGS TO ALL MEN: THE FALSE PROMISE OF THE
MODERN AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 71, 76 (1980).
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alternately inflicted anger and derision on the office and the man. Ford's
pardon of Nixon added an element of cynicism. Slander and malice toward
presidents, of course, was not new. Washington suffered his share, as did
Jefferson, Lincoln, and Franklin D. Roosevelt. But the invective now ap-
peared on a massive scale. Once peerless and invincible, presidential
majesty seemed diminished, and Nixon and his immediate successors served
as easy prey for cruel, contemptuous humor. The media criticism of the
presidency, and the preoccupation with presidential sins of omission or
commission, had gathered such momentum in the Nixon years that it seemed
impossible to turn off the spigot. Jimmy Carter fared no better; indeed, his
self-avowed status as an outsider, his mannerisms, and his alternating shifts
between doubt and assured faith provided tailor-made targets for equally
biting humor and criticism. The Ford and Carter Administrations, especial-
ly, offered the spectacle of president as victim.
Clinton Rossiter notwithstanding, the President of the United States
now appeared to be an immobilized Gulliver-or worse yet, a Lilliputian.
"A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government."
Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 70. "A feeble execution is but another
phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may
be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government." By the end of the
1970s, the nation seemed to view its government as "feeble," and hence
"bad."
Although Watergate gave rise to the criticism of the "imperial presi-
dency," the leitmotif in the early Reagan years was that the nation could ill
afford a crippled Chief Executive. Ford spoke of an "imperiled Presidency."
Yet power and authority were not so much at issue during the Watergate
years as were responsibility and accountability. Richard Nixon endlessly
stressed the importance, the infallibility, and the uniqueness of the "Presi-
dency"--reiteration designed, it seemed, to insulate the President from ac-
countability. Nothing in the historical traditions of executive power, nothing
in the Constitution, nothing even in the modem celebrations of executive
authority justified Nixon's rationalizations. Indeed, had he acknowledged
responsibility for Watergate, Nixon might have had a different fate. The
President's foes-and the nation-needed more than he offered. Nixon had
underestimated the historical tradition of skepticism toward unrestrained
power.22
22. Louis FISHER, CONSTrrUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT 12 (1985). PHILIPPA STRUM's, A Symbolic Attack Upon the Presidency, in
THOMimAs CRONIN & REXFORD G. TUGWELL, THE PRESIDENCY REAPPRAISED 249-63 (1974),
has many useful insights in qualifying the criticism of the "Imperial Presidency."
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In subsequent years, references to Nixon's deeds and the Watergate
controversy became a shorthand for amorality, abuse of power, and official
criminality. In turn, Watergate encouraged a routinized-some would argue
a trivialized--response to official breaches of public law and confidence.
A succession of congressional investigations, special prosecutors, and media
pressures followed the various allegations, some well founded, some not.
Watergate established historical traces as standards for future political
behavior. For those who thought the scandal a "dim and distant curiosity,"
the Iran-Contra affair in 1986-87 offered a rude reminder. The Reagan Ad-
ministration's secret shipment of weapons to Iran, clearly intended as
ransom for American hostages held there, and the diversion of profits to the
Contra rebels in Nicaragua vividly revived the memories, the lessons, and
even the language of Watergate, sometimes inappropriately so. Almost in-
stantaneously, the media raised the familiar Howard Baker question: "What
did the President know, and when did he know it?"
Watergate veterans weighed in with experienced advice. Alexander
Haig urged President Reagan to take responsibility for the scandal and
immediately dismiss underlings suspected of violating the laws. The
President, he continued, should refuse to appoint a special prosecutor, nor
should he allow congressional hearings (as if it were in his power to bar
them). Finally, Haig thought Reagan should tell the American people:
"And if you don't like it, impeach me!" He later lamented that Reagan did
not follow his advice and instead "went along with a six-month orgy" of
independent-counsel investigations and congressional hearings. Richard
Nixon told Reagan that the affair would not be "another Watergate, as long
as you stay ahead of the curve." More familiar language: Thirteen years
earlier, he had told Assistant Attorney General Petersen that he wanted "to
stay one step ahead of the curve."23
Reagan and his advisers had learned a great deal from the Watergate
experience. The President appointed the Tower Commission to investigate
the Iran-Contra affair. He generally cooperated, and more importantly, gave
the appearance of cooperation (if not of truthfulness). He never asserted
executive privilege; he instructed relevant agencies and individuals to
cooperate with Congress and with the independent counsel he appointed
(ignoring Haig), and even made available to the congressional committee
23. "1988, in Washington at least, was the year of the pig. Not since the Watergate
scandal and its aftermath has concern with the ethics of public officials reached such a
feverish pitch," Terence Moran, The New Breed ofEthics Scandal, LEGAL TnMEs, Dec. 19,
1988, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1988; NEwSWEEK, Dec. 22, 1986, at 17; Tape Transcript, the
President and Petersen, Apr. 15, 1973, UnitedStates v. Mitchellmaterials, National Archives.
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material held by his designated biographer as well as extracts from his
personal diaries. One congressman, however, was unimpressed and thought
the Reagan Administration had learned a different lesson from Watergate:
"they learned to destroy as much evidence as possible and to appear
cooperative." The next perpetrators of misdeeds, he thought, would do
"even better" at covering their tracks.
The Iran-Contra affair may or may not have been a greater threat to the
American constitutional order than had Watergate, yet its d6nouement was
not nearly as dramatic. Reagan undoubtedly suffered a loss of credibility,
but unlike Nixon he retained a substantial measure of public trust. For
some, nevertheless, there was a sinister aspect in what was perceived as the
privatization of foreign policy by the White House and the adventurism of
presidential subordinates. More than anything, perhaps, the affair revealed
the shortcomings of Reagan's careless management style. But the congres-
sional inquiry demonstrated that the constitutional arrangements for shared
governance remained contested ground in the American system. And within
those conflicts, as within that system, "trust," as Secretary of State George
Shultz admitted, "is the coin of the realm."24  Watergate sounded its
haunting tones throughout the episode.
Watergate became a permanent part of the American political language
after 1972, but its meaning could be easily forgotten. At a 1978 press
conference, a reporter asked President Jimmy Carter if he would consider
reducing or withholding federal revenue-sharing funds from those cities or
states that did not follow his wage guidelines. "I think this would be illegal
under the present law," the President said. The reporter, as if oblivious to
Nixon's extra-legal policies, persisted and repeated the question. "No,"
Carter responded very firmly, "we could not do that under the present law."
Yet for others, Watergate was more instructive. In 1983, revelations
indicated that the Solicitor General's office had suppressed evidence that
might have helped the cause of the Japanese-Americans when the Supreme
Court heard arguments in 1944 regarding the constitutionality of their
24. REPORT OF TIE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA
AFFA R, H.R. REP. No. 100, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1987), S.R. REP. No. 100, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 216 (1987); Elizabeth Drew, Letterfrom Washington, THE NEW YORKER,
Aug. 31, 1987, at 89; Theodore Draper's articles on the Iran-Contra affair in The New York
ReviewofBooks, October 8,22, December 17, 1987, are especially insightful. The literature
is growing on the Iran-Contra controversy. Harper'sFebruary and April 1988, offered some
interesting critiques and debates on the congressional report. A thoughtful analysis is Harold
Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the
Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255 (1988).
1762 Vol. 18
61
: Nova Law Review 18, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Kutler
wartime internment. A Justice Department attorney, who later went on to
a distinguished career as a civil libertarian, was asked some forty years later
why he had not publicly exposed the alleged chicanery when he found
himself tormented between conscience and loyalty to superiors in 1944.
"Watergate," he responded, "hadn't happened yet."25  With President
Clinton embroiled in a controversy over his allegedly questionable private
business dealings, the Republican House leader complained that the
President's behavior was "Nixonish."
Watergate, on the whole, has lingered in public memory. The public
traditionally has been disposed to expect the worst of legislators "and at the
same time believe in the high virtues of the president and his entourage."26
But for a while, at least, the situation has been reversed. When the
expectation of executive virtue is disappointed, the weight of such
disappointment almost inevitably produces a massive response which,
however naively, attempts to ensure against any repetition of executive
offenses. Some of the resulting measures succeed; some amount to little
more than an exercise in futility or wrongheadedness. And so, the judgment
of the effectiveness of post-Watergate reforms results is a mixed verdict.
Perhaps above all, however, Watergate revitalized and nourished the
tradition of constitutional responsibility. It also elevated moral consider-
ations in the judgment of public officers and in the conduct of public
business. Whether involving limitations on campaign funds, ethical
standards for elected and appointed officials, governmental intervention in
the private sphere, or the conduct of foreign policy, a national consciousness
of the need of checks on powerholders was sparked by Watergate. That
concern has remained vital in the years since, prompting both legislation and
criticism that reinforced some standards for the proper conduct of political
leaders and governmental officials. However excessive, faulty, or even
misguided the responses to Watergate may have been, they reflected an
understanding that public officials must themselves adhere to the same rule
of law they so piously demand that the governed obey. What is not
acceptable is Nixon's 1977 rationalization that "when the President does it,
that means that it is not illegal."27  Richard Nixon's most ardent and
passionate defenders must either agree, or defend the alien proposition that
a president is above the law.
25. PUB. PAPERS: JIMMY CARTER 1978, at 2224 (December 12, 1978); PETER IRONS,
JUSTICE AT WAR 351 (1983).
26. FISHER, supra note 22, at 333.
27. FROST, supra note 5, at 183.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For many years it was easy to succumb to the temptation to teach
separation of powers theory as "Richard Nixon" law. The leading cases
about executive privilege arose out of Watergate, and controversies over
impoundment, war powers, and impeachment were directly connected to the
Watergate experience. In this essay, I want to suggest that treating sepa-
ration of powers law as "Richard Nixon" law is descriptively accurate and
distorted at the same time, and normatively misleading. It is descriptively
accurate because the modem law of separation of powers has been shaped
by the legacy of Watergate, which includes a substantial period of divided
government. It is descriptively distorted because important separation of
powers controversies cannot easily be linked to Watergate. It is normatively
misleading because the political context-the sense that contemporary
separation of powers controversies are indeed the legacy of Watergate-has
obscured the fact that separation of powers controversies now arise because
of the transformation of modem government into a complex bureaucratic
state. This transformation has tom separation of powers theory away from
its traditional base, described by the metaphor of "checks and balances," and
has left separation of powers theory without a new base.
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. The Author would like to
thank L. Michael Seidman for his comments on this Essay.
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II. SEPARATION OF POWERS AS "RICHARD NIXON" LAW
A list of Watergate-connected cases establishes the importance of
Watergate for separation of powers theory.' First there are the executive
privilege cases. United States v. Nixon,2 the leading case raising questions
of privilege in criminal prosecutions, was obviously part of Watergate.
Cases that claimed damages from high executive officials including the
President, who then raised claims of privilege, gained credibility because
Watergate had discredited Nixon.3 The independent counsel case dealt with
the statute adopted to avoid future "Saturday Night massacres."4 Buckley
v. Valeo5 disposed of a challenge to the means of selecting the Federal
Election Commission.6 It arose out of campaign finance reforms adopted
to eliminate one type of abuse that, it was felt, contributed to Watergate.
Finally, there is the Walter Nixon case in which the Court held that judicial
review of impeachment processes was barred by the political question
doctrine.7 The Chief Justice's opinion was more than typically confused,
but its motivation appears to have been concern over the possibility that the
courts might be called upon to review a presidential impeachment, a concern
triggered in part by the Watergate experience.
Beyond the cases directly connected to Watergate, other separation of
powers controversies seem part of its legacy. The War Powers Resolution,
for example, a perennial source of issues for classroom discussion, resulted
from the inter-branch suspicion that, on the President's side, led to
Watergate. Even the legislative veto decision might be understood as part
of Watergate's legacy.' Congress had been using legislative vetoes for a
generation, and presidents had been interposing mild objections for as long.
1. I examined the chapters on separation of powers in several leading constitutional law
casebooks to determine what proportion of their pages was devoted to cases closely linked
to Watergate. WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (9th ed. 1993),
had the smallest proportion (16%), followed by GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (2d ed. 1991), with 23%, and GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (12th ed.
1991), with 26%. Taking account of the fact that casebooks tend to be dominated by recent
cases, these proportions seem high enough to be noteworthy.
2. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
3. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
4. Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 663 (1988).
5. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
6. Id. Buckley is more widely known, of course, for its holding that free speech
principles limit Congress' power to regulate campaign finance.
7. Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).
8. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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It might be argued, however, that the issue came to a head because
Watergate exacerbated tensions between the departments.
The standard account of Watergate's legacy for separation of powers
theory is directly normative. On this account, Watergate demonstrated the
dangers of concentrated governmental power. To put it perhaps overdrama-
tically, the New Deal, the Warren Court, the New Frontier, and the Great
Society had lulled Americans into believing that a powerful national
government was always a benign force for progress; Richard Nixon and
Watergate showed that it was not. Before Watergate, constitutional theory
and decisional law concentrated on the individual rights provisions of the
Constitution. These were seen as the primary mechanisms, enforced by the
courts, by which the Constitution protected individual rights. Watergate
directed scholarly and judicial attention back to the indirect protections of
individual rights in the Constitution, that is, to separation of powers.
There are other, and in my view more important, connections between
Watergate and modem separation of powers controversies. Those controver-
sies arise when Congress and the President are at odds, which is most likely
to occur when the departments are controlled by different political parties.
Accordingly, the most significant political phenomenon of the past
generation was the permanently divided government, with Congress
controlled by Democrats and the presidency by Republicans. Until 1993,
the only period of unified government, the Carter presidency, was itself a
direct consequence of Watergate.
In an important way, though, divided government may well have
resulted from Watergate too. In 1968, it seemed to some that the New Deal
coalition had crumbled and was about to be replaced by a new national
Republican coalition, which would control both the presidency and
Congress.9  Watergate interrupted that process. The public, wary of
concentrated power as a result of Watergate, appears to have concluded that
divided government is attractive.
Divided government, however, produces separation of powers
controversies. Policy differences between the departments generate
legislative proposals and executive initiatives to which the other department
takes exception. Ordinarily, these controversies are resolved by political
negotiation during which the departments reach compromises acceptable to
each. But over an extended period, divided government produces separation
of powers cases as well, because it affects bargaining strategies. Specifical-
ly, after an extended period in which one party controls the presidency, the
9. See KEvN PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN MAJoiuTY (1969).
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President will be more reluctant to compromise with Congress. For
predictable political reasons, a sustained period of divided government will
lead to a judiciary dominated by appointees of the President's party; the
Senate cannot resist more than sporadically the transformation of the federal
courts that the President's power to initiate appointments allows. As a
result, litigators may think that the courts have become allies of one side in
separation of powers controversies. Partisans of the President may think
that the possibility of prevailing in litigation is great enough to allow them
to stiffen their positions in political negotiations. Therefore, controversies
that might have ended through negotiation instead turn into court cases.
These are structural characteristics that lead to more separation of
powers cases after a sustained period of divided government. The particular
form division took in the past generation contributed to the proliferation of
such cases as well. The competing parties had different views about the
importance of strong presidential authority. Republicans desired a strong
presidency in foreign affairs and a weak national government in domestic
affairs, whereas Democrats wanted a weak presidency in foreign affairs and
a strong national government in domestic affairs.
Thus, in foreign affairs, the parties were directly opposed on questions
of presidential power, and the Democrats, in control of Congress, were in
a position to transform this opposition into separation of powers controver-
sies. Watergate itself arose from President Nixon's concern about opposi-
tion to his conduct of foreign policy. The repeated controversies about war
powers and the Iran-contra affair are similar in structure.
The impoundment issue,"0 which briefly flared up during the Nixon
presidency, typifies separation of powers controversies in the domestic
arena. Though not new," the issue recurred during the Nixon Administra-
tion when President Nixon "transformed an occasional practice into a special
test of wills with Congress."' 2  Impoundment became an issue because
Democrats wanted a strong national government, and found the President
thwarting their desires. To no one's surprise, Democrats tried to develop
10. Impoundment occurs when the President or other U.S. government officers take
action, or fail to take action, that precludes the obligation or expenditure of Congress' budget
authority. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 756 (6th ed. 1990).
II. For historical development of the impoundment issue, see STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE
WARS OF WATERGATE 133-34 (1990).
12. Id. at 133. During a press conference on January 31, 1973, President Nixon stated
that "the Constitutional right for the President of the United States to impound funds [,] and
that is not to spend money, when the spending of money would mean .. increasing prices
or increasing taxes for all the people, that right is absolutely clear." Id.
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ways to accomplish their goals without the President's participation, and
Republican Presidents tried to develop ways to reduce the domestic role of
the national government. 3
The normative and political accounts of Watergate's legacy are
connected, as a matter of constitutional theory. "Checks and balances" is
one of the central images of separation of powers theory, or, as James
Madison put it, separation of powers protects liberty by setting ambition to
counteract ambition.'" Politicians are ambitious, in the Madisonian sense,
when they seek to protect the prerogatives of their offices against intrusions
by occupants of other offices. Following this logic, divided government
epitomizes how separation of powers serves liberty.
The foregoing account of Watergate's legacy for separation of powers
theory is surely correct, in one sense. Watergate did heighten concern for
concentrated power, and it did contribute to the development of divided
government. As I argue next, however, viewing modem separation of
powers law as "Richard Nixon" law has distorted that law and, more
importantly, has obscured deeper sources of modem separation of powers
problems.
III. GOVERNMENTAL INNOVATIONS AND
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Intensification of partisan conflict, caused by a divided government and
principled concern for controlling concentrated power, has heightened the
stakes in separation of powers controversies. One result, ironically, has
been to mislead scholars about the nature of those controversies. This is the
underside of seeing separation of powers law as "Richard Nixon" law.
Rather than expressing deep conflict between a Republican president and a
Democratic Congress, the conflicts arise because of the modernization of the
national government.
Viewing the modem law of separation of powers as the legacy of
Watergate induces scholars to consider the implications of divided
government and partisan conflict. The Madisonian emphasis on ambition
counteracting ambition seems to address those questions as well. Yet, unless
we place Madison's concerns into a modem context, that emphasis is likely
to be normatively misleading and descriptively distorted. Unfortunately,
adjusting those concerns to take account of modem conditions proves quite
13. This is a formula for repeated clashes, some of which will end up in court.
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 356 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1974).
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difficult, and may partially explain why the image of Watergate continues
to dominate separation of powers thinking; we have nothing to put in its
place.
The standard account I have given is descriptively distorted because it
fails to explain some of the most important characteristics of modem
separation of powers law. Although "Richard Nixon" law makes United
States v. Nixon 5 the paradigmatic case, a better paradigm is the Sentencing
Commission decision, Mistretta v. United States.1 6  Mistretta does not
easily fit into the standard account, yet it exemplifies modem separation of
powers problems in several ways.
First, the Sentencing Commission was clearly a technical adaptation to
deal with what national law-makers saw as a modem problem: sentencing
disparity resulting from the proliferation of federal crimes and the expansion
of the federal bench. 7 Second, the decision adopted what has come to be
called a "functional" analysis of separation of powers issues. According to
proponents of functional analysis, courts should assess innovations in
government structure by considering whether the innovation is a sensible
attempt to deal with a difficult modem problem in a way that does not
threaten to undermine fundamental constitutional values.'" Functional
analysis almost inevitably leads the Court to uphold governmental innova-
tions against separation of powers challenges.
The Court's functional analysis is not a well-suited tool for dealing
with sharp partisan conflicts between the President and Congress. The
Court has sometimes used a more formal analysis, 9 particularly in the
legislative veto decision. Most commentators, however, believe that the
Court's formalistic decisions are deviations from a more consistent
commitment to functionalism.2" Mistretta and the independent counsel
decision are more typical of the functionalist pattern: Despite occasional
invalidations, as a general matter the Court has rejected separation of power
15. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
16. 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (constitutionality of Sentencing Commission challenged on
several grounds including separation of powers).
17. Id. at 363-65.
18. For my analysis of this issue, see Mark Tushnet, The Sentencing Commission and
Constitutional Theory: Bowls and Plateaus in Separation of Powers Theory, 66 S. CAL. L.
REv. 581 (1992).
19. See id.
20. One reason for the belief that separation of powers controversies are more serious
and more contentious than they were in the past may be that Justice Scalia, the newspapers'
and scholars' favorite justice, is an articulate proponent of a formalism that the Court, in fact,
has by and large rejected.
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challenges to federal statutes. The Court's implicit judgment in preferring
functionalism appears to be that most separation of powers controversies are
not the product of sharp partisan conflict in which they are called upon to
side with either the President who appointed them or the Senate that
confirmed them.2
The standard account relies on the Madisonian vision. For Madison,
the President's ambition counteracted Congress's. Direct political confronta-
tions were the mechanism by which separation of powers protected liberty,
as each side sought to advance its own interests and found itself checked by
the other. Equally important, the disputes were personalized, as the term
ambition suggests. That is, political interests led particular people to fight
other people over competing agendas. One small indication of what can be
called the personalization of ambition is the Framers' choice of a unitary
over a plural executive. By placing the executive power in the hands of a
single person, the Framers believed that they could promote both energy and
responsibility in the Executive, and individual responsibility would be
enforced by impeachment to remove "the" wrong-doer from office.
The Madisonian perspective leads to a positivist account of separation
of powers law. On this view, the Constitution does not prescribe any
particular outcome in separation of powers controversies. Rather, it
establishes a framework for political contention, and validates whatever
results from that contention.22
This positivism, however, is hard to sustain under modem conditions.
Although strongly originalist contemporary discussions of the separation of
powers continue to speak in personalized terms,23 they are difficult to
employ in connection with a modem, bureaucratic government. We can say
that the legislative veto is a mechanism by which Congress (seen as a unit)
attempts to control the President (seen as an individual). The reality,
however, is that the veto is an attempt by congressional committees and
their staffs to exercise some continuing supervision over the behavior of
lower-level bureaucrats. In Chadha, for example, "Congress" was not
concerned that "the President" had adopted too generous a standard for
determining when to waive deportation in hardship cases; rather, the chair
21. Note, however, that a more careful phrasing of the proposition about the Court's role
is that the perception among partisans, that the Court will be an ally, can generate litigation
in cases that otherwise might be negotiated to a solution. Eventually, however, a perception
that experience proves to be inaccurate presumably disappears.
22. For some qualifications and elaborations, see Tushnet, supra note 18, at 582.
23. See, e.g., Steven Calabresi & Kevin Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1153 (1992).
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of the House subcommittee with jurisdiction over the Immigration and
Naturalization Service was concerned that the bureaucrats in charge of
making hardship decisions were using too generous a standard. 24
Similarly, when Justice Scalia criticized the innovation of the
independent counsel statute in Morrison v. Olson,25 his description of the
Commission as an effort to aggrandize one "department" at the expense of
another did not capture the more complex reality. Noting, as the Watergate
legacy suggests, the immediate partisan context'of contemporary disputes,
Justice Scalia saw the independent counsel statute as "Congress's" attempt
to reduce "the President's" power by allowing it to compel investigations
that the President would not otherwise allow to go forward.26 If we move
back a bit from the immediate context of divided government, though, we
might see the independent counsel statute as an effort to deal with problems
that arise precisely when we can no longer personalize the presidency
because the President has so many subordinates over whom he has little
direct control. Because the executive is in fact no longer unitary, it is
misleading to insist on "the President's" responsibility for all that happens
in the executive departments.
Once we abandon the personalization of ambition, the Madisonian
positivist perspective cannot be sustained, for it relied on counterbalancing
forces of political ambition, which can no longer be located anywhere in the
complex bureaucracies of the modem state. Ambition, of course, remains:
members of the House of Representatives want to run for the Senate,
senators want to run for the presidency, presidents (and members of
Congress) want to be reelected. These ambitions, though, are not rooted in
the institutions themselves. Ambitious politicians look out for themselves,
not for the prerogatives of the departments in which they find themselves.
Other originalist perspectives are equally flawed, for more familiar
reasons. Suppose, contrary to Madison, that the Framers did embed in the
Constitution a particular vision of the proper relation between "the
executive" and "Congress." As critics of originalism have shown, the
transformation of government means precisely that the Framers' vision
cannot resolve contemporary controversies.
More generally, the complexity of governing in the contemporary
world-the problems of a national economy's integration into an internation-
al system and the problems of establishing or maintaining a just and orderly
society in an ethnically and socially pluralist nation-means that new
24. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 926.
25. 487 U.S. 654, 701-03 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 703.
1772 [Vol. 18
70
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss3/1
Tushnet
instruments of government are likely to be developed. We have become
accustomed to one such innovation: the administrative agency. Separation
of powers purists suggested that such agencies are unconstitutional, 7 but
the Court, in Bowsher v. Synar,2" went out of its way to indicate its
disapproval of that position.29 It is only because we had not adjusted to
other innovations, such as the independent counsel or the Sentencing
Commission, that constitutional challenges seemed credible.
In this sense, the novel methods of government that have generated
separation of powers cases are not the legacy of Watergate. They are,
instead, the products of modem life. As such, however, analyzing them
with constitutional concepts predicated upon images of a government such
as existed in 1789 is not likely to be helpful. If neither the presidency nor
Congress is unitary, for example, the personalization associated with the
Madisonian idea of ambition counteracting ambition simply does not speak
to the institutions of government we now have. Analyses that pursue that
idea, or indeed any other predicated on an understanding of the constitution-
al order of older institutions, may be faithful to the Constitution in an
originalist sense yet unfaithful to the constitutional project.
That project is to assure that the institutions we actually have be
regulated by law, and that all who exercise public power are governed by
the rule of law. The question then becomes whether it is possible to
develop an approach to separation of powers analysis that is both descrip-
tively accurate-that captures the fundamentals of modem government-and
normatively acceptable-that ensures the rule of law. The difficulty is
particularly acute in connection with separation of powers disputes. In the
constitutional scheme, the separation of powers might be called a "trans-
substantive" method of protecting liberty and promoting effective govern-
ment.30 Separation of powers controversies ought to be resolved, accord-
ing to this method, without regard to the underlying political issue
provoking the controversy. So, for example, whether the Constitution has
room for a special counsel must be decided without regard to the actions of
27. See, e.g., Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub noma.
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Geoffrey Miller, IndependentAgencies, 1986 SUP.
CT. REv. 71.
28. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
29. Id. at 725 n.4.
30. I adopt 1he term from discussions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g.,
Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84
YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1975).
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Richard Nixon or Ronald Reagan, except to the extent that those actions
reveal something systemic about how the modem presidency operates.
To decide these questions trans-substantively, courts must ask whether,
taking the way the modem government operates into account, liberty and
efficiency will be better promoted by allowing some governmental
innovation or by barring it. The functionalist approach now prevailing on
the Court is problematic because it so often amounts to a rubber-stamp for
institutional innovations: If Congress believed that the innovations serve
useful functions without threatening the balance of power that promotes
liberty, the courts are not well-positioned to disagree. The Court's
functionalism, thus, may simply be how it expresses its resigned acceptance
of what the Justices understand to be the inevitable modernization of the
national government. If in this view modernization might not be a transcen-
dentally good thing, but it is going to happen no matter what, then why
bother to pretend that there are constitutional barriers to modernization?
Understood in this way, functionalism may satisfy the demand for a
descriptively accurate approach to separation of powers problems. It hardly
seems to satisfy the demand for a normatively attractive one. The view that
such problems are the legacy of Watergate may stand in the way of
developing a more satisfactory approach. Somehow, judges and scholars
have to figure out a way to identify which of the innovations modem life
is likely to bring forward ought to be rejected as unconstitutional. Treating
the problems as the legacy of Watergate does not seem likely to help in that
endeavor.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For almost two years, from early 1973 to September, 1974, Watergate
dominated the nation's consciousness. On a daily basis it was on the front
pages-usually the headline; in the news magazines-usually the cover
story; on the television news-usually the lead. Washington, D.C., a town
that ordinarily is obsessed by the future and dominated by predictions about
what the President and Congress will do next, was obsessed by the past and
dominated by questions about what Richard Nixon had done and why he
had done it. Small wonder: Watergate was the political story of the
century.
Since 1974, Watergate has been studied and commented on by
reporters, television documentary makers, historians, and others. These
commentators have had an unprecedented amount of material with which to
work, starting with the tapes, the documentary record of the Nixon
Administration, other material in the Nixon Presidential Materials Project,
plus the transcripts of the various congressional hearings, the courtroom
testimony of the principal actors, and the memoirs of the participants. But
despite the billions of words that have been written and said about
* Stephen Ambrose is Boyd Professor of History and Director of the Eisenhower Center
at the University of New Orleans. He is an editor of the Eisenhower papers and has authored
more than a dozen books on history and political affairs, including NIXON: THE TRIUMPH OF
A POLITICIAN 1962-1972.
This essay comprises the edited remarks of Professor Ambrose delivered at the
Watergate Era Symposium held at Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center in Fort
Lauderdale, Florida on March 25-26, 1993.
73
: Nova Law Review 18, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
Watergate, fundamental questions about the scandal remain. These
questions include: Why did the burglars break into the offices of the
Democratic National Committee ("DNC")? Who was Deep Throat? Why
didn't Nixon burn the tapes once Alexander Butterfield had revealed their
existence? Did Nixon cut a deal with Vice President Gerald Ford-a
resignation for a pardon? These are the questions I will take up in this
essay.
II. WHY DID THEY BREAK IN?
The day after the arrest of the burglars in the offices of the DNC,
Nixon scribbled some comments on a Ron Ziegler memo that characterized
the break-in as a "third-rate burglary." Nixon wrote, "He [Ziegler]
understated. Attempt at burglary. Bizarre business. There was no
involvement whatsoever by W[hite] H[ouse] personnel."
Thus did the cover-up begin, and to this day those words constitute
Nixon's basic defense; he knew nothing about it and he could not for the
life of him figure out why anyone would want to break into the DNC.
In a lifetime of bold and brazen acts, this was the boldest and most
brazen, as well as the most successful. Two decades later, Nixon's query
still dominates discussion and investigation of Watergate. Why break into
the DNC? Who on earth ordered such a foolish thing?
The answer revolves around the strange relationship between Howard
Hughes, Larry O'Brien and Richard Nixon. Hughes gave money to both the
Democratic and Republican parties and, Nixon believed, had paid off a nine
million dollar debt from Hubert Humphrey's 1968 campaign. Nixon knew
that Hughes had O'Brien on his payroll. Nixon also knew that Hughes had,
at various times over the preceding twenty-five years, given money to him
[Nixon]--often large amounts, in cash. Further, Nixon had made some big
money from Florida real estate investments made with Bebe Rebozo-and
evidently Hughes was in on the operation, and Nixon was afraid that
O'Brien knew about the whole scheme.
In 1972, H.R. "Bob" Haldeman talked with White House aide Jeb
Magruder about the puzzle of who ordered the break-in and why.
Haldeman's handwritten notes of the conversation read: "Plan hatched
here-Hunt, Liddy & Colson. Colson called Jeb twice-to get going on this
thing. Specifically L. O'Brien info re Fla. dealings."
Another Nixon defense is his question: Why should I have taken
chances when I knew I was a sure-thing winner in the 1972 election? The
effectiveness of the argument relies on the public's short and faulty memory.
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In early 1972 Nixon was trailing Senator Edmond Muskie in the polls. His
big lead did not come until after the Democrats nominated George
McGovem-by which time he had already put the pressure on CREEP
Chairman John Mitchell to get more intelligence on what O'Brien knew.
Also remember, in 1968, Nixon had a twenty-eight point lead over
Humphrey, but almost got beat. He was ahead of John Kennedy in 1960,
too, only to lose. To sum up, in the spring of 1972, Nixon was by no
means a certain winner and he wanted every edge he could get.
"To this (lay," Haldeman said at a 1987 conference at Hofstra Universi-
ty, "no one knows who ordered the break-in." That is true in the strictest
sense-no one has ever found an order reading, "break into the DNC, signed
RN." Nixon and his associates and defenders have raised all sorts of dark
possibilities: that it was a CIA or JCS plot, or a John Dean/Al Haig plot,
or that the Democrats set it up themselves.
In my opinion, John Mitchell ordered the operation; his principal agent
was Jeb Magruder; the operatives were men hired by Chuck Colson, G.
Gordon Liddy and H. Howard Hunt; all these men were responding to
unrelenting pressure from Nixon to find out what O'Brien knew.
III. WHO WAS DEEP THROAT?
Next question: Who was Deep Throat? Once again, I don't have an
answer, only an opinion. Deep Throat was a composite character made up
by Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward for dramatic purposes (and it surely
worked). Their information came from a variety of sources, none of whom
met them in underground garages in the middle of the night. This is based
on my judgment that no one person in the Administration knew as much as
Deep Throat supposedly knew.
A more substantial question is: What was the role of the press in
general, and Woodward and Bernstein in particular, in forcing Nixon's
resignation? The media, naturally enough, thought that it was central,
critical, and the sine qua non of the entire Watergate story. In my view, the
press played a peripheral role. Had there been no press coverage, or no
Washington Post investigative reporting, there still would have been a trial
in Judge John Sirica's court, there still would have been the Ervin
Committee Hearings, and there still would have been impeachment
proceedings. What brought Nixon to resignation was not the press but his
own conduct, as revealed by the constitutional process that was based on the
separation of powers. The courts and the Congress did their jobs. The
system worked.
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IV. WHY DIDN'T NIXON BURN THE TAPES?
What many people believe to be the most puzzling question of all is
actually the easiest to answer. The question is: When Butterfield revealed
the existence of the tapes, why didn't Nixon pile them up on the White
House lawn, call in the reporters, pour some gasoline over the tapes, say,
"watch, you bastards!" and toss a match on the pile?
John Connally urged him to do just that. Connally sent a message to
Haldeman: "Please, Bob, use your influence to convince the President to
bum the tapes .... Say they must be destroyed now that their existence
has been made public."
There was a perfect cover. Nixon could say that the conversations
dealt with national security affairs and matters highly embarrassing to
politicians from both parties. Since that was true, and since every politician
who had been in the Oval Office since 1971 was at that moment racking his
brain to remember what he had said there, a bonfire would have elicited
protest and criticism, but it would not have destroyed the President. Nor
would it have been illegal. Nixon regarded the tapes as his personal
property, a position upheld by the precedent that any President's papers are
his personal property, and a position upheld by the courts in 1992. As the
tapes had not been subpoenaed, burning them would not be destroying
evidence in a criminal case.
Still, a bonfire would have raised another storm. Leonard Garment
warned that it would forever seal an impression of guilt in the public mind.
Spiro Agnew agreed with Garment.
Haldeman also opposed destroying the tapes, but his reason had nothing
to do with public opinion. Rather, it got straight to the heart of the matter.
As Nixon later put it, "Haldeman said that the tapes were still our best
defense, and he recommended that they not be destroyed."
Later, Nixon's standard response to the question, what is the lesson of
Watergate? became, "bum the tapes." But at the time, in 1973, that was the
last thing he would do.
To understand why, it is first necessary to point out that only two men
in the Oval Office knew that a tape recorder was running. They were
Richard Nixon and H.R. Haldeman. That makes everything they said
suspicious-were they speaking spontaneously and truthfully, or were they
speaking for the record? It is impossible to tell. Listening to the tapes
today, when you hear Nixontell John Dean, "but that would be wrong," you
just can't tell if he means wrong in a political sense, or a moral sense, or a
constitutional sense, or a legal sense-or if he just wants to get that sentence
on the tape, just in case.
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Now flash forward to Nixon's situation had it come to an impeachment
and a trial before the Senate. Nixon's lawyer walks into the Senate chamber
with a tape recorder, and delivers the following speech: "Senators, you
have heard Mr. Dean accuse the President of paying blackmail money, hush
money, to Howard Hunt. Now, Senators, I want you to hear the President
himself, to hear his response when Dean told him the money had to be
paid." And with that, the lawyer hits the start button on the tape recorder,
and the Senate hears Nixon say, "but that would be wrong." The lawyer
hits the stop button. "Senators, you heard it yourselves. I rest my case."
There are two basic factors at work here. First, the tapes were Nixon's
best defense, just as Haldeman said, for the obvious reason that they
contained so many exculpatory statements by Nixon; statements that he had
made in his own transparent way whenever he remembered that the recorder
was running. Nixon had already drawn on that asset in the preparation of
a summary he had given Fred Buzhardt, which Buzhardt in turn had given
to the Republican staff members of the Ervin Committee. This summary
was what led to the Butterfield admission that a taping system existed in the
White House (Butterfield was responding to a question about how the
President could have such a good memory as to quote directly from
conversations more than a year old; in other words, as so often, Nixon had
no one to blame but himself for his problems).
The second factor was explained by Haldeman, who pointed out that
Nixon "just never dreamed it was possible that the tapes would ever be
heard by anyone other than himself." They were his property. They were
protected by executive privilege. Everything Nixon had said in his July 7,
1973 letter to Ervin ("I shall not permit access to Presidential papers")
applied equally to the tapes.
Nixon did not destroy the tapes because they constituted his best
defense, if used selectively, and because he was certain he could command
complete control of them. What Nixon failed to anticipate was the
persistence with which Ervin, the Special Prosecutor, and Judge Sirica
would demand access to the tapes, or the power of public opinion that
would muster behind that demand, or the independence of the Supreme
Court.
The Supreme Court was critical. Right up to the end of July, 1974,
Nixon was fairly confident the Court would rule that the tapes were his to
do with as he saw fit, or at least that the Court would divide, with two,
three, or possibly four votes upholding executive privilege, which would
allow him to defy an order to yield up the tapes. It was the unanimous
Court ruling that forced him to release the smoking gun tape of June 23,
1972.
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On July 21, 1973, Nixon wrote a private note on the subject: "If I had
discussed illegal action, I would not have taped. If I had discussed illegal
action and had taped, I would have destroyed the tapes once the investiga-
tion began."
Whether this was self-deception or pure cynicism, or something in
between, is impossible to say. He certainly had discussed illegal action on
March 21, 1973, with John Dean; indeed he had ordered illegal action (the
payment to Hunt) and it had been carried out. The attempt to use the CIA
to turn off the FBI back in June 1972, the break-in to Daniel Ellsberg's
psychiatrist's office, and other Nixon Administration actions had some cover
of national security, but the Hunt payment was in direct response to
blackmail.
With regard to Nixon's second sentence, he explained in his memoirs
that he decided the tapes were "my best insurance." If other aides turned
against him, as Dean had done, "the tapes would give me at least some
protection." They would provide a defense to sum up, so long as Nixon
could make selective use of the tapes. His greatest fear, repeated innumera-
ble times to Haldeman, was that Dean had his own tape, made on a machine
hidden in his lapel.
V. VICE PRESIDENT FORD AND THE PARDON
Before beginning my discussion of the pardon, I want to take this
opportunity to quote Richard Nixon on the subject of pardon and forgive-
ness.
At a news conference on January 31, 1973, Courtney Sheldon of the
Christian Science Monitor asked Nixon if, now that the war was over, he
had given any thought to amnesty for draft evaders.
Nixon replied that "it takes two to heal wounds," and, in view of the
criticism he was getting over the settlement, "it makes one [wonder] whether
some want the wounds healed." He said he had achieved "peace with
honor," even though "I know it gags some of you to write that phrase." As
to "healing the wounds . . . certainly I have sympathy for any individual
who has made a mistake. We have all made mistakes. But also, it is a rule
of life, we all have to pay for our mistakes."
He went on:
Amnesty means forgiveness. We cannot provide forgiveness. . ..
Those who served paid their price. Those who deserted must pay their
price, and the price is not a junket in the Peace Corps, or something like
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that, as some have suggested. The price is a criminal penalty for
disobeying the laws of the United States.
Now, why did Nixon choose Ford for his Vice President, and why did
Ford pardon Nixon? Spiro Agnew's resignation in October 1973, triggered
the Twenty-fifth Amendment, which required Nixon to select a new Vice
President, subject to confirmation by a majority of both Houses of Congress.
Who can say what went through Nixon's mind? As Ford aide Robert
Hartmann has commented, "no man living can outguess Richard Nixon
when it comes to figuring things out to the third, fourth, and fifth degree of
indirection." Certainly, there were a lot of nuances and complexities-much
to think about.
The terms of the Twenty-fifth Amendment gave Nixon an invaluable
asset; in the event of his resignation, impeachment, or death, it was nothing
less than the ultimate prize in American politics. He was sure to spend it
in such a way as to do himself the most good. But because the wording of
the Twenty-fifth Amendment was mandatory, he had to spend it quickly.
Nor could he spend it freely, as his selection was subject to congressional
confirmation.
Under ordinary circumstances, Nixon would have given his full
attention to his momentous decision, but October 10, 1973, was not an
ordinary occasion. Nixon's biggest problem was not selecting a replacement
for Agnew, but finding someway to avoid the demands of Special Prosecu-
tor Archibold Cox for Watergate related tapes. The case was before the
United States Court of Appeals, which was scheduled to hand down its
ruling in a day or two.
When Nixon saw Attorney General Richardson on the afternoon of
October 10, his first words were, "now that we have disposed of that matter
[Agnew's resignation], we can go ahead and get rid of Cox."
But if the ruling of the court of appeals went against him on the tapes,
even getting rid of Cox would not solve his problems. If he refused to
comply, he would set off a major constitutional crisis. Uppermost in his
mind, then, was not the Twenty-fifth Amendment, but Section 2 of Article
I of the Constitution, which states that the House of Representatives "shall
have the sole Power of Impeachment." In short, if the firing of Cox and the
defiance of a court order set off a serious impeachment proceeding, Nixon's
fate would rest, first of all, with the Republican members of the House.
Nixon could not count on their unquestioning support. Aside from his
Watergate problems, there was the Christmas bombing. Coming immediate-
ly after Henry Kissinger's election-eve claim that "peace is at hand," the
bombing had led to widespread criticism of the President, from Republicans
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as well as Democrats. There was a further cause for worry, one that was
expressed by Nixon's Congressional liaison aide, William Timmons, in a
post-election memorandum: "Unfortunately, many GOP members feel the
President was interested in his own reelection and didn't do enough to help
them in their campaigns. This could result in an independent attitude
toward the President." Worst of all, in part because of Nixon's single-
minded concentration on his own reelection, the Democrats controlled the
House.
To sum up the situation on the afternoon of October 10, what Nixon
most needed to buy with the asset the Twenty-fifth Amendment gave him
was some Republican support in the House of Representatives.
Immediately after receiving Agnew's resignation, Nixon began
conferring with congressional leaders, cabinet members, and his aides.
Washington was agog; the atmosphere was likened to a political convention.
In the midst of intense speculation, the names most often mentioned were
Governors Nelson Rockefeller and Ronald Reagan, along with John
Connally, Elliot Richardson, and Barry Goldwater. Gerald Ford's name,
however, was not mentioned.
Nixon's most important conference on October 10 was with presidential
advisors Bryce Harlow and Mel Laird. Between them, they knew the House
as well as any two men in the country. Laird had been a congressman for
sixteen years; Harlow had been President Dwight Eisenhower's liaison with
Congress for eight years and Nixon's for two years. They told the President
he had but one choice, Gerald Ford.
The Speaker of the House, Carl Albert, told the President bluntly that
Ford was the only Republican who could be quickly confirmed. Late that
evening, Laird made a telephone call to Ford. "Jerry," he said, "if you were
asked, would you accept the Vice Presidential nomination?" Laird did not
say that he was inquiring for Nixon, but as Ford noted, "someone had told
him to call."
In short, Nixon had made up his mind before he saw the results of his
poll. The poll itself (recently released by the National Archives) showed
how popular Ford was in the House, as well as how little support he had
outside that body. In the House, there were eighty votes for Ford, thirty-
five for Rockefeller, twenty-three for Reagan, and sixteen for Connally.
Nixon could hardly have been surprised by the results of his poll. He
was one of the best at counting votes in the Congress, almost as good as
Laird and Harlow. That was why he had picked Ford even before he
opened a single ballot.
Figuring out Nixon's motives for his decisions is a popular, if not
frustrating, political parlor game. With regard to his selection of Ford, H.
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R. Haldeman told me once that Nixon picked Ford because he reasoned that
as the members of the House knew Ford so intimately, they would never
impeach Nixon if it meant Ford would become President. Haldeman's
interpretation is that Ford was Nixon's insurance policy. Others have
adopted the same view.
If true, Nixon had made a fatal blunder. As the poll showed, Ford was
widely popular among the Republicans in the House; as the event showed
in August of 1974, republican congressmen could hardly wait to substitute
Ford for Nixon as President. If Nixon wanted an insurance policy, he
should have supported Agnew's demand for an impeachment inquiry, as a
way of keeping Agnew in office. How many Democrats would have been
willing to vote to impeach Nixon if Agnew had been Vice President?
It is always dangerous to ascribe to Nixon a single, simple motive, but
in this case it seems too clear that he selected Ford as a way of appeasing
Republican members of the House of Representatives; with Cox, the tapes,
and the defiance of a court order uppermost in his mind. Others would
argue that what Nixon had in mind was further down the road; his own
resignation, and consequent need for a pardon. In this interpretation, he felt
he could count on "good old Jerry" more than anyone else.
On August 1, 1974, Haig met with Ford. Haig's purpose, he later
testified, was to tell Ford that Nixon was close to resigning and "to
emphasize to him [Ford] that he had to be prepared to assume the presiden-
cy within a very short time." But there was more to it than that. As Ford
later testified, "it was his [Haig's] understanding from a White House
lawyer that a President did have the authority to grant a pardon even before
any criminal action had been taken against an individual." It was a private
meeting. It inevitably raises suspicion that a deal was cut between Haig and
Ford; a pardon for a resignation.
The only two men who know for certain, both vehemently deny that
a deal was made. Judging by the extensive written commentary, much of
which was by men close to Nixon or Ford, their denials are hard to believe.
But unless a tape recording emerges, or unless either Haig or Ford say
something different from what they have already testified, no one will ever
be able to prove that a deal was cut.
I cannot resist the temptation to do some speculation of my own. I
begin with some observations. First, while Nixon and Ford were close
professional associates, they were not intimate friends who trusted each
other. At their October 10, 1973 meeting, Ford noticed that Nixon was
relaxed, that he was wearing a sports jacket and slacks, and that he was
smoking a pipe. Ford had never before seen Nixon relaxed, casually
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dressed, or smoking. The fact that all this was new to Ford tells a great
deal about how close their quarter-century old relationship was.
Second, Nixon owed Ford far more than Ford owed Nixon. It was
characteristic of Nixon that he got more loyalty than he ever gave, and that
was certainly true in this case. Ford had staunchly supported Nixon
throughout his career, from the fund crisis of 1952 to the Watergate crisis
of 1972-74, while Nixon had double-crossed Ford in the Douglas affair, and
throughout his first term treated Ford with disdain that bordered on
contempt. Nixon had lied to Ford from January of 1973 to August of 1974
when he insisted that he had no involvement in the Watergate cover-up.
Nixon not only allowed, but encouraged Ford to make himself vulnerable
by forthrightly and indignantly defending the President.
While it is true that Nixon had chosen Ford to become Vice President,
both men knew that circumstances rather than admiration, friendship, or
trust dictated that choice. Further, there is no evidence that Nixon attempted
to get Ford to agree that in return for the Vice Presidency, Ford would grant
a pardon if worse came to worst. Nixon did ask Ford to promise that he
would not be a candidate for the Presidency in 1976; a promise Ford gave-
which in itself is a reminder of how valuable private, personal promises are
among American politicians.
Third, it was the Vice President, not the President, who occupied a
position of strength at the beginning of August, 1974. Ford enjoyed deep
and wide-spread support from the public and from the Congress; Nixon did
not. Nixon could not say, "look, either you promise to pardon, or I'll never
resign." The Presidency was no longer Nixon's to give or keep.
Fourth, it is necessary to recall what Bryce Harlow said to Ford in a
discussion following the August 1st meeting between Haig and Ford.
Hartmann had arranged the get-together because he wanted to convince Ford
to tell Nixon that there could be no deal, or even the appearance of one.
Better the message came from Harlow than from Hartmann. Harlow told
Ford,
it is inconceivable that [Haig] was not carrying out a mission for the
President, with precise instructions, and that it is the President who
wants to hear your recommendations and test your reaction to the
pardon question. But the President knows that he must be able to swear
under oath that he never discussed this with you and that you must be
able to swear that you never discussed it with him.
Ford saw the point. He called Haig to say that he had no intention of
recommending whether or not Nixon should resign. Ford added that
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nothing he and Haig talked about (meaning the President's pardoning
power) should be given any consideration whatsoever as indicating any
intent on his part to involve himself in Nixon's resignation decision. Haig
said he understood and agreed.
That sounds far more believable than the opposite conclusion, that Haig
and Ford entered into a solid deal of pardon for resignation. My own
reading of Nixon is that he had thought the whole thing through and
concluded that the far greater risk was to have Haig ask straight out for a
pardon agreement. That might have caused Ford to bristle, grow indignant,
get angry, throw Haig out of his office, and set his feet in cement against
a pardon. It is often true in American politics that what is not said, but that
both sides can count on as being understood, leads to a more solid
agreement than what is promised.
Fifth, Nixon could anticipate political developments accurately.
Looking ahead,, he knew President Ford's problems in the late summer of
1974 would be many and difficult, and that the last thing the new President
would want would be a flood of pre-Nixon trial publicity. For his own
good, for the good of the Republican party, for the good of the country,
Ford would want to avoid the orgy of Nixon-bashing that would accompany
a Nixon indictment and trial.
Nixon could be confident that Ford would both be told and would
figure out for himself that picking a jury for a Nixon trial would dominate
the headlines for weeks, perhaps months, and still might prove impossible.
An actual trial would be even worse. As to what might be revealed in a
trial, again Nixon could count on Ford's shuddering at the thought of that.
Nixon knew that Ford was going to have to pardon him, and he did not
send Haig to see Ford to extract such a promise. Being Nixon, he could not
help himself from meddling, manipulating, and seeking reassurance. So
Nixon sent Haig to see Ford, not to make a deal, but to make sure Ford
knew that as President he had the right to pardon even before an indictment.
When Haig reported that Ford had been so informed, Nixon was satisfied.
A week later, he resigned.
One month later, Ford pardoned Nixon for all crimes he may have
committed. I confess that at the time I shared the feelings of helpless rage
that overcame millions of Americans. My fury knew no bounds. I cursed,
I screamed, I swore I'd never forgive Jerry Ford. I was certain Ford had
entered into a corrupt bargain with Nixon.
Over the years, however, I have come to realize that Ford was
absolutely right to do what he did. It may have been something he had to
do, but he still deserves credit for doing it forthrightly, courageously,
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quickly, and at his own expense. The last thing this country needed in
1975-76 was to tear itself yet further apart over the fate of Richard Nixon.
My subject has been Nixon's selection of Ford for the Vice Presidency,
and Ford's pardon of Nixon. My conclusion is that in October of 1973,
Nixon had no choice, and that in September of 1974, Ford had no choice.
The circumstances that dictated the developments were the structure of the
existing situations, not the personalities of the two men, nor any secret
deals.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need
not be further urged. All that remains for me to add is, that you keep
the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon secrecy, success
depends in most Enterprises of the kind, and for want of it they are
generally defeated . .. ."
- Letter from George Washington to Elias
Dayton, July 26, 1777.
1. 8 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 478-79 (Q. Fitzpatrick ed. 1933).
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"No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his
interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt
his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are
unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time."
- THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
This article considers whether Congress constitutionally may empower
independent counsel to challenge presidential invocations of the state secrets
privilege,2 and whether federal courts constitutionally may review such
challenges. A case or controversy implicating these questions nearly arose
out of the Iran-Contra Affair when the Reagan and Bush administrations
opposed the public disclosure of evidence necessary for the trials of Oliver
North, John Poindexter, Richard Secord, Albert Hakim, and Joseph
Fernandez on the ground that disclosure would harm the national security.
Lawrence Walsh, the Iran-Contra Independent Counsel, chose not to seek
judicial evaluation of the executive national security claims, however,
choosing instead to drop the central conspiracy charges against North,
Poindexter, Secord, and Hakim and to acquiesce in judicial dismissal of the
entire Fernandez indictment.
A threshold question also existed whether Congress actually had
authorized independent counsel to challenge executive state secret claims.
Two statutes governed this question: Title VI of the Ethics in Government
Act of 1978' (which created independent counsel) and the Classified
Information Procedures Act of 1980 ("CIPA").4 Pursuant to a sunset
provision, the independent counsel portions of the Ethics Act expired
2. The state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary privilege which the United States
may invoke to prevent the disclosure of "national security information." See infra note 61,
section IV.A.2, and subpart IV.B.
"National security information" refers to information relating to military, intelligence, or
foreign affairs matlers the public disclosure of which could harm the national security of the
United States. The term encompasses, but is not limited to, "classified information."
"Classified information" refers to information the United States Government officially
has designated as national security information pursuant to statute or executive order. See
generally Bruce E. Fein, Access to Classified Information: Constitutional and Statutory
Dimensions, 26 W14. & MARY L. REV. 805, 807-09 (1985). By invoking the state secrets
privilege, the United States can avoid disclosing or prevent the disclosure of national security
information which has not been formally classified.
3. Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 601(a), 92 Stat. 1824, 1867-73 (1978) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 49, 528-29, 591-99 (1988)) (expired 1992) [hereinafter Ethics Act].
4. Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980) (codified at 18 U.S.C. app. II § 4 (1988))
[hereinafter CIPA].
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December 15, 1992. 5 Construction of the expired statute continues to be
important nonetheless. The Senate and House of Representatives each have
passed bills which would reenact the relevant portions of the expired
legislation,6 and President Clinton has advocated that the expired legislation
be renewed.7
Part II of this article recounts the experience of the Iran-Contra
independent counsel, and surveys historical judicial practice regarding
review of executive nondisclosure decisions in the national security area.
Part III examines the statutory framework which existed prior to the
expiration of the independent counsel portions of the Ethics Act. Along
with Independent Counsel Walsh, commentators appear uniformly to have
concluded that the Ethics Act and CIPA did not empower independent
counsel to seek judicial review of executive attempts to suppress trial
evidence on grounds of national security.8 Part III offers a contrary view.
The discussion in part three also applies to the statutory framework which
would exist were Congress to renew the independent counsel portions of the
Ethics Act.
Part IV is an extended argument that Congress constitutionally may
empower independent counsel to challenge, and federal courts to review,
presidential invocations of the state secrets privilege. It questions a contrary
view recently expressed by Professor Ronald Noble, and suggested by a
1981 Gary Schmitt essay about executive privilege.9
5. Sunset provision at 28 U.S.C. § 599. A filibuster threat prevented timely congressional
consideration of a reauthorization bill. See, e.g., Senator Carl Levin & Senator William Cohen,
Save the Special Prosecutor Law, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1992, at C7.
6. S. 24, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1993); H.R. 811, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); see also
Joe Davidson, Senate Renews Special Counsel Law, But Adds Some Controls on Spending,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1993, at A4; Adam Clymer, House Votes to Restore Independent Counsel
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1994, at A25.
7. Reno Backs Revival oflndependent-Counsel Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 16,1993, § 1, at 15.
8. See Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, vol. I, at xxi, 55,
565, Aug. 4, 1993 [hereinafter Final Report of Independent Counsel]; Ronald K. Noble, The
Independent Counsel Versus the Attorney General in a Classified Information Procedures Act
- Independent Counsel Statute Case, 33 B.C. L. REV. 539, 572 (1992); Sandra D. Jordan,
Classified Information and Conflicts in Independent Counsel Prosecutions: Balancing the
Scales of Justice After Iran-Contra, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1651, 1654 (1991); HAROLD HONGJU
KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION-SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA
AFFAIR 240 n.87 (1990).
9. See Noble, supra note 8, at 577-80; Gary J. Schmitt, Executive Privilege: Presidential
Power to Withhold Information from Congress, in THE PRESIDENCY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDER 154 (Joseph M. Bessette & Jeffrey Tulis eds., 1981).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Experience of the Iran-Contra Independent Counsel
Through their control of national security information, the Reagan and
Bush administrations exerted significant leverage over Independent Counsel
Lawrence Walsh, the Special Prosecutor responsible for investigating the
Iran-Contra Affair. The Executive branch's opposition to the use of national
security information as evidence in the Iran-Contra trials led the Independent
Counsel to drop the central charges against former National Security Council
aide Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, former National Security Adviser
Admiral John Poindexter, Major General Richard Secord, and Albert
Hakim.' 0 It also pressured him into acquiescing in Judge Claude Hilton's
dismissal of the entire indictment of Joseph Fernandez, the former Central
Intelligence Agency ("CIA") station chief in Costa Rica.
The situation was novel in the independent counsel context. No party
was seeking access to information. This distinguishes the Iran-Contra
dynamic from the Watergate tapes case. There, the special prosecutor Leon
Jaworski sought access to information only the President possessed.' 2 In
the Iran-Contra prosecutions, the judges, defendants, and prosecutor already
were privy to the relevant information. At issue was whether the prosecu-
tion and the defendants could disclose it at trial.
1. A Hamstrung Independent Counsel
The most obvious and direct effect of an executive prohibition of the
evidentiary use of national security information is to prevent the prosecution
of particular allegations of criminal wrongdoing. Such prohibition, however,
also may diminish an independent counsel's ability to carry out his or her
overall investigative function-arguably the more important role an indepen-
10. THIRD INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS BY INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR IRAN/CONTRA
MATTERS (June 25, 1992) [hereinafter THIRD INTERIM REPORT BY INDEPENDENT COUNSEL],
relevant portions reprinted in 138 CONG. REC. S9179-01 (daily ed. June 30, 1992) (statement
of Sen. Kerry); see also Michael Wines, ProsecutorAsks for Dismissal of Key Charges Against
North; Disclosure of Secrets Feared, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1989, at Al; David Johnston, U.S.
Drops Part of its Case Against Iran-Contra Figures, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1989, at A7.
11. Final Report of Independent Counsel, supra note 8, at xv, 37-38, 283, 288-93; see also
United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 153 (4th Cir. 1990).
12. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). That the Watergate prosecutions did
not involve national security information also distinguishes them from the Iran-Contra
prosecutions. See id. at 706, 710.
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dent counsel is expected to play in our governmental scheme.' 3 The threat
of criminal sanction is a prosecutor's primary instrument for obtaining
information or testimony from potential sources or witnesses, and it is a
significant investigatory advantage an independent counsel has over Con-
gress.'4 Deprived of it, an independent counsel may be left groping for the
light switch.
Walsh, for instance, most likely targeted North, Fernandez, and
Poindexter as much to pry loose any incriminating knowledge they might
possess about their superiors as for any retribution or deterrence objec-
tives. 15 It had been hoped that if the Fernandez prosecution progressed, for
example, Fernandez would implicate higher-ups at the CIA in return for
leniency.' 6  Almost two years after the Fernandez indictment was dis-
missed, Walsh allowed Alan Fiers, former chief of the CIA's Central
American Task Force, to plead guilty to misdemeanor charges of withhold-
ing information from Congress. In return, Fiers provided information and
13. The Ethics Act required an independent counsel to file a final report with a supervisory
judicial panel, and the panel in turn was permitted to transmit the report to Congress or publish
any portions it deemed appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 594(h) (1988) (expired 1992). Section
595(a)(2) authorized an independent counsel to submit reports to Congress whenever he or she
wanted. Section 595(c) required an independent counsel to advise the House of Representatives
of any information he or she discovered that might constitute grounds for an impeachment. See
also THIRD INTERIM REPORT BY INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, supra note 10 ("Under the governing
statute, Independent Counsel's responsibilities are threefold. First, he has an investigative role.
Second, he has a prosecutorial role. Third, he has a reporting role.") (citations omitted);
MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour (PBS television broad-cast, Nov. 24, 1989) (transcript available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File) (statement of Scott Armstrong of the National Security
Archives regarding the "role of the office").
14. Arthur Liman, Chief Counsel to the Senate Iran/Contra Committee, Congressional
Investigations and Criminal Prosecutions: The Iran-Contra Experience, Remarks at NYU Law
School, at 23 (Oct. 22, 1991) (unpublished text of speaker's prepared remarks on file with
author) ("Without the power to indict," Senate Committee had little success convincing
witnesses whose stories did not hold up "that they should be more forthcoming for us than they
were for the Independent Counsel.").
15. Final Report of Independent Counsel, supra note 8, vol. I, at 106 (viewing North's
cooperation as the key to the secrets behind the Iran-Contra Affair), 136 (noting that
Independent Counsel's investigative mandate could not be fulfilled until Poindexter was
interrogated to find out about activities of other high-ranking officials); see also JEFFREY
TOOBIN, OPENING ARGUMENTS, A YOUNG LAWYER'S FIRST CASE 170 (1991) (regarding Office
of Independent Counsel's expectations about evidence North could offer).
16. Final Report of Independent Counsel, supra note 8, vol. I, at 292-93 (stating that
Fernandez would have incriminated higher-ups at CIA had case gone to trial); see also
MacNeillLehrer Newshour, PBS television broadcast, Nov. 24, 1989 (transcript available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File) (statement of Nina Totenberg).
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testimony which enabled Walsh to indict Claire George, former CIA
Director of Operations, two months later for perjury and obstruction of
Congress, and enabled Walsh three months later to obtain guilty pleas from
Elliot Abrams, former Assistant Secretary of State for inter-American affairs,
for withholding information from Congress.' 7 Four months after the Fiers
plea bargain, Walsh indicted Duane Clarridge, former head of the CIA's
Latin American Division and counterterrorism unit, for perjury and false
statements." It is mere speculation (but illustrative nonetheless) to
hypothesize that Walsh might have reached Fiers, George, Abrams, and
Clarridge sooner if he could have brought more pressure to bear on
Fernandez.
2. A Remaining Gap in the Government's
System of Self-Policing
A structural and procedural defect once thought to exist in our govern-
ment's system of self-policing, and which Congress sought to repair by
creating independent counsel in the Ethics Act, reemerged during the
Iran-Contra Affair in a slightly altered, narrower form. "Congress, of
course, was concerned when it created the office of independent counsel
with the conflicts of interest that could arise in situations when the
Executive branch is called upon to investigate its own high-ranking
officers."' 19 Congress's concern derived from a sentiment that
fifty years of the nation's history involving the Teapot Dome, Truman
Administration, and Watergate scandals, has demonstrated a generally
recognized inability of the Department of Justice and the Attorney
General to function impartially with full public confidence in investigat-
ing criminal wrongdoing of high-ranking government officials of the
same political party. °
17. Final Report of Independent Counsel, supra note 8, vol. I, at 53, 263, 281; see also
David Johnston, Poindexter Wins Iran-Contra Case in Appeals Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
1991, at Al, A8.
18. Final Report of Independent Counsel, supra note 8, vol. I, at 53; see also David
Johnston, Ex-C.LA, Official Charged in Iran Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1991, at A12; David
Johnston, Ex-Agent Cut a Dashing Figure in the Spy World, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1991, at A 12.
19. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677 (1988).
20. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 504 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (quoting In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34,42 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). See also,
e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1307, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 1 (1978) ("purpose of the legislation is to...
eliminate the conflict of interest inherent when the Department of Justice must investigate and
prosecute high-level executive branch officials").
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Slightly more than a decade after the passage of the Ethics Act, the
Executive no longer was investigating its own high-ranking members, but
it had successfully retained de facto responsibility for determining whether
evidence could or could not be used in their criminal trials. Here, the issue
remained whether the Executive was able to "function impartially with full
public confidence."
3. The Appearance of Executive Bias
The specter of an executive conflict of interest pervaded the Walsh
national security information setbacks.
a. The North Case
Professor Harold Koh writes: "Public suspicion that President Reagan
had issued North a 'pocket pardon' was dampened only by the fact that
neither the judge nor the independent counsel had challenged publicly the
legitimacy of the nondisclosure.",2' This "despite the Reagan administra-
tion's questioning of both the fitness of the case for judicial examination and
the constitutionality of independent counsels" in amicus briefs it had filed
prior to the dropping of the two North counts.22
According to Koh, "classified information that later became public
during the [North] trial cast doubt on the validity of the government's
sweeping claims of secrecy. 23  For instance, the intelligence agencies
initially demanded that the entire pretrial CIPA order of Judge Gerhard
Gesell be sealed, but when Gesell later ordered it unsealed, only two words
in the ten-page order were redacted.24 Similarly, Koh and others25 adduce
a memorandum the independent counsel introduced as evidence in edited
form which, it was later discovered, had been made public in its entirety in
a civil lawsuit the previous year. Koh finds "troubling" that this discovery
21. See KOH, supra note 8, at 32.
22. See id. at 24, 28, 32 (citing Memorandum of Law of the United States Filed by the
Department of Justice as Amicus Curiae with respect to the Independent Counsel's Opposition
to the Defendant's Motions to Dismiss or Limit Count One at 6, United States v. North No.
88-0080-02 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 18, 1988); Brief on Behalf of Amicus Curiae United States in
Nos. 87-5261, 87-5264, and 87-5265, In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd
sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)).
23. KoH, supra note 8, at 32.
24. Id. (citing Sealed Memorandum and Order re North's CIPA § 5 Notices (D.D.C. Jan.
19, 1989)).
25. See, e.g., MacNeillLehrer Newshour, supra note 13 (statement of Nina Totenberg).
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prompted Gesell to complain of a "looseness in Government dealings with
this problem of classified information. 26 Gesell, who mockingly dubbed
the executive intelligence officials who monitored secrecy in the North trial
"security gurus, '27 also complained that he faced an "absurd situation
where the press is accurately reporting information in the public domain
while the court is confronted with representations that the same facts must
never be officially acknowledged."2
Jeffrey Toobin, an associate independent counsel to Walsh during the
North trial, has characterized the intelligence agencies as "insatiable" and
having "paranoid fantasies."29
Virtually all of the information relevant to the trial of Oliver North had
been disclosed during the time of the Iran-Contra hearings-either in
the hearings themselves or in press reports about them. But that, as we
came to learn, did not necessarily help us as we began our lengthy
struggle over classified information. We were still discovering one true
secret of the charmed circle of national security insiders: that what is
labeled secret often is not?0
According to Toobin, the administration took the position that
diplomatic necessity required the nondisclosure of information that was
widely known, but not officially acknowledged.'
26. KOH, supra note 8, at 32 (citing David Johnston, Trial of North Stalled Again; Defense
Moves for Dismissal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1989, at Al, A20). A similar episode involving
North's personal notebooks-which North removed from the National Security Council after
he was fired-is cited in Walsh's final report. The notebooks remained in North's possession,
and, for Fifth Amendment reasons, Walsh could not obtain copies of them until North testified
in his own defense at trial. "In view of the enormous amount of classified, compartmented
information in the North notebooks," Walsh's final report states, "Independent Counsel is at a
loss to explain why attorneys general Meese and Thornburgh declined to recover the notebooks
from North. Final Report of Independent Counsel, supra note 8, vol. I, at 119 n.61.
27. E.g., Joe Pichirallo, Spy Agencies Gain Seats at North Trial; 9 Potential Jurors Are
Added to Pool, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1989, at A4.
28. KOH, supra note 8, at 32 (citing Memorandum and Order re Motion of Defendant North
to Dismiss the Indictment for Prosecutorial Misconduct at 5 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 1989)).
29. TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 206, 208.
30. Id. at 172.
31. It appears Ihat the intelligence agencies commonly take this position. As much or more
than the intelligence community fears exposure of specific operations, capabilities, or sources,
it fears fostering a perception around the world that the United States cannot keep a secret.
Such a perception would decrease the willingness of governments, sources, and assets to
cooperate covertly with the United States. Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act:
A Short Case Study in the Perils and Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY
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When a fact had merely been disclosed in the media ... the adminis-
tration could say to its allies that the United States government had not
officially confirmed that fact-even if the newspaper stories cited, as
they invariably did, unnamed government officials. So the classified
information regulations did not apply to administration officials leaking
classified information to their favorite reporters; but they did, apparent-
ly, apply to us-when we were only trying to play by the rules. In
truth, then, the four-cornered debate among the judge, the defense, the
prosecution, and the administration.., had almost nothing to do with
"secrets," as that word is conventionally used in the English lan-
guage.32
Toobin recounts, for example, that on December 21, 1988, the administra-
tion held a cabinet-level meeting to discuss the national security issues in
the North case and decided to "allow [the Independent Counsel] to disclose
that Saudi Arabia had donated money to the Contras-a fact that had been
common knowledge for approximately a year."33
According to Toobin, the administration did not limit its nondisclosure
L.J. 649, 671-77 (1984). From this standpoint, even a highly publicized trial of an intelligence
official which disclosed no information remotely classifiable as sensitive could severely damage
our national security. Hard data demonstrating that information disclosure impairs intelligence
activities are scarce, however. Id. at 676. More relevant to the Iran-Contra prosecutions, it is
a highly contestable proposition that official disclosures chill potential covert cooperators more
than pervasive unofficial disclosures do.
32. TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 173; see also SECOND INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS BY
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS, at 21 (Dec. 11, 1989) (copy of
unclassified version on file with author) [hereinafter SECOND INTERIM REPORT BY INDEPEN-
DENT COUNSEL] ("Independent Counsel believed that two of the primary concerns of the
intelligence agencies-the names of certain Latin American countries and general references
to one of the capabilities of a particular agency-were publicly known and should not [have
been barred from disclosure at the North trial].").
33. TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 185; see also SECOND INTERIM REPORT BY INDEPENDENT
COUNSEL, supra note 32, at 21 (recounting cabinet-level meeting of Attorney General with
representatives of intelligence agencies on Dec. 21, 1988). For press accounts confirming
Toobin's assertion that Saudi Arabia's donation was common knowledge for approximately a
year prior to December 21, 1988, see, e.g., David E. Rosenbaum, The Iran-Contra Thicket;
Mysteries Remain in the Affair, Even as It Has Raised Vital Issues on Abuse of Power, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 1987, at Al ("Saudi Arabia was donating millions of dollars to the rebel
forces .... ); Gerald M. Boyd, Reagan Denies Asking Saudisfor Contra Aid, N.Y. TIMES, May
13, 1987, at Al; Doyle McManus, Contras May Have Got $30 Million from Saudi Arabia, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 1987, at 1 ("A draft report prepared by the staff of the Senate Intelligence
Committee... disclosed that... Saudi Arabia had contributed $31 million to a contra group,
according to sources who have read the paper.").
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position to genuine secrets and unofficially disclosed "fictional secrets"
only; 34 it even opposed the evidentiary use of information which had been
officially disclosed. A few days before the December 21 cabinet meeting,
Walsh had submitted to the administration a forty-five-page list of press
reports pertaining to the disputed evidence, as well as a list of official public
disclosures which was almost as long. One item on the official disclosures
list was a nationally televised news conference of November 25, 1986 in
which Attorney General Meese had specifically said that the National
Security Agency was involved in arms sales to Iran. Nonetheless, the
administration not only continued to "acquiesc[e] in the NSA's demand that
its role in the Iran arms sales be covered up," but it "agree[d] to censor the
NSA's very existence. 35
Toobin writes that frustration with the administration led the Walsh
office to consider threatening to resign, and that the office even drafted a
public release in contemplation of making that threat.36 The impasse was
broken, ironically, when North subpoenaed President Reagan and President-
elect Bush on December 30, 1988.37 The subpoenas "soften[ed] the
admini-stration's positions on a broad range of classified information
issues." According to Toobin: "North's presidential subpoenas demonstrat-
ed, more clearly than any other episode so far, that political rather than
34. TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 173.
35. Id. at 184-85; see also Second Interim Report by Independent Counsel, supra note 32,
at 21 (On December 20, 1988, Independent Counsel supplied the Attorney General "an
appendix of numerous public references to [certain Latin American countries and capabilities
of a particular intelligence agency] both by government representatives and by private
persons."), and al: n.8 ("In mid-December 1988, the NSA rejected a critical substitution which
might have preserved [North] Counts One and Two."); Final Report of Independent Counsel,
supra note 8, vol. I, at 110 ("In advance of the meeting of the intelligence heads, Independent
Counsel on December 20, 1988," provided Attorney General Thornburgh with "an extensive
collection of press reports, including a book, to demonstrate that the information was not in fact
secret. Independent Counsel offered to meet with the group to present his argument, but
Thornburgh did not acknowledge the offer."). For press reports confirming Toobin's account
of Attorney General Meese's press conference disclosure, see, e.g., John N. Maclean, Agency
Detected Protected Iran Deal, CHI. TRIB., December 15, 1986, at 1; Doyle McManus, Messages
on Arms Deal Intercepted, Not Acted on, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1986, at I. Cf also former CIA
Director Stansfield Turner, Intelligencefora New World Order, Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, issue
4, Fall 1991 at 150, 150 n.1 (using pseudonym for U.S. intelligence agency responsible for
satellites because "[flor reasons that are difficult to comprehend, the true name of this agency
is classified.").
36. TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 186-87.
37. See, e.g., Philip Shenon, Reagan and Bush Get Subpoenas To Testify as Witnesses for
North, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1988, at 1.
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national security considerations governed the administration's decisions on
classified information. If the administration shut down the case now...
the odor of cover-up would be too strong."38
The North subpoenas, and a bargain Walsh struck with Attorney
General Thornburgh on January 4, 1989, enabled the North case to proceed
to trial. For his end of the bargain, Walsh agreed to drop the broad
conspiracy counts against North, and, in return, Thornburgh promised not
to interfere with the trial of the remaining counts in the North indictment.
39
After the conspiracy counts were dropped and the North case proceeded to
trial, according to Walsh's final report, "[o]nly one intelligence agency
persisted in abusing its classification powers ... by stubbornly refusing to
consider declassifying even the most mundane and widely known 'secrets'
under its jurisdiction. 40 Walsh's report credits the Attorney General with
declining to support the agency in its "extreme positions, ' 41 but the report's
tone regarding the Reagan administration's overall treatment of security
information issues in the North case is one of dissatisfaction and suspicion.
"At the heart of the Iran/Contra affair," the report states, "were criminal acts
of Reagan Administration officials that the Reagan Administration, by
38. TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 189.
39. Id. at 190; see also Second Interim Report by Independent Counsel, supra note 32, at
22 ("On January 4, 1989,... Independent Counsel was encouraged by the Legal Advisor of the
State Department and the Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division to
believe that the trial on the remaining counts could probably be completed if Counts One and
Two were dropped."). Shortly after Walsh dropped the North counts, however, the Justice
Department tried to appeal Judge Gesell's CIPA orders. The eleventh-hour effort halted the
North trial just before opening arguments, and "prompted the sharpest clash between an
administration and an independent counsel since the 1974 'Saturday night massacre."' KOH,
supra note 8, at 33-34. Judge Gesell characterized the Justice Department's attempt as
"frivolous." Id. at 241 n.93 (citing Order Denying Stay at 2 (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 1989)); see also
TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 212-17. According to the final Walsh report, the attempt to proceed
with the conspiracy counts against North ultimately bogged down over two categories of
national security information.
The classified information at issue included the names of Latin American countries
and officials referred to in certain documents, even though the country identities
and the facts spelled out in the documents were publicly known. The intelligence
agency heads also refused to permit the disclosure of the nature of intelligence
reports circulated to [North's superiors].., which exposed the U.S. arms sales and
Iranian claims of being overcharged. Judge Gesell ruled that the nature of the
intelligence enhanced its credibility and thus would be material to the defense.
Final Report of Independent Counsel, supra note 8, vol. I, at 109-10.
40. Final Report of Independent Counsel, supra note 8, vol. 1, at 111.
41. Id.
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withholding non-secret classified information, ensured would never be
tried."42
b. The Fernandez Case
The Executive was less flexible in the Fernandez case than in the North
case. 43 This is not surprising considering the Executive had successfully
stood its ground in the North case already, and that the Fernandez case
commanded far less public attention than the North case had. Koh writes
that the Justice Department forced the dismissal of the Fernandez case when
it "blocked disclosure of classified information regarding the location of CIA
stations that had already been widely reported in the press."" Significant-
ly, Walsh did not drop the Fernandez indictment voluntarily as he had the
two North charges, but made the Attorney General formally block the use
of the disputed evidence pursuant to CIPA, which in turn left Judge Hilton
no choice but to dismiss the case.45
This time around, the contemporaneous statements which emanated
from Walsh's office were less obliging. After Thornburgh filed his blocking
affidavit, Associate Independent Counsel Lawrence Shtasel declared: "We
are troubled by the actions of the intelligence agencies and the Attorney
42. Id. at 55.
43. MacNeillLehrer Newshour, supra note 13 (statement of Nina Totenberg); see also
SECOND INTERIM REPORT BY INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, supra note 32, at 28 ("[G]reater rigid-ity
by the agencies .... became manifest in Fernandez."), at 31 ("[U]nlike the position the CIA had
taken in the North trial," in the Fernandez trial the CIA requested that the Attorney General
"prohibit[ ] the disclosure of... the existence and location of CIA stations and a facility .... ").
44. KOH, supra note 8, at 239-40 nn.83 & 86 (citing Ann Pelham, Walsh Clashes with
Justice Department over Secrets, LEGAL TIMES, July 31, 1989, at 2; David Johnston, Case
Dismissed in Contra Affair, Clearing Agent. N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1989, at AI); see also
MacNeil/Lehrer, supra note 13 (statements of Nina Totenberg and Scott Armstrong); SECOND
INTERIM REPORT BY INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, supra note 32, at 1.
The information withheld by the Attorney General consists of... a description of
three United States programs in Costa Rica... [and] the existence and location
of [word deleted in unclassified report] CIA stations and a facility in Latin
America. These facts are publicly known. The Administration withheld the
information, however, solely to avoid government acknowledgment of these
known facts, which would have been referred to in trial documents and in the
testimony of witnesses.
Id.; see also THIRD INTERIM REPORT OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, supra note 10, at 5 ("Attorney
General Thornburgh's refusal to declassify publicly known but officially secret information
forced the dismissal of the government's entire case against... Joseph Fernandez.").
45. See Uniled States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 149-50, 153-54 (4th Cir. 1990).
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General who have made bringing this case to trial extremely difficult."46
One news commentator, who attributed her account to conversations she had
with members of Walsh's office, reported: "What they have begun to think
in the independent counsel's office is that there's a cover up .... The
suspicion is that the very people who are saying you can't have this
evidence at trial because it compromises national security are the very
people who could conceivably be implicated."47
Walsh's subsequent interim reports to Congress accused the Justice
Department and the intelligence agencies of "unproductive litigation" and
"an established routine of attrition and exhaustion," and sharply criticized
the administration's nondisclosure positions in the Fernandez prosecution.48
46. MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour, supra note 13 (statement of Nina Totenberg).
47. Id.
48. Independent Counsel's Supplement to Previous Reports Regarding United States v.
Fernandez, submitted to House and Senate Intelligence and Judiciary Committees on October
24, 1990, at 3, 10 (copy of unclassified version on file with author); see Second Interim Report
by Independent Counsel, supra note 32, at 39-43, 48, 54:
The Attorney General and the intelligence agencies conceded in their affidavits
that the existence of the[ ] CIA stations and their locations are publicly known.
The only question was whether acknowledgment of these facts during the Fernan-
dez trial by government officers or through government documents would have
created an unacceptable risk to our national security. We suggest that against the
three-year widespread disclosure of truly sensitive information regarding these
countries, the acknowledgment of these publicly known facts would barely add a
drop to an already full bucket.
But for the gravity of the consequences, the Attorney General's determina-
tion and the process by which it was reached have almost comic aspects: the
solemn convention of the intelligence agency heads assuring each other that
national security could not tolerate this additional acknowledgment, without
including Independent Counsel, the officer responsible for the prosecution ....
[The intelligence agencies' affidavits] are based largely on speculation about
the effect government acknowledgment of the publicly known information at issue
in Fernandez might have on United States intelligence-gathering capa-bilities.
None of these assessments of risk are supported by hard data about the state of
affairs in the countries at issue, about the sources of potential risk to United States
interests, or about the measures, if any, that can be taken to compensate for the
incremental risk of acknowledgment of the stations. Nor is there any effort to
provide an accurate measure of the harm that might result from such a disclosure.
The Attorney General undercuts the credibility of his own affidavit by
suggesting that, notwithstanding the consequences he believes could result in
serious damage to the national security, he might reconsider his decision to
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Walsh's final report states:
Independent Counsel did not challenge the need to protect ... three
CIA programs. He was willing to drop the charges to which the
programs had been held to pertain. The critical information that would
have permitted trial of the other charges was the location of two well-
known CIA stations. Each had been identified in North. They were
regularly mentioned in the press-even in the obituary of a former
station chief. The intelligence agencies' submissions to the Attorney
General were not specific enough to rebut this fact. They were general
reiterations of the need to preserve "deniability" of well-known facts.49
B. Availability of Judicial Recourse?
In the face of all the publicly voiced suspicion, according to Koh,
"[o]nly the independent participation of both Gesell and Walsh [in the North
trial] allayed public doubts about President Reagan's motives for withhold-
ing the information." 0 The same can be said of Walsh and Judge Hilton's
participation in the Fernandez case (by which time George Bush was
President). However, as Koh adds, "one cannot automatically infer from
Walsh and Gesell's [or Hilton's] acquiescence ... that the information was
properly withheld."5'
Of course, it would not have been appropriate for Gesell or Hilton to
do anything but acquiesce. As judges, they could only adjudicate controver-
sies placed squarely before them by the parties.52 But need Walsh have
prohibit the release of the information ... if Judge Hilton's dismissal of the
indictment is affirmed on appeal.
The agencies' actions have created an unacceptable enclave that is free from
the rule of law.
49. Final Report of Independent Counsel, supra note 8 vol. I, at 292.
50. KOH, supra note 8, at 32.
51. Id. at 240 n.87.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1990):
Our role in this appeal is circumscribed. We are not asked, and we have no
authority, to consider judgments made by the Attorney General concerning the
extent to which the information in issue here implicates national security ...
Instead, we are faced with a series of very narrow, fact-specific evidentiary
determinations and with the question whether the defendant could receive a fair
trial without the aid of certain evidence.
Id. at 154. Professor Sandra Jordan mistakenly states that the Fernandez court reviewed and
upheld the executive classification decisions which derailed the Fernandez prosecution. Jordan,
supra note 8, at 1682.
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behaved as passively as the judges? Could he have sought judicial review
of the Executive's claims about the need for secrecy? Section 594(a) of the
Ethics Act specified that an independent counsel's "investigative and
prosecutorial functions and powers shall include ... contesting in court
... any claim of privilege or attempt to withhold evidence on grounds of
national security."
5 3
1. The "No" Vote
According to Koh: "Walsh's options were limited even if he strongly
disagreed with the president's decision to withhold disclosure" in the North
case. "Had he either publicly challenged the president's decision or
threatened to resign, he would have acted inconsistently with his statutory
and judicial mandate to try the case to judgment." Koh does not consider,
however, the most appropriate course of action for which the Ethics Act
appears to provide-independent-counsel-spurred judicial review of
executive classification decisions (although Koh does allude to the
possibility of judicial review in the context of a civil action under the
Freedom of Information Act).54 Professors Sandra Jordan and Ronald
Noble have affirmatively rejected the possibility of using the Ethics Act for
such a purpose.55
Walsh appears to have taken as equally dim a view as Koh, Jordan, and
Noble of the options that were available to him, and an even dimmer view
than Koh and Jordan of the Judiciary's power to review executive nondisclo-
sure decisions. In remarks to the New York Bar Association in 1991
regarding the North case, Walsh stated: "The court had no power to compel
the release [of the information]." This is because "[i]n matters of national
security-particularly in matters involving clandestine operations-the
executive branch alone determines what, if any, information is ... publicly
disseminated about its actions. 56  Upon the completion of his tenure,
Walsh stated in his final report:
53. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (expired).
54. KoH, supra note 8, at 240 n.87.
55. Jordan, supra note 8, at 1654 ("As it stands, the Independent Counsel Statute provides
no mechanism to challenge classification decisions made by executive branch members.");
Noble, supra note 8, at 572 ("When checked by the Attorney General's filing of a CIPA section
6(e) affidavit, the Independent Counsel has no effective way to protect her public image except
to publicly criticize... the Attorney General's decision .... ).
56. Lawrence Walsh, Due Process and the Rule of Law, 46 RECORD ASS'N BAR CITY N.Y.
358, 372, 376 (May 1991).
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Under [CIPA], the attorney general has unrestricted discretion to decide
whether to declassify information necessary for trial, even in cases in
which Independent Counsel has been appointed because of the attorney
general's conflict of interest .... This discretion gives the attorney
general the power to block almost any potentially embarrassing prosecu-
tion that requires the declassification of information."
Furthermore, "No court can challenge the substance of [an attorney general's
exercise of C]IPA]; no litigant has standing to contest the attorney general's
decision.""8
There are good reasons for an independent counsel to blanch at the
prospect of asking a judge to reject an executive representation that informa-
tion must be withheld from a public trial in order to protect the national
security. The Supreme Court has strongly suggested that a degree of
constitutionally based presidential discretion exists regarding the disclosure
of national security information.59 In addition, in many contexts, judicial
decisions which ostensibly have been based not upon constitutional but upon
common law and statutory grounds have accorded the "utmost deference"'
to the President's responsibility for protecting security secrets. For example,
the courts generally describe the common law evidentiary privilege which
covers national security information-the state secrets privilege-as
"absolute." 6  The courts also have exhibited extreme reluctance to
embrace supervisory roles Congress has assigned to them which might entail
review of executive decisions based upon national security information. For
example, in Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,62
in an admittedly "not ... literal[ ]" reading of the Civil Aeronautics Act, the
Supreme Court forswore any statutory authority to review denials by the
57. Final Report of Independent Counsel, supra note 8, vol. I, at xxi.
58. Id. at 565,
59. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-11 (1974); Environmental Protection
Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 83 (1973); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
728-30 (1971) (per curiam) (Stewart, J., concurring); Chicago & Southern Air Lines v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
60. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710 (citing Chicago & Southern Air Lines, 333 U.S. at Ill and
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953)).
61. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1952), is the seminal state secrets privilege case,
although it does not use the term "absolute." See id. at I 1 ("even the most compelling necessity
cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets
are at stake"); see also, e.g., Halkin v. Helms (Halkin 11), 690 F.2d 977, 990 (1982); Jabara v.
Kelley, 75 F.R.D. 475, 481 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (both using the term "absolute").
62. 333 U.S. 103, 106 (1948).
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Civil Aeronautics Board of citizen air carriers' applications to engage in
overseas and foreign air transportation if the Board's denials had been
approved by the President. Similarly, Congress twice had to amend the
Freedom of Information Act to overrule broad judicial interpretations of
provisions in the act which enable the executive branch to withhold national
security information.
63
The courts have been wise to tread lightly where national security
issues are at stake. When it is alleged that grave and irreversible national
harm might result from a judicial misstep, judges understandably would
prefer to err on the side of caution. In this regard, courts often have bowed
to the Executive's superior knowledge, experience, and expertise in military,
intelligence, and foreign affairs matters.6 In occasional bouts of self-depre-
cation, courts have likened foreign intelligence gathering to the construction
of an arcane "mosaic" which they inadequately fathom.65 "What may seem
trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a
broad view of the scene .... The courts, of course, are ill-equipped to
become sufficiently steeped in foreign intelligence matters to serve
effectively in the review of secrecy classifications.. .. ." Add to the
Executive's superior expertise the fact that the Executive is subject to more
immediate electoral control than are the courts;67 add, too, the desirability
that our nation speak with one voice where foreign affairs are concerned,68
and an appealing argument can be made that the courts should steer clear of
executive security classifications.
63. For a brief recounting, see, e.g., Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1200, 1202-03 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (Wright, C.J., concurring).
64. E.g., Chicago & Southern Air Lines, 333 U.S. at 111 ("[E]xecutive decisions as to
foreign policy... are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.... They are
decisions ... for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility .... ).
65. Halkin v. Helms (Halkin 1), 598 F.2d 1,8 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See also McGehee v. Casey,
718 F.2d 1137, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 971
(D.C. Cir. 1982)).
66. Halkin 1, 598 F.2d at 9 (citing United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972); see also Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 & n.
31 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
67. See, e.g., Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111
(1948) ("[Dlecisions as to foreign policy ... should be undertaken only by those directly
responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil.").
68. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), specifies that courts should be more wary to
approach questions when "multifarious pronouncements by various departments" could cause
embarrassment to the United States.
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2. The "Yes" Vote
Notwithstanding the foregoing concerns, suggestions that the Executive
branch has exclusive control over national security information, either as a
matter of historical practice or textual legal authority, are greatly exaggerat-
ed. The Judiciary has frequently reviewed, and at times rejected, executive
evaluations of the necessity for nondisclosure of national security informa-
tion.
a. A Historical Review
In 1807, in United States v. Burr,69 Chief Justice Marshall directed
subpoenas duces tecum to President Jefferson and to the Secretary of the
Navy for the production of a letter General Wilkinson wrote to the President
and of certain military orders, despite the Executive's contention that the
documents contained secrets pertaining to the nation's relations with Spain.
Regarding General Wilkinson's letter, Marshall opined:
There is certainly nothing before the Court which shows that the letter
in question contains any matter the disclosure of which would endanger
the public safety. If it does contain such matter.., which it is not the
wish of the Executive to disclose, such matter, if it be not immediately
and essentially applicable to the point, will, of course, be suppress-
ed .... 7 0
Regarding the military orders (which Aaron Burr alleged had been published
in the Natchez Gazette), Marshall wrote:
Such documents have often been produced in the courts of the United
States and the courts of England. If they contain matter interesting to
the nation, the concealment of which is required by the public safety,
that matter will appear upon the return. If they do not, and are material,
they may be exhibited.7
In 1952, in United States v. Reynolds, while allowing the Secretary of
the Air Force to withhold national security information from a civil litigant
suing the United States under the Tort Claims Act, the Supreme Court
nonetheless reviewed the Secretary's contention that secrecy was necessary,
69. 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d).
70. Id. at 37.
71. Id.
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declaring: "Judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated
to the caprice of executive officers."72
In 1971, in New York Times Co. v. United States, a the Executive
sought to enjoin the New York Times and Washington Post newspapers from
publishing portions of a classified historical study on Vietnam (the Pentagon
Papers). Upon consideration of the untoward consequences the Executive
alleged could result from the material's dissemination, the Supreme Court
was not sufficiently impressed to grant an injunction. "I have gone over the
material listed in the in camera brief of the United States," Justice Douglas
wrote. "It is all history, not future events. 74 Justice Brennan hypothe-
sized that potential consequences grave enough to warrant pre-publication
censorship could exist, but that they were not present in the instant case:
Even if the present world situation were assumed to be tantamount to
a time of war, or if the power of presently available armaments would
justify even in peacetime the suppression of information that would set
in motion a nuclear holocaust, in neither of these actions has the
Government presented [sic] or even alleged that publication of items
from or based on the material at issue would cause the happening of an
event of that nature.75
Dissenting, Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Burger and Blackmun, agreed
that "[t]he power to evaluate the 'pernicious influence' of premature
disclosure is not ... lodged in the Executive alone," although the Justices
were quick to minimize their derogation of executive power: "Even if there
is some room for the judiciary to override the executive determination, it is
plain that the scope of review must be exceedingly narrow. ' '76
Unlike New York Times Co., neither Burr nor Reynolds involved the
judicial rejection of an executive nondisclosure position. However, the
exercise of judicial review, unless it be an empty form, is an assertion of the
power to overturn (albeit not as firm an assertion as an actual overturn-
ing).77
72. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9-10.
73. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
74. Id. at 723 n.3 (Douglas, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 757-58 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
77. Compare, for example, Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821), considered to have
established the federal judiciary's power to overturn state criminal proceedings even though the
Supreme Court upheld the Virginia criminal decision it reviewed. See, e.g., McKesson Corp.
v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, Dept. of Business Regulation, 496 U.S. 18,
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While New York Times Co. marks the only time the Supreme Court has
rejected an executive nondisclosure position in the national security context,
courts of appeals and district courts have invalidated executive national
security classifications on a number of occasions-although these are
exceptional." In addition, in Central Intelligence Agency v. Sims, 79 the
Supreme Court implicitly legitimated the power a court of appeals and a
district court below had exercised in invalidating certain CIA security
classifications, even though the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts'
rulings on the merits.
At issue in Sims was the disclosure of the identities of researchers and
research institutions who participated in the CIA's MKULTRA program.
The Supreme Court reversed the district court's disclosure orders because
it interpreted "intelligence source," as protected from disclosure in the
National Security Act of 1947, more broadly than the district court and the
court of appeals and in such a way that encompassed the MKULTRA
researchers. 'rhe Court did not declare that the district court, given the court
of appeals' more narrow construction of "intelligence source," had lacked
the authority to review and invalidate the CIA's classification decision.
Indeed, the Supreme Court's upholding of the CIA classification decision
was itself a review of that decision.80 If the courts had lacked authority to
review the CIA's decision, it would have been inappropriate for the Supreme
Court to reach the substantive issues involved in construing the National
Security Act.
Even judicial examinations which uphold executive classifications have
tended to loosen the executive grip on improperly withheld national security
26-27 (1990); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CoNsTrUTIONAL LAW 50 (2d ed. 1991).
78. See, e.g., Wiener v. FBI, 943 F.2d 972, 979, 980-82, 983 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 3013 (1992); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51,59-61 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1038 (1984), appeal after remand, 807 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 870 (1987); Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity v. CIA, 636
F.2d 838, 844-47 (D.C. Cir. 1980), vacated on motion of plaintiffs pending Supreme Court
Review, 455 U.S. 997 (1982); United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 409 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1983); Dunaway v. Webster, 519 F. Supp. 1059, 1070-71 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Jabara
v. Kelly, 62 F.R.D. 424 (E.D. Mich. 1974); International Prod. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403,
407-08 (2d Cir. 1963); cf. Washington Post v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, 789 F. Supp. 423,425-26
(D.D.C. 1992) (due to identification of "obvious gaps" in Executive's national security
exemption claims during course of litigation, and Executive's resulting voluntary production
of documents in response to FOIA request, plaintiff has "substantially prevailed even if no
judgment has been entered in its favor" so that award of counsel fees is justified).
79. 471 U.S. 159 (1985).
80. Accord Wiener v. FBI, 943 F.2d 972, 983 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
3013 (1992).
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information. Courts have kept intelligence agencies on their toes by sending
back unsatisfactory, "conclusory" agency affidavits, insisting that the
agencies identify the specific harm that would result from disclosure and
that they segregate truly sensitive wheat from non-sensitive chaff."1 In
addition, the mere prospect of judicial review has induced greater voluntary
disclosure by the intelligence community, presumably to avoid judicially
mandated disclosure.2
3. An Open Question
The preceding survey is offered as a demonstration that although the
81. See, e.g., id. at 977; Weberman v. National Sec. Agency, 490 F. Supp. 9, 13-14
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (National Security Agency "has failed to show that confirmation or denial of
the existence of... information would create potential harm to the national security," and NSA
affidavits "do not logically support a Secret or Confidential classification by NSA.");
Weberman v. National Sec. Agency, 668 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1982) (upon reviewing additional
NSA affidavit, district court determined that information was properly classified); Ray v.
Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1199 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright, C.J., concurring) (agreeing with
court's remand and its "conclusions that the CIA's affidavits in support of its claims of [FOIA's
national security] exemption are ambiguous and unsatisfactory."); Clift v. United States, 597
F.2d 826, 829 (2d Cir. 1979) (Reynolds' requirement that Defense Secretary personally invoke
state secrets privilege not necessary due to special facts of case, but "[g]overnment would be
wiser not to put courts to this test in the future."); Patterson v. FBI, 705 F. Supp. 1033, 1039-40
(D.N.J. 1989) (district court refused to accept special agent's "vague" affidavit, insisting on in
camera review of information at issue).
82. See, e.g., Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1201 & n.7, 1212 n.51 (Wright, C.J.,
concurring) (Not until Freedom of Information Act claimants brought suit did CIA admit it
possessed documents relevant to claimants' FOIA request and release portions to claimants, and
not until claimants filed motion for in camera inspection did CIA submit additional affidavit
giving "more detailed [ ] but still inadequate" descriptions of items withheld); Goland v. Central
Intelligence Agency, 607 F.2d 339,343-44 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Not until FOIA claimants brought
lawsuit did CIA voluntarily declassify and provide to claimants 80% of document it previously
classified "secret" and withheld from claimants in its entirety); Washington Post v. U.S. Dept.
of Defense, 766 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1991) (in light of Special Master's conclusion that
purported national security information already was in public domain, Defense Department
withdrew FOIA exemption claim and released document to plaintiff); Halperin v. CIA, 446 F.
Supp. 661, 666-67 (D.D.C. 1978) (Only after court examined documents in camera and
requested supplemental affidavits from CIA explaining why disclosure to FOIA plaintiff would
compromise intelligence sources and methods, did CIA voluntarily release portion of withheld
material to plaintiff.); see also Wald, supra note 31, at 677 quoting Senate testimony of Morton
Halperin regarding FOIA:
It is not that courts will often or even perhaps ever order the Agency to release
material. Rather the knowledge that ajudge may examine material in camera leads
the Agency, its attorneys, and the Justice Department attorneys, to take a hard look
at the requested material and to decide if its withholding is really justified.
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courts accept the Executive's substantial responsibility for controlling the
public dissemination of national security information, they have long
recognized that in various contexts the Judiciary also has a role to play in
making these determinations. How the judicial and executive roles would
interact in the event an independent counsel sought to challenge an
executive nondisclosure decision, however, is an open question. Unlike a
prior restraint of the press (New York Times Co.), or a discovery request by
a civil tort claimant (Reynolds), or a FOIA request by a private citizen
without any particularized standing (Sims), such a challenge by an
independent counsel would present a situation of first impression.
III. STATUTES
Part III of this article considers the statutory framework which existed
before the December 1992 expiration of the Ethics Act's independent
counsel provisions-and which will exist once more if H.R. 811 or S. 24
become law. Subpart A argues that the expired portions of the Ethics Act
authorized (and that H.R. 811 and S. 24 would authorize) independent
counsel to contest presidential invocations of the state secrets privilege.
Subpart B argues that this authority did not (and would not) conflict with
the Classified Information Procedures Act. Part IV will then argue that the
relevant statutory law, as interpreted in this part, would be constitutional.
A. Title VI of the Ethics in Government Act
Section 594(a) of the expired portions of the Ethics Act enumerates the
"investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers" of independent
counsel. Paragraph six states that these include: "receiving appropriate
national security clearances and, if necessary, contesting in court (including,
where appropriate, participating in in camera proceedings) any claim of
privilege or attempt to withhold evidence on grounds of national securi-
ty." 3 The plain meaning of the section appears to be that independent
counsel may challenge executive security classifications and that courts may
adjudicate those challenges.
The only qualifications within 594(a)(6) are the word "appropriate,"
which occurs twice, and the term "if necessary." Neither "appropriate"
applies to the core act of "contesting in court." The first "appropriate"
modifies the independent counsel's "receiving" of "national security
83. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (expired).
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clearances." The simplest interpretation of this modification is that the
independent counsel should have access to classified information only when
it is necessary for the performance of his or her functions. This replicates
the standard "need to know" guideline by which security information is
dispensed within the intelligence community.
The second "appropriate" refers, again, not to the act of "contesting,"
but to a mechanism by which it can occur-"in camera proceedings." Two
likely interpretations of this qualification exist. The first interpretation is
that the court should not handle security information in camera unless its
facilities are sufficient to safeguard the information.m The second is that
in camera proceedings should be a means of last resort because public
proceedings are preferable whenever they are possible. 5
Unlike the two "appropriates," the term "if necessary" does qualify the
act of "contesting." Most likely, however, it means that an independent
counsel cannot challenge executive security classifications simply because
he or she disagrees with them. An independent counsel can only challenge
security classifications if they also interfere with his or her own duties.
Without considering the foregoing construction of 594(a)(6), Sandra
Jordan summarily concludes that the section only authorized an independent
counsel to seek access to security information, and not to seek to use it in
court.86 Jordan's interpretation seems to comport with an equally con-
clusory Fourth Circuit dictum in United States v. Fernandez.87 That
dictum can be read to suggest that "attempt to withhold evidence" refers
only to withholding evidence from the independent counsel and not from a
public trial. That is, if the Executive attempted to prevent public disclosure
of evidence-already having provided the evidence to the independent coun-
sel in private-the Executive would not be attempting to "withhold
evidence" within the meaning of the Ethics Act. Even this strained reading
of "withhold," however, would not limit an independent counsel to seeking
mere access to security information. The section still authorized an
84. Cf Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8 ("The court itself must determine whether the circumstances
are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very
thing the privilege is designed to protect."); Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362,
1369 (4th Cir.) ("In our own chambers, we are ill equipped to provide the kind of security
highly sensitive information should have."), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
85. See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214,224 (1978) ("in camera review
... is designed to be invoked when the issue., could not be otherwise resolved"); Wiener
v. FBI, 943 F.2d 972, 979 (9th Cir. 1991) ("In camera review does not permit effective
advocacy."), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3013 (1992).
86. Jordan, supra note 8, at 1654, 1665 n.70.
87. 887 F.2d 465, 471 n.6 (4th Cir. 1989).
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independent counsel to contest "any claim of privilege or attempt to
withhold evidence on grounds of national security." Nor must "on grounds
of national security" modify "any claim of privilege" via the disjunctive "or"
for the section to have authorized independent counsel to contest security
classifications. "Any claim of privilege," after all, encompasses the state
secrets privilege."8
The Fernandez dictum can also be read to suggest that an independent
counsel would have lacked standing under 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(6) to
challenge an executive security classification where it was the defendant,
and not the independent counsel, who sought to use the evidence at issue.
Paragraph six of 594(a), however, contains no language to this effect, and
paragraph three authorizes an independent counsel to "appeal[ ] any decision
of a court in any case or proceeding in which such independent counsel
participates in an official capacity. ' 9 That an independent counsel should
have had standing to argue that the defendant's evidence could be presented
is somewhat counterintuitive, but it makes sense considering that it was the
independent counsel and not the defendant who would have been interested
in enabling the trial to proceed.
Because section 594(a)(6) was never invoked for the purpose of
contesting an executive security classification, the question of whether it
could have been used for this purpose was never judicially resolved. In
addition to the Fourth Circuit, however, Justice Scalia and the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit have discussed the provision
in dicta. Contrary to the Fourth Circuit, each construed the Ethics Act in
substantially the same manner as I have (albeit to support their opinions that
the Act was unconstitutional). 90
88. The executive regulation which created the Watergate special prosecutor authorized him
"to contest the assertion of 'Executive Privilege."' United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694-
95 (1974) (citing 38 Fed. Reg. 30,739, as amended by 38 Fed. Reg. 32,805). Perhaps it was in
reaction to the Nixon Court's subsequent suggestion that a state secrets privilege might exist
distinct from the generic communications privilege recognized in Nixon, that Section 594(a)(6)
of the Ethics Act was drafted to refer to "any claim of privilege." Cf Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, Ethics in Government Act of 1978, S. Rep. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 66 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4282 ("[The] powers [in section 594(a) of
the Ethics Act] were generally patterned on the [executive] grant of authority given to the
Watergate Special Prosecution Force.").
89. Ethics Act, 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(3) (expired).
90. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 708, 717 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Another preeminently political decision is whether getting a conviction in a
particular case is worth the disclosure of national security information that would
be necessary. The Justice Department and our intelligence agencies are often in
disagreement on this point, and the Justice Department does not always win. The
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B. The Classified Information Procedures Act
The Classified Information Procedures Act ("CIPA") is a set of
procedural mechanisms for managing, during the course of criminal prosecu-
tions, classified information the classification of which is not in dispute.9
If a court determines that a defendant must be allowed to use classified
information as evidence in order to receive a fair trial, CIPA requires that
the "United States" agree to disclose the evidence or forego enough of its
prosecution so that the defendant can receive a fair trial without the evi-
dence.92 Thus, CIPA forces the "United States" to balance its interest in
secrecy against its interest in prosecution.93
CIPA's forcing of a "disclose or dismiss" dilemma upon the United
States was not new. It duplicated a rule which the courts already had
fashioned.94 CIPA's innovations are procedural. These include, primarily,
a requirement that the defendant notify the government before trial of his
intention to introduce classified information as evidence, and a provision for
pre-trial hearings on questions of admissibility.95
Jordan, and perhaps Independent Counsel Walsh, too readily assume
that CIPA absolutely empowers an attorney general to squelch an indepen-
present Act even goes so far as specifically to take the resolution of that dispute
away from the President and give it to the independent counsel.
Id. at 708; see also In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 503 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd sub nom. Morrison
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). Unlike Justice Scalia's Morrison dissent, I do not interpret
section 594(a)(6) to take the disclosure decision away from the President and give it to the
independent counsel. Rather, I interpret the section to authorize the Judiciary to review the
President's disclosure decision if the independent counsel asks it to. The Supreme Court
majority did not construe section 594(a)(6) when it upheld the constitutionality of independent
counsel in Morrison. The majority's decision to uphold the constitutionality of the Ethics Act's
independent counsel provisions despite Justice Scalia's and the D.C. Circuit's objections
regarding section 594(a)(6), however, might be persuasive authority in lower courts that a
reenacted equivalent, construed in the manner I have suggested, would be constitutional.
91. See generally Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Critical Review of the Classified Information
Procedures Act, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 277 (1986).
92. 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 6(e) (1985).
93. Fernandez, 887 F.2d at 469; United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1197 (11 th Cir.
1983); Richard P. Salgado, Government Secrets, Fair Trials, and the Classified Information
Procedures Act, 98 YALE L.J. 427, 431 & n.36 (1988).
94. See, e.g., Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 12; Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 181, 184
(1969); Tamanaha, supra note 91, at 303, 306.
95. 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 5,6(a) (1985); see, e.g., United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1106
(4th Cir. 1985) (CIPA is "merely a procedural tool requiring a pretrial court ruling on the
admissibility of classified information.").
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dent counsel's prosecution on grounds of national security.' As Jordan
points out, CIPA is silent on the question of independent counsel.97 If the
construction of the Ethics Act in subpart A above is correct, there is little
reason to think that CIPA took away from independent counsel in 1980 what
the Ethics Act had given them in 1978, especially since CIPA and the Ethics
Act were easily harmonized.
From the standpoint of CIPA, security classification decisions occur in
a black box. Referring to the decision-maker as the "United States"
throughout, the Act does not specify whether a classification decision
belongs to the President alone or might result from the judicial resolution
of a dispute between the Chief Executive and an independent counsel (an
inferior executive officer)9" exercising his or her contestation power under
another statute. Section 6(e)(1) of CIPA does specify that in order to
prevent a defendant from disclosing classified evidence, the United States
must file with the court an "affidavit of the Attorney General objecting to
disclosure," but the "United States" and not the Attorney General remains
the controlling power here, and section 6(e)(2) "afford[s] the United States
an opportunity . ... to withdraw its objection to the disclosure" with no
reference to the Attorney General's opinion at all. In addition, the Act
authorizes the United States to prevent only the disclosure of classified
evidence by a defendant; it says nothing of preventing disclosure by a
prosecutor.
CIPA does not contemplate and was not intended to handle disputes
about the propriety of a classification, or the split-personality "United
States" that exists during prosecutions by independent counsel. 99 Congress
96. Jordan, supra note 8, at 1653-54, 1666-67, 1671-72; Final Report of Independent
Counsel, excerpts quoted supra in text accompanying notes 57-58. As a Senate report on the
Ethics Act stated: "It is a basic tenet of our legal system that a lawyer cannot act in a situation
where he has a conflict of interest or the appearance thereof." Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, Ethics in Government Act of 1978, S. Rep. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4222.
97. Jordan, supra note 8, at 1653, 1666; see also Final Report of Independent Counsel,
supra note 8, vol. I, at 565 ("Congress could not have intended that CIPA... be used by the
attorney general to control prosecutions of independent counsel.").
98. Independent counsel are inferior executive officers under the Appointments Clause of
Article II of the Constitution. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670-72.
99. Fernandez, 887 F.2d at 469 ("We agree with the Attorney General that CIPA envi-sions
a single decisionmaker balancing the cost of national security disclosure against the cost of
aborting a prosecution.").
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enacted CIPA in an attempt to alleviate the problem of "graymail.' ' "
Graymail is the tactic of a criminal defendant who threatens to disclose
national security information at trial in order to pressure the government to
stop prosecuting him or her'' Disputing the propriety of a security
classification is the last thing in the world a graymailing defendant would
do. The validity of a classification, the soundness of the estimation that
public disclosure would harm the United States, is the very assumption
which enables a defendant to commit graymail.
Nowhere does CIPA's language suggest that courts are unable to
review national security classifications. Indeed, some of the opinions cited
in section II.B.2. above which review or invalidate executive classification
decisions were written after the enactment of CIPA (although they did not
involve CIPA cases). 2 As the House Report on an early and substantial-
ly similar version of CIPA stated, CIPA "is not intended to ... change the
existing rules of evidence and criminal procedure."'' 3 When CIPA was
enacted, contemporary rules of evidence and procedure, as they still do
today, included the common law state secrets privilege which has been
subject to judicial review since its beginnings.""
Although CIPA's legislative history does not contain an express
legislative denial of any intention to nullify the now expired 28 U.S.C. §
594(a)(6), it is a "well-established principle of statutory interpretation that
implied repeals should be avoided."'0 5  Considering that the powers
100. S. Rep. No. 823,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294,
4297-98; accord, e.g., Fernandez, 887 F.2d at 466; United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959,
965 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 427 (1st Cir. 1984).
101. See generally Note, Graymail: The Disclose or Dismiss Dilemma in Criminal
Prosecutions, 31 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 84 (1980).
102. See supra notes 78-8 1.
103. Salgado, supra note 93 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 831, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 3
(1980) and H.R. Rep. No. 831, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 11 (similar language)); see also,
e.g., United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1106 (4th Cir. 1985) (no new substantive law
created by enactment of CIPA); United States v. Wilson, 732 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1984)
(holding same as Smith); United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1199 (11th Cir. 1983)
(holding same as Smith and Wilson).
104. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30
(C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d).
105. United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 169 (1991); see also, e.g., County of Yakima v.
Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683, 690 (1992) ("cardinal rule ... that repeals by
implication are not favored"); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum, 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950)
(stating that Declaratory Judgment Act did not impliedly repeal or modify the statutory
requirements for federal jurisdiction); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory
State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 471 (1989).
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granted to independent counsel under section 594(a) were granted "[n]ot-
withstanding any other provision of law,"' 6 the presumption that CIPA
did not impliedly repeal the powers granted in section 594(a)(6) should have
been especially strong. Considering, too, that subsequent to CIPA's passage,
Congress reenacted Title VI of the Ethics Act with the same "notwithstand-
ing any other law" proviso,'07 the presumption against implied nullification
may have been insurmountable.
When two statutes are capable of co-existence, "it is the duty of the
courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to
regard each as effective."'0" The construction of 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(6)
advocated in subpart A above would have retained CIPA's full effect. If an
independent counsel had contested an executive security classification, the
judicial determination whether to permit the President to shield the informa-
tion would have been an event which logically preceded the application of
CIPA. If the court found for the independent counsel, CIPA issues would
never have arisen. If the court found for the President, then CIPA would
have come into play, completely; the Attorney General would have had full
discretion to disclose or to force dismissal.
On the other hand, if CIPA had nullified the independent counsel's
contestation power under 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(6), it would have significantly
diluted not only that provision but all of Title VI of the Ethics Act. As a
Senate committee report stated in its explanation of an independent
counsel's powers under the Ethics Act: "The whole purpose of this chapter
is defeated if a special prosecutor ... does not have clear authority to
conduct a criminal investigation and prosecution without interference ... or
control by the )epartment of Justice."' 9
Finally, if CIPA were to preclude independent counsel from challenging
executive classification decisions, CIPA itself would have a different
practical effect in prosecutions by independent counsel than it would in
prosecutions by Attorneys General. The careful balancing of incentives it
works in the latter context would disappear in the former where the "United
States" (i.e., the Attorney General) would possess weak prosecution
106. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (expired). Section 594(a) excepts 18 U.S.C. § 2516--concerning
the authority to conduct wiretaps-from its "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law"
exclusion. That Congress specified an exception seems to indicate that it was fully aware of
how broad an exclusion it included in section 594(a).
107. Fernandez, 887 F.2d at 468 n.5.
108. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
109. Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, Ethics in Government Act of 1978, S. Rep.
No. 170, 95th Cong... 2d Sess. 66 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4282.
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incentives incapable of counterbalancing its desire for secrecy. Nothing in the
history or language of CIPA implies that its application was meant to be so
bifurcated. Such an arbitrary bifurcation would go against the very grain of
the statute, enacted as it was to alleviate graymail and "to help ensure that the
intelligence agencies are subject to the rule of law." 10 It was only wrong-
doing by the most senior intelligence agency officials which was likely to be
prosecuted by independent counsel. Ironically then, if CIPA had precluded
independent counsel from challenging executive security classifications, it
would have treated the most senior intelligence officials-potentially the most
serious wrongdoers, and the most effective graymailers-more leniently than
any others.
IV. THE CONSTITUTION
Apart from the construction of the Ethics Act's now expired independent
counsel provisions and the bills that would renew them, a larger and more
difficult question looms in the background. If a statute creating independent
counsel existed which everyone agreed assigned to independent counsel the
authority to contest in court presidential invocations of the state secrets privi-
lege, would the statute be constitutional? Part IV addresses this question.
Subpart A reviews the origins of the constitutional executive privilege and the
Supreme Court's suggestion that an "extra-strength" executive privilege for
national security information might reside in the Constitution. Should the
current common-law state secrets privilege be constitutionalized, it would be
necessary to determine its application in the independent counsel context. For
this reason, subpart B attempts to square judicial review of executive
nondisclosure positions in the independent counsel context with the relatively
sparse Supreme Court doctrine which already exists in two analogous state
secret contexts--civil tort suits and prior restraints of the press. Broadening
the focus, subpart C addresses the separation of powers doctrine, arguing that
it is compatible with this article's conception of the role of judicial review in
the independent counsel context.
A. A Constitutionally Based Executive State Secrets Privilege?
1. Executive Privilege - Origins
The text of the Constitution does not explicitly grant to the President
any (much less exclusive) responsibility for regulating government secrecy.
110. Senate Judiciary Committee, Classified Information Procedures Act, S. Rep. No. 823,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294, 4296-97.
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Adducing this fact, at least one commentator has branded the notion of such
a constitutionally based executive responsibility a "myth."'" The Framers
certainly knew how to grant secrecy privileges; they explicitly granted them
to Congress and to its members in the Journal Clause and in the Speech or
Debate Clause, and to all persons in the Fifth Amendment of the Bill of
Rights." 2  The argument has even been advanced, in United States v.
Richardson, that the Constitution mandates certain disclosures of national
security information." 3
In United States v. Nixon," 4 however, the Supreme Court ruled that
the Constitution gives to the President a qualified confidentiality privilege
for generic communications with his or her advisors. The Court acknowl-
edged that no such privilege can be found in the text of the Constitu-
tion.1 5  Rather, the Court derived the privilege from the sum of the
President's enumerated Article II duties." 6  The Court explained that
powers which the Constitution does not grant to the President, but which are
reasonably appropriate for the effective discharge of powers which the
Constitution does grant the President, should be considered to accompany
the granted powers.'
The essential rationale the Nixon opinion offered was a common sense
public policy prescription. The President and his or her aides should be
assured a degree of confidentiality, the Court stated, to help them make
better decisions. "Human experience teaches," wrote Chief Justice Burger,
"that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well
temper candor with a concern for appearances ... to the detriment of the
111. RAOUL BERGER, ExEcuTiVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 1, 1 (1974). For
a response, see Schmitt, supra note 9.
112. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, ci. 3 ("Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and
from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require
Secrecy .... ); id. § 6, cl. I ("[Flor any Speech or Debate in either House, [the Senators and
Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place."); id. amend. V ("No person...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... ").
113. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). The Richardson argument was
based on Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the United States Constitution which states: "[A]
regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be
published from time to time." The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the issue,
however, because it ruled that the plaintiff's taxpayer status was an insufficient basis for
standing.
114. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
115. Id. at 705 n.16, 711.
116. Id. at 704, 705-07.
117. Id. at705 n.16, 711.
1994] 1817
115
: Nova Law Review 18, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
decisionmaking process."'" 8
2. A Special Executive Privilege
for State Secrets?
As for national security information (which was not involved in Nixon),
the Court suggested without deciding the issue that an even stronger
constitutionally derived executive privilege might exist."9 Thus, Nixon
leaves intact United States v. Reynolds. Reynolds avoided the question of
a constitutional state secrets privilege, and grounded its recognition of the
state secrets privilege in the common law of evidence. 20 In contrast to
Nixon, which hinted that a constitutional state secrets privilege would derive
from the President's enumerated Article II duties as Commander in Chief
and from his or her foreign affairs responsibilities, 2' Reynolds suggested
that it might reside more generally in the constitutional separation of
power.12 1
A future Supreme Court decision which elevated the state secrets
privilege from common law to constitutional status would have important
ramifications for congressionally created independent counsel. 123  Such a
decision is a plausible (even likely) synthesis and extension of Chicago &
118. Id. at 705.
119. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706-07, 710.
120. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6; accord Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S.
73, 83 (1973).
121. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710 (citing Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,
333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)); accord New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 729-30 (per curiam)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
The President's Commander in Chief power is found in Article II, Section 2, Clause 1
of the United States Constitution which states: "The President shall be Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States .... The
President's foreign affairs powers and duties are found in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 and
Article II, Section 3. The former provides: "He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and
he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors .... The latter provides: "[H]e shall receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers ......
122. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at6 n.9. See Halkin v. Helms (Halkin 1), 598 F.2d 1, 14 n.9 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (Bazelon, J., and Wright, C.J., dissenting) (drawing distinction between contemplated
derivations of state secrets privilege in Reynolds and Nixon).
123. It might not have the same ramifications for a presidentially appointed independent
counsel (like the Watergate special prosecutors) if the President were to waive aspects of the
constitutional privilege by the appointment.
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Southern Air Lines, Reynolds, New York Times Co.,24 and Nixon.
Because the courts determine constitutional law as much as they do common
law, the decision's effect on the courts' control over their own disposition
of state secret issues would be limited to whatever constraints inhere in stare
decisis.125 Congress, though, would lose its ability to modify the state
secrets privilege through legislation. Also, if the state secrets privilege were
constitutionalized, it is likely that some version of it would be extended
from the contexts in which it already has been applied to the context of
independent counsel prosecutions. 26
It is therefore incumbent upon those who advocate the renewal of the
independent counsel provisions of the Ethics Act, and the construction of
those provisions to authorize independent counsel to contest presidential
invocations of the state secrets privilege, to make constitutional arguments
why the independent counsel context is special. Otherwise, our legislative
and/or interpretive efforts run a greater risk of being constitutionally mooted.
To that end, subpart B below compares the as-yet hypothetical possibility
of litigation over security-information disclosure in the independent counsel
context with two contexts in which security-information disclosure already
has been litigated. Subpart B postulates a Jacksonian sliding-scale of judi-
cial deference among the contexts. It suggests that less judicial deference
is appropriate in the independent counsel context than in the United States
v. Reynolds civil tort suit context, but more deference is appropriate in the
independent counsel context than in the New York Times Co. First Amend-
ment context. (The analysis assumes that the courts would treat the
Reynolds context no differently applying a constitutionalized state secrets
privilege than they have so far applying the current common-law privilege.)
124. Justice Stewart wrote, in one of six concurring New York Times Co. opinions:
[I]t is clear to me that it is the constitutional duty of the Executive-as a matter of
sovereign prerogative and not as a matter of law as the courts know law- ...
to protect the confidentiality necessary to carry out its responsibilities in the fields
of international relations and national defense.
This is not to say that Congress and the courts have no role to play.
New York Times CO., 403 U.S. at 729-30.
125. Constitutional decisions might exert a stronger or weaker staie decisis pull than
common law decisions, of course, but the significant comparison here is between the constraints
a constitutionalized state secrets privilege would place on the judiciary and on Congress
respectively.
126. Sandra Jordan acknowledges the possibility of such a ruling, but overstates its
consequences, asserting that "no checks upon the executive for improperly refusing to release
information needed by an Independent Counsel" would remain. Jordan, supra note 8, at 1680
n.142. Political pressure and impeachment still would serve as checks, albeit weak ones. See
infra discussion in section V.C.4.
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B. The Independent Counsel Context Is Special
1. Executive Power Fluctuates-A Sliding
Scale of Judicial Deference
By what rationale could a constitutionalized state secrets privilege apply
differently to a dispute between an independent counsel and the President
than it would in other situations? As Justice Jackson suggested in Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer: "Presidential powers are not fixed but
fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of
Congress."'27 The concept applies with equal force to the conjunction or
disjunction of Presidential powers with rights or powers the Constitution
gives to anyone else.' 28
Jackson's thesis is reflected in the various standards of review courts
have applied in disputes over the Executive's control of national security
information. Comparing these standards, a sliding-scale of judicial
deference to the Executive can be discerned. In ascertaining how a
constitutionalized state secrets privilege might properly be applied in an
independent counsel situation, it helps to analyze the nature of the disputes
which underlie the various existing standards.
To locate the independent counsel context on the sliding-scale, I will
frame it with two other contexts. At the pole of maximum deference,
represented by United States v. Reynolds, the courts accord the Executive
more deference than they should in the independent counsel context. At the
pole of minimum deference, represented by New York Times Co., the courts
accord the Executive less deference than they should in the independent
counsel context. In absolute terms, these two cases probably do not
represent actual constitutional poles.' 29  For the relative terms of this
inquiry, however, they serve adequately as boundaries between which the
independent counsel context may be pinpointed.
127. 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
128. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280,289 n. 17 (1981). The President's plenary power over
foreign relations, "like every other government power, must be exercised in subordination to
the applicable provisions of the Constitution." Id. (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)).
129. For instance, "in the criminal field, . .. the Government can invoke its evidentiary
privileges only at the price of letting the defendant go free." Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 12. This
standard, which absolutely prevents the government from suppressing evidence which the
defendant needs, is even less deferential than that of New York Times Co.
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2. Pole of Maximum Deference: United States v. Reynolds
Reynolds firmly established the state secrets privilege, a common law
evidentiary privilege which belongs to the "Government."' 130 From Rey-
nolds, courts have derived a "reasonable danger" standard for invoking an
absolute privilege against disclosure.' 3' In a civil trial, 3 1 if the court is
satisfied that a "reasonable danger" exists that disclosure of the information
at issue would adversely affect the national security, then the court must
uphold the government's claim of privilege, 33 even if it harms the parties
seeking disclosure.
The need of litigants seeking disclosure is not relevant to the question
of whether the! privilege is properly claimed. No balancing of the national
interest in secrecy against any countervailing disclosure interests takes place.
The proper balance has been predetermined-secrecy is always the weightier
interest. The need for disclosure is only relevant in determining how far the
court should inquire into the appropriateness of the claim of privilege."
For a number of reasons, courts should show less deference to
executive nondisclosure positions in independent counsel cases than they do
in Reynolds cases. These include the existence of a conflict between the
congressional and executive functions; a heightened conflict between the
judicial and executive functions; the heightened public interest in the
disclosure of evidence in criminal trials and the President's ability to pardon
criminal defendants; the existence of an executive conflict of interest; the
increased judicial power (in its naked sense) which comes from the posses-
sion of the disputed information; and the relative frequencies of the disputes.
I will discuss each of these reasons in sequence.
130. Id. at 6-7, 12.
131. See National Lawyers Guild v. Attorney Gen., 96 F.R.D. 390, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1982),
and authorities cited therein.
132. Reynolds distinguished criminal trials. See supra note 129.
133. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
134. Id. at 11; accord, e.g., Halkin v. Helms (Halkin 11), 690 F.2d 977,990 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Some judges, however, have construed Reynolds to allow a balancing of interests approach. See
American Civil Liberties Union v. Brown, 619 F.2d 1170, 1173-78 (7th Cir. 1980); Jabara v.
Kelley, 75 F.R.D. .475, 484 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Halkin 1, 598 F.2d at 11-18 (Bazelon, J., and
Wright, C.J., dissenting). Butsee National Lawyers Guild v. Attorney Gen., 96 F.R.D. 390,399
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("The weight of authority does not support this view .... The court views
ACLU [v. Brown] and Jabara [v. Kelley] more as anomalies than as well-reasoned and
legitimate challenges to the standard of review established in Reynolds.").
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a. Congressional Disjunction
As Justice Jackson stated in Youngstown: "When the President takes
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his
power is at its lowest ebb .. ,,.3 In Reynolds, the President's will was
in conjunction, not disjunction, with that of Congress.'36 If an indepen-
dent counsel were to seek disclosure under a statute similar to the expired
Ethics Act, however, Congress's and the President's powers would be in
disjunction.1 37
A related distinction between Reynolds and the independent counsel
context derives from this congressional disjunction. The Executive's
authority to withhold security information from the Federal Tort Claims Act
plaintiff in Reynolds was based partly on the concept of sovereign immuni-
ty. 3  Sovereign immunity concerns do not exist in the independent
counsel context for two reasons. First, Congress has specifically authorized
the independent counsel to seek disclosure. Second, the relief sought is not
retrospective compensation from the public fisc by a private citizen-
traditionally barred by sovereign immunity doctrine-but rather an in-
junction to prevent an executive officer from interfering with the indepen-
dent counsel's or the defendant's prospective presentation of evidence at
trial.
b. Heightened Judicial Disjunction
Justice Jackson was only discussing a conflict between the congressio-
135. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
136. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6 ("IThe judgment below subjected the United States to liability
on terms to which Congress did not consent by the Tort Claims Act."). Reynolds also describes
the privilege as belonging to the "United States," or to the "Government," rather than to the
Executive alone. Id. at 6-7, 12.
137. Cf. Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1958). The court stated:
Unless Congress has created rights which are completely illusory, existing only at
the mercy of government officials, the [Invention Secrecy A]ct must be viewed as
waiving the [state secrets] privilege.
[Reynolds] and Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875) are distinguish-
able. Neither ... involved a specific enabling statute contemplating the trial of
actions that by their very nature concern security information. Moreover ... [iun
the instant case appellant is not seeking to obtain secret information which he does
not possess.
Id.
138. See supra note 136.
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nal and executive functions when he characterized the executive power as
being at its "lowest ebb." When the Executive asserts unqualified control
over evidence necessary for a trial, a conflict occurs between the judicial
and executive functions also. Hence, rhetorical impossibilities notwithstand-
ing, in a disclosure dispute between an independent counsel and the
President, the President's power would sink below the "lowest ebb" Justice
Jackson described. More significantly, in the context of an independent
counsel's criminal prosecution, the presidential and judicial functions would
clash more strongly than in a civil case like Reynolds. In Nixon, the
Supreme Court wrote:
The impediment that an absolute, unqualified privilege would place in
the way of the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do
justice in criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict with the function
of the courts under Art. III.' 9
As quoted in subsection c below, the Court felt that an unqualified privilege
would be a greater impediment to the judicial function in the criminal
context than in the civil context.
c. Criminal vs. Civil Trials
The heightened conflict between presidential and judicial responsibili-
ties which occurs when executive secrecy privileges are invoked in a
criminal case meshes with another important distinction between the
Reynolds context and the independent counsel context. As the Nixon court
articulated, the public interest in the disclosure of all relevant evidence is
stronger in criminal trials than in civil trials:
139. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974). Regarding the proposition that the
executive and judicial powers are in disjunction in a civil case too, see Reynolds, 345 U.S. at
8 & n.21 ("The court itself must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the
claim of privilege.... It is the judge who is in control of the trial, not the executive ....")
(citation omitted); Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987,997 (3d Cir. 1951) ("[T]o hold that
the head of an executive department of the Government in a suit to which the United States is
a party may conclusively determine the Government's claim of privilege is to abdicate the
judicial function and permit the executive branch... to infringe the independent province of
the judiciary as laid down by the Constitution."), rev'd, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (Third Circuit
opinion adopted by Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson, JJ., dissenting in United States v.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 12).
Regarding the proposition that the disjunction is less severe in a civil case than it is in a
criminal case, see Nixon, infra text accompanying note 140.
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[An executive] privilege must be considered in light of our historic
commitment to the rule of law .... This is nowhere more profoundly
manifest than in our view that "the two fold aim [of criminal justice] is
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer .... ." To ensure that
justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory
process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the
prosecution or by the defense.
[P]roduction of all evidence at a criminal trial ... has constitu-
tional dimensions.
We are not here concerned with the balance between the Presi-
dent's ... interest in confidentiality and the need for relevant evidence
in civil litigation .... We address only the conflict between the
President's assertion of ... privilege ... and the constitutional need for
relevant evidence in criminal trials.1
40
Aside from historic commitments to the rule of law, a more mundane
reason to accord the Executive less deference in independent counsel cases
arises from the distinction between civil and criminal trials. In a civil suit,
but for an evidentiary privilege, the Executive would be legally powerless
to protect national security secrets.1 41 In the independent counsel context,
however, the President has the practical option of pardoning the defendant
if he or she feels strongly enough that the national interest in secrecy
demands it.'
42
In theory, a pardon need not have broader effect than an unqualified
evidentiary privilege. Issuing a conditional, piecemeal pardon would
achieve the same end. Such a pardon might be phrased in the following
manner: "I pardon the defendant for all offenses the trial of which would
require the public disclosure of national security information x, y, and z, the
substance of which I have apprised the independent counsel, the court, and
the defendant."
140. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708-12 & n.19 (citation omitted). Reynolds also distinguished the
application of the state secrets privilege in criminal cases from its application in civil cases. See
supra note 129.
141. Of course, where the government is a party, it can protect secrets by settling out of
court or conceding liability. Settlements and concessions of liability are problematic, though,
because they might expose the public fisc to an unacceptable number of strike suits. Also,
solutions of this nature are less viable in suits where the United States intervenes to protect
secrets but is not involved in the underlying dispute. See cases cited infra note 143.
142. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President... shall have Power to grant Reprieves
and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.").
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d. Executive Conflict of Interest
The biggest reason for differentiating an independent counsel prosecu-
tion from a Reynolds case is that executive conflicts of interest are not such
a concern in the latter context. In the Reynolds context, high executive offi-
cials generally are not implicated in wrongdoing, and, if they are, the
opprobrium and punishment risks they face usually are not as severe as the
risks faced by a potential criminal defendant. Also, in those Reynolds cases
where the government invokes the state secrets privilege as an intervenor
and is not a party to the underlying dispute, executive conflicts of interest
most likely do not exist. 43 In independent counsel cases, however, the
conflict of interest issue is paramount-it is an independent counsel's raison
d'etre.'" As President Carter articulated when he supported the creation
of independent counsel, the purpose of independent counsel is to dispel even
the appearance of an executive conflict of interest. 4"
An analogy to the corporate law "business judgment rule" is apt here.
Under the business judgment rule, courts ordinarily defer to the judgment
of a corporation's board of directors in determining what corporate action
would be in the corporation's best interest. An exception occurs, however,
when directors are defendants in a shareholder derivative action. The Dela-
ware Supreme Court has ruled that when directors are sued derivatively by
a corporation through its shareholders, a court applying Delaware law has
the discretion to apply "its own business judgment" in deciding whether it
would be in the corporation's interest for its shareholders to continue the
suit in the corporation's behalf."4
143. For cases involving invocations of the state secrets privilege by the United States as
a third party, see, e.g., In re: Under Seal John Doe 1 v. John Doe 3, 945 F.2d 1285 (4th Cir.
1991); Zuckerbraun v. General Dynamics Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1134 (D. Conn. 1990), aiftd, 935
F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1991); Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1985);
Northrop Corp. v. McDonnel Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Farnsworth
Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1980).
144. SPECIAL PROSECUTOR ACT OF 1978, H.R. REP. No. 1307, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1978) ("The purpose of the legislation is to... eliminate the conflict of interest inherent when
the Department of Justice must investigate and prosecute high-level executive branch
officials.").
145. JIMMY CARTER, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMIT-
TING A DRAFT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO PRESERVE AND PROMOTE ETHICAL STANDARDS
THROUGHOUT TH. EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, H.R. Doc. No. 139, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977) ("This [special prosecutor legislation] ... will eliminate all
appearance of high-level interference in sensitive investigations and prosecutions.").
146. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981). The Delaware Supreme
Court's approach has been followed and amplified in a noteworthy federal court opinion as
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Both the business judgment rule and the state secrets privilege are
based in part on the fact that the decision-maker whose decision is subject
to judicial review acts within a sphere of constitutionally and/or legislatively
assigned authority, and in part on the assumption that the decision-maker
possesses a special, non-judicial expertise. All else being equal (and this
discounts, among other things, the difference between constitutionally and
legislatively assigned spheres of authority), the business judgment rule's
notion that judicial intervention is appropriate when the decision-maker is
subject to a conflict of interest suggests that federal courts should have
similar discretion to apply their own "national security judgment" in the
independent counsel context. This analysis dovetails with that of the Nixon
court when it adduced the benefits of candor in the decision- making process
as a rationale for creating a constitutional confidentiality privilege for the
President and his advisors. As much as "[h]uman experience" teaches that
a group will make better decisions if its members feel they are able to speak
openly with one another,'47 human experience teaches that people are less
likely to make good decisions when they are judging their own cause.
e. Having vs. Seeking Information
Another aspect of the independent counsel scenario distinguishes it
from Reynolds and most of Reynold's progeny: the litigant seeking
disclosure possesses the disputed information. This has two ramifications.
First, it increases the likelihood that the information is actually
important for the trial. If the defendant is the party who wants to use the
information, it means the court probably has decided that the information is
relevant evidence without which the trial cannot proceed. 148 If the inde-
pendent counsel is the one who wants to use the information, it means the
independent counsel thinks it will enable him or her to prove criminal
well. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982) (applying Connecticut law), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
147. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705.
148. Under CIPA, supra note 4, a criminal defendant seeking to use classified evidence
must first notify the government. The government then has the opportunity to argue that the
evidence is irrelevant or inadmissible, or to offer non-classified substitutions to be used in its
place. The time would not be ripe for an independent counsel to contest an executive
classification decision until the trial judge has decided that all non-classified alternatives are
inadequate and that the defendant must be able to present classified evidence in order to receive
a fair trial. At that point, the independent counsel would either have to drop the case, or
challenge the Executive's classification decision.
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wrongdoing. 19 In a Reynolds case, the party seeking disclosure often does
not have the information nor even knows whether it exists. 50
Second, the practical balance of power between the Judicial and the
Executive branches shifts subtly. If the parties did not have the information,
the court would have to order the Executive to provide it to them, raising
the real possibility that the Executive would refuse.15' Executive non-
compliance would leave the court with no recourse of its own, and in the
potentially embarrassing and delegitimizing posture of issuing an ineffectual
decree. When the parties have the information, however, the court can
simply allow them to introduce it at trial, without worrying that the ruling
might be ineffectual. If this happened, and the President still wanted to
prevent disclosure, he or she would have to pardon the defendant.'52
Thus, in the independent counsel context, the question is not whether the
court has the power to compel executive disclosure of national security
information, but whether the Executive has the power to prevent judicial
disclosure without pardoning the defendant.'53
149. As Congress considers reviving the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics Act,
it might want to contemplate requiring independent counsel to obtain the same sort of relevance,
admissibility and inadequacy of substitution rulings that defendants must obtain under CIPA
before independent counsel may challenge the propriety of executive security classifications
pertaining to prosecution evidence. Such a requirement would give content to the "if necessary"
limitation on independent counsel's contestation power in section 594(a)(6) of the Ethics Act,
and might provide an extra safeguard against unripe or unnecessary challenges by independent
counsel.
150. Indeed, the'Supreme Court characterized the Reynolds plaintiff's showing that the
information at issue was necessary as "dubious." Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11. But cf Halpern,
258 F.2d at 36 (Reynold's case in which litigant seeking disclosure possessed the information
at issue).
151. At oral arguments in United States v. Nixon, President Nixon's attorney suggested to
the Supreme Court that Nixon might decide not to produce his tapes if they were subpoenaed.
Schmitt, supra note 9, at 193 n.81.
152. The Attorney General also could try firing the independent counsel, but this probably
would just delay matters. Under the Ethics Act the Attorney General was able to dismiss an
independent counsel for "good cause"-the existence of which the Judiciary presumably was
the final arbiter. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a) (expired).
153. While power and authority are not the same, their conflation may at times be
unavoidable. At least since Justice Marshall ruled that he lacked the authority to command that
the Secretary of State deliver to the justices of the peace their commissions in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), power on occasion has been an important, if unspoken, factor in
the Judiciary's calculation of its own authority. Whether the Judiciary's increased power in the
independent counsel context is a legitimate reason for exercising it might depend on whether
the Judiciary's diminished power in the Reynolds context has been a factor in discretionary
decisions by judges to exercise greater restraint than judicial authority requires in calibrating
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f Frequency
Occasions requiring the use of interim special prosecutors to investigate
high executive officials have been exceptional. If the past is a reliable
predictor, they will continue to be exceptional. Even more rare would be
the subset of those occasions which required the Judiciary to adjudicate
disputes between independent counsel and the Executive over the evidentiary
use of security information. To date, in fact, that subset is an empty set.
In the aggregate then, judicial review of executive classification decisions
arising from independent counsel cases would be a much lower order
intrusion upon the executive sphere than judicial review arising from the
sum of day-to-day Reynolds cases.
In the past, the Supreme Court and the Executive branch have each
exhibited concern for frequency in constitutional inquiries of this nature. In
both New York Times Co. and Nixon, the Supreme Court excused its limitation
of executive power by noting that the particular circumstances involved were
not likely to happen very often." Similarly, when President Ford asserted
that the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act were unconstitu-
tional, he vetoed them in part because of the drain on Executive resources
which the mass of FOIA requests would work. 55
the Reynolds standard of review.
154. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 733 (per curiam) (White, J., concurring) ("[D]iscom-
fiture [at denying relief to the United States on its good-faith claims that publication will work
serious damage to the country] is considerably dispelled by the infrequency of prior-restraint
cases."); Nixon, 418 U.S. at 712 ("[W]e cannot conclude that advisers will be moved to temper
the candor of their remarks by the infrequent occasions of disclosure because of the possibility
that such conversations will be called for in the context of a criminal prosecution.").
155. President Ford gave the following reason for his veto:
[M]any millions of pages of... files would be subject to compulsory disclosure
at the behest of any person unless the Government could prove to a
court-separately for each paragraph of each document-that disclosure "would"
cause... harm .... Our... agencies do not have, and could not obtain, the large
number of trained and knowledgeable personnel that would be needed to make
such a line-by-line examination of information requests ....
GERALD R. FORD, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES VETOING H.R.
12471, AN ACT TO AMEND THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AcT, H.R. Doc. No. 383, 93rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 111 (1974). Resource drain continued to be one of the defense and intelligence
agencies' primary complaints about FOIA after Congress passed the amendments over Ford's
veto. See Wald, supra note 31, at 672-73.
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3. Pole of Minimum Deference: New York
Times Co. v. United States
While Reynolds, as it generally has been construed, sets an exceedingly
deferential standard for judicial review of executive representations that
security information must not be disclosed, New York Times Co. sets an
exceedingly difficult standard for the Executive to meet. In New York Times
Co., the Court of Appeals for the S
econd Circuit had held, and the Nixon Administration itself suggested on
appeal, that for the Administration to convince the courts to enjoin the
publication of the Pentagon Papers, the Administration should have to show
that disclosure would cause "grave and irreparable injury" or "grave and
immediate danger" to the public interest. Justice White rejected these
formulations, however, as too deferential to the Executive. 156 Mirroring
White, Justice Brennan opined that a pre-publication restraint could never
be predicated upon mere conjecture that harm might result, and could only
be legal if the nation were at war or, maybe, if the world situation were
tantamount to time of war.157 Justice Stewart, on the other hand, indicated
that he preferred a standard closer to those the Administration and the court
of appeals had formulated. 58 Interestingly, neither the Reynolds nor the
New York Times Co. standard looks to the need of the non-government
litigant who is seeking disclosure, only to the harm the government alleges
would result from disclosure. Under Reynolds, the government need only
show that any harm to slight harm might occur, while under New York
Times Co., it must show that enormous harm to catastrophic harm would
occur.
The argument that the Executive should bear a heavier burden in
justifying prior restraints of the press than prior restraints of independent
counsel does not need extensive elaboration here. A dispute between the
Executive and an independent counsel over the control of state secrets pits
the President's general and implied constitutional powers against congressio-
nal and judicial powers of a similar magnitude. In a prior restraint case,
however, general and implied presidential powers compete against "specific
and emphatic [constitutional] guarantees" that the freedom of the press shall
156. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 732 & n.2 (per curiam) (White, J., concurring).
157. Id. at 725-26 (Brennan, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I cannot say that disclosure.., will surely result
in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people.").
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not be abridged.159
To the extent an independent counsel's First Amendment rights might
be implicated, they are attenuated or waived by the independent counsel's
prior acceptance of the obligations which accompany his or her position.
Newspapers, unlike government officials, are not employees of the state or
servants of the people. They do not receive security information in the
course of performing official functions. They owe no fiduciary-like duty to
closely hold the people's or the government's confidences and to dissemi-
nate them only in accordance with proper legal forms. 16° Indeed, they are
sometimes portrayed as belonging to a quasi-formal "fourth estate" which
the founders intended to play a supplemental role as gadfly in our system
of checks and balances.
61
C. Separation of Powers
1. Introduction
The preceding "sliding scale" analysis in subpart B is largely compara-
tive, and rests on two assumptions: first, that if the state secrets privilege
were constitutionalized, it would continue to be applied as it has been, and,
second, that such an application would be constitutional. Either assumption
could be wrong. For this reason, subpart C will attempt independently to
justify this article's conception of the role of independent counsel in terms
of the constitutional separation of powers.
The term "separation of powers" encompasses a cluster of interrelated
concerns regarding the proper allocation of government authority and power
among government institutions. Initially, it is useful to distinguish two
separate inquiries prone to conflation under the separation of powers rubric:
"what allocation of power does the Constitution actually prescribe?" and
159. Id. at 716-17 (Black, J., concurring) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall
make no law... abridging the freedom.., of the press .... "); see also id. at 730-31 (White,
J., concurring) (judgment due to "extraordinary protection against prior restraints enjoyed by
the press under our constitutional system.").
160. Cf Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) ("[T]he State has interests
as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it
possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.").
161. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 717 (Black, J., concurring) ("The press was protected
so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people."); id. at 728 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (press supplements governmental checks and balances); see also Potter Stewart, Or
of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633-34 (1975) ("The relevant metaphor... is [that] of the
Fourth Estate.").
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"what allocation is 'best'?" The former inquiry is reflected in the first
criterion the Supreme Court uses to identify nonjusticiable "political
questions"-whether the Constitution "textually commits" a decision to one
of the political branches of government, thereby precluding judicial
resolution or interference by the other political branch.1 62  Section 2,
below, argues that the constitutional text does not preclude congressionally
authorized judicial review of executive security privilege claims in the
independent counsel context.
Where the search for a clear textual prescription is inconclusive,
normative rationales may inform allocation choices. This latter inquiry, the
search for the "best" allocation of power, may be guided by at least two
different separation of powers rationales-one positive and one nega-
tive. 63 The positive rationale for separation of powers is functional. For
efficiency's sake, it posits, each branch of government should perform only
those functions at which it is most proficient. Sometimes incompatible with
this positive rationale, the negative separation of powers rationale seeks to
guard against tyranny by preventing the centralization of government
power."6 Government power is so dangerous, the negative rationale posits,
that it must be diffused among separate institutions, each capable of
preserving itself against the others.
The positive, or functional, rationale for separation of powers can cut
two ways regarding judicial review of executive invocations of the state
secrets privilege in the independent counsel context. If it requires that the
President always be able to execute covert military or foreign policy with
the utmost expedience, then it argues for a quite limited judicial role. If,
however, it means that United States policy should reflect the most accurate
possible assessment of the nation's security interests, then, I will argue, it
suggests that a substantial judicial role is desirable.
This functional argument, contained in sections three through six below,
addresses a series of separation of powers concerns articulated by the
Supreme Court and by commentators which derive mainly from the
162. Nixon v. United States [hereinafter WalterL Nixon], 113 S. Ct. 732,735 (1993); Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
163. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the
United States, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363, 372-73 (1982).
164. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison) ("The accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands ... may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny."); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) ("[T]he Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty .... ");
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,710, 727 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The purpose of the
separation and equilibration of powers.., was.., to preserve individual freedom.").
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functional rationale. These concerns include: the relative competencies and
expertise of the Judiciary and the Executive; the relative merits of the
judicial forum versus normal political processes; the availability of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for assessing claims of privilege; and
the judicial ability to fashion appropriate and final relief.'65 These con-
cerns have been advanced as reasons why courts should avoid decisions
involving military and foreign affairs,' 66 the Executive's withholding of
information from Congress, 67 and challenges by independent counsel of
executive state secrets privilege claims.
61
For historical reasons, the negative rationale most obviously cuts in the
direction of a greater judicial role. Abuses of secrecy in the name of
national security, and in particular executive abuses, have plagued our nation
in this century. However, in an essay favoring a constitutional executive
privilege, Gary Schmitt has suggested that executive privilege is a desirable
safeguard against an overweening or oppressive Congress. The last section
below argues that Schmitt's concerns are less apposite in the independent
counsel context than in the context he addresses-congressional demands to
be supplied information by the Executive.
2. Textual Commitment
As is often the case in hard political question cases, the search for
clear, exclusive textual commitments is inconclusive in this separation of
powers inquiry." Consequently, this subsection argues, the constitutional
text does not preclude a judicial role in evaluating executive invocations of
165. See WalterL Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 739; Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,518-19,
548-49 (1969); Baker, 369 U.S. at 210, 217.
166. See Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review
and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held
secret.... But even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature of
executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions
are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the
government, Executive and Legislative... . They are and should be undertaken
only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or
imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude,
facilities nor responsibility ..
Id. at 111.
167. Schmitt, supra note 9, at 178-82.
168. Noble, supra note 8, at 577-80.
169. Walter L. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 741 (White, J., concurring) ("IThere are few, if any,
explicit and unequivocal instances in the constitution of this sort of textual commitment.").
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the state secrets privilege at the request of independent counsel.
I discussed earlier how the Constitution does not explicitly grant to the
President any responsibility for regulating government secrecy.17 The
Nixon rationale for a constitutional executive communications privilege is
that the Constitution impliedly grants to the President all powers that are
appropriate and relevant for carrying out the powers it explicitly grants him
or her. By the same rationale, Nixon suggested, a constitutional state secrets
privilege might accompany the military and foreign affairs functions which
the Constitution explicitly vests in the President.
The Constitution explicitly grants military and foreign affairs powers
to Congress as well. Is it not just as appropriate then, that Congress too
receive implied powers to regulate governmental secrecy in these areas? 7'
In sheer number, word count, and page space, the Constitution's textual
commitments of military and foreign affairs powers to the Congress over-
whelm its like commitments to the President. The Constitution contains
four textual commitments of military or foreign affairs powers to the Presi-
dent. "'72 Half of these grant powers which may be exercised only with the
advice and consent of the Senate. The Constitution contains at least sixteen
textual commitments of military or foreign affairs powers to Congress. 173
170. See supra text accompanying notes 111-18.
171. Cf. United States v. AT&T, 567 F.2d 121, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("The executive would
have it that the Constitution confers on the executive absolute discretion in the area of national
security. This does not stand up.... [T]he Constitution ... confers upon Congress other
powers equally inseparable from the national security."); cf also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280,
289 n.17 (1981) (President's foreign relations power must be exercised in subordination to
applicable constitutional provisions).
172. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States ...."); id. § 2, cl.
2 ("He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors ...."); id. § 3 ("[H]e shall
receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers ....").
173. In addition to the Senate's Article II advice and consent duties, these include: U.S.
CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To ... provide for the common
Defence ... of the United States .... ); id. § 8, cl. 3 ("To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations"); id. § 8, cl. 10 ("To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high
Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations"); id. § 8, cl. 11 ("To declare War" and "grant
Letters of Marque; and Reprisal"); id. § 8, cl. 12 ("To raise and support Armies"); U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 13 ("To provide and maintain a Navy"); id. § 8, cl. 14 ("To make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces"); id. § 8, cl. 15 ("To provide for
calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions"); id. § 8, cl. 16 ("To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia,
and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States,
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Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 is the most expansive of these, empowering
Congress to make laws relating to all powers which the Constitution vests
in the United States Government. Presumably, "all" powers includes the
military and foreign affairs powers more directly vested in the President.174
The argument for joint executive and congressional proprietorship of
state secrets is particularly compelling when the secrets are not purely
executive in nature. The Nixon privilege, covering communications among
the President and his advisors, applies to information solely of executive
origin. State secrets tend to involve covert government activities which
Congress has authorized, appropriated money for, and (in theory at least)
monitors. For such secrets, both branches share a kind of generative
proprietorship.
If the foregoing proposition that the Constitution impliedly grants
Congress a degree of authority to regulate government secrecy is correct,
could not Congress create corresponding judicial functions in adjudicating
disputes arising out of such regulation? Moreover, the Constitution
explicitly charges the federal courts with adjudicating various cases that
reserving to the States ... [training and personnel concerns] according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress"); id. § 8, cl. 17 ("To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever ... over all Places purchased ... for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, [and]
Arsenals"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution ... all ... Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."); id. § 9, cl. 1
(Giving Congress the power to regulate the "migration and importation of persons."); id. § 9,
cl. 8 ("[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under [the United States], shall,
without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any
kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign state."); id. § 10, cl. 2 ("No state shall, without
the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may
be absolutely necessary for ... inspection ... ; and all such Laws shall be subject to the
Revision and Control of the Congress."); id. § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent
of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into
any Agreement or Compact with.., a foreign Power, or engage in War .. "). On the power
to grant "letters of marque and reprisal," and its relationship to issues involved in the
Iran-Contra prosecutions, see Jules Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden
War and Forgotten Power, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1035 (1986).
174. Gary Schmitt turns the preceding argument on its head, pointing out that "meagerness
of text does not necessarily imply a paucity of power." He suggests that the lesser enumeration
of war powers in Article II might "indicate an intent on the part of the framers to grant a
substantial amount of discretion" to the President, to avoid burdening him or her with details.
Schmitt, supra note 9, at 172-73. Schmitt's is a valid, if creative, textual interpretation, but
hardly conclusive. Nor does it negate the substantial congressional role in military and foreign
affairs enumerated in Article II, even as it views that enumeration restrictively.
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touch on military and foreign affairs matters."' By implication and
extension, could not such a congressional bestowal of subject matter
jurisdiction be appropriate in light of the Article III text?
A special executive privilege for state secrets would also compete with
explicit or implied constitutional grants of authority to the other branches
which are not directly related to military and foreign affairs. The Judiciary's
constitutionally assigned responsibility for the "fair administration of
criminal justice" is an example discussed earlier.' Another example
might be Congress's implied authority to create legal mechanisms for
ensuring that its laws are obeyed and enforced. Such an authority would be
especially relevant when the laws needing enforcement are laws that prohibit
lying to Congress-as occurred in the Iran-Contra Affair. Surely it is a
relevant and appropriate accompaniment to the sum of Congress's explicit
constitutional responsibilities that Congress have the implied power to
ensure information provided to it is truthful and accurate.
3. Expertise
a. The Judiciary Has Sufficient Expertise
That courts lack the expertise to evaluate state secrets has often been
stated, but rarely explained. One possible explanation is that state secrets
are too complex for judges to appreciate or grasp. But courts routinely deal
with the most important and complex issues of our society.' What
makes national security matters recherch6? Are military and intelligence
175. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Judicial Power shall extend to all... Treaties... ;
to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; ... to Controversies... between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."); id. § 3, cl. I ("Treason against the United
States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies.... No
person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same
overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.").
176. The quote is from Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,711-13 (1974); see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 139-40.
177. Cf United States v. United States Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 320
(1972) [hereinafter Keith] ("We cannot accept the Government's argument that internal security
matters are too subtle and complex for judicial evaluation. Courts regularly deal with the most
difficult issues of our society. There is no reason to believe that federal judges will be
insensitive to or uncomprehending of the issues involved in domestic security cases."). Judge
Bazelon extrapolated this Keith argument to national security matters in Halkin v. Helms
(Halkin 1), 598 F.2d 1, 15 n. 17 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Bazelon, J.) (objecting to denial of petition for
en banc rehearing.
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methodology more arcane than the usual medical malpractice or patent
litigation? If knowledge of background information is necessary to
appreciate certain national security threats (the possibility of which has
concerned judges and executive officials in the past),"'8 the information
may be presented to a court in camera. If a security threat still is too subtle
for the Executive to convey its significance to a court, there is reason to
doubt that it exists. Doomsayers making patently implausible predic-
tions-the English folktale of Chicken Little comes to mind' 79-should
not be heeded just because they show up in court with impressive charts and
solemn affidavits. Chicken Little is an extreme and fanciful example, of
course, but to concede that a judge should not defer to a Deputy CIA
Director Little just because he or she wears the Article II mantle would
seem to be a concession that the propriety of constitutional claims of state
secrets privilege would be justiciable, at least in some circumstances.
Admitting this exception, moreover, it is unclear where and by what
principle the exception could be limited.
Another possible explanation for judicial incapacity is that secrecy
decisions often are prophylactic judgment calls made on the basis of limited
information of unknown reliability, particularly in the area of foreign affairs.
But, assessing foreign affairs pitfalls-for example, predicting the effect that
exposure of a joint covert effort with a foreign government would have on
other governments' or on intelligence operatives' willingness to cooperate
secretly with the United States in the future-is no more prophesy than a
host of typical judicial decisions: for example, predicting the degree to
which exposure of a citizen informant will impede domestic law enforce-
ment; 18 or awarding a broadcasting license on the basis of sex will
promote certain forms of speech; 8 ' or calculating the lost future wages of
178. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text; Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d
987,997-98 (3d Cir. 1951) (opinion adopted by Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson, JJ., dissenting
in United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 12). ("[If, as the Government asserts is sometimes
the case, a knowledge of background facts is necessary to enable one properly to pass on the
claim of privilege those facts also may be presented to the judge in camera.").
179. In the folktale, Chicken Little (a.k.a. Henny Penny or Chicken Licken) comes to
believe that the sky is falling after an acorn drops on her head. She and several compatriots set
out to warn the King. All are eaten en route by Foxy Woxy, however, so that "to this day the
King has never been told that the sky was falling." See, e.g., V.S. HUTCHINSON with
illustrations by Lois LENSKI, CHIMNEY CORNER STORIES 3 (1925); THE OXFORD COMPANION
TO CHILDREN'S LITERATURE 110 (1984).
180. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
181. Lamprecht v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 958 F.2d 382, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(Future Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas found that "[alny 'predictive judgments'
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a tort victim; or deciding whether probable cause exists for a search warrant.
The existence of relative degrees of uncertainty among a category of factual
judgments would be a poor reason for the judiciary to shun the entire
category-even if many of the decisions in the category involve a high
degree of uncertainty. First, such an approach would be unnecessarily
overexclusive, excluding decisions that could be based on more certain and
complete information. Second, our judicial fact-finding system generally
approaches risk of error not by avoiding judgment, but with burdens of
proof. It would be a sufficient and appropriate corrective for uncertainty in
the state secrets area if a judge, in setting burdens of proof, factored in the
magnitude of harm the Executive alleged would result from disclosure, just
as the Supreme Court has calibrated burdens of proof by the relative
importance of interests at stake in other contexts.1
8 2
In fact, the Reynolds court appears to have signaled its own use of this
approach when it emphasized that the historical context of its decision was
the midst of the Korean War. "In the instant case," the court wrote, "we
cannot escape judicial notice that this is a time of vigorous preparation for
national defense."' 83 This reference would seem to be a tacit bow to the
notion that courts must weigh the magnitude and the plausibility of alleged
dangers in deciding whether to defer to the Executive's nondisclosure
decision. Historical context, i.e. "time of war," was a rough-and-ready
proxy for satisfying these criteria with regard to the Air Force test data at
issue in the case. Presumably, the nation was sufficiently aware that it was
at war when the Supreme Court decided Reynolds that it did not need to be
reminded of the fact. The statement's most plausible significance would
have been for future courts, deciding future cases, at times of relative peace.
As for legislative estimations of judicial competence, Congress
specifically addressed the question when the Nixon and Ford Administra-
tions urged Congress to relax the Freedom of Information Act's general de
novo review standard for cases involving FOIA's national security exemp-
tion. Both administrations argued that judges lack the knowledge and
concerning group behavior and the differences in behavior among different groups must at the
very least be sustained by meaningful evidence.").
182. Cf In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362-63 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that
every element of a criminal offense must be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt"); Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) ("clear and convincing" proof required in
civil suits where particularly important individual interests are at stake).
183. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
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expertise necessary to make disclosure decisions regarding state secrets. Is4
"Congress soundly rejected this contention, however," and refused to create
the special exception the Executive wanted. 8
Closely related to the issue of judicial expertise is the question of
judicial responsibility. However, there is little reason to fear that judges will
be insensitive or careless where security issues are concerned.'8 6 Through-
out our history the Judiciary has approached security matters with solicitude
and caution. It has never been accused of dropping the ball.8 7 To the
extent a judge's self-interest enters the equation, a natural bias probably
exists for the judge to err on the side of nondisclosure. To err on the side
of secrecy is to err in private; to err on the side of disclosure is to err
publicly. By choosing secrecy, a judge greatly reduces his or her risk of
public embarrassment.
184. Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright, C.J., concurring). See
sources cited in id. at 1206 n.28; PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS VETOING H.R. 12471,
AN ACT TO AMEND THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AcT, H.R. Doc. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974) ("[T]he courts should not be forced to make what amounts to the initial
classification decision in sensitive and complex areas where they have no particular expertise.").
185. Ray, 587 F.2d at 1210; see 120 CONG. REC. 17,028 (1974) (Sen. Chiles) ("We say that
four-star generals or admirals will be reasonable but a Federal district judge is going to be
unreasonable. I cannot buy that argument, especially when I see that general or that admiral has
participated in covering up a mistake, and the Federal judge sits there without a bias one way
or another. I want him to be able to decide without blinders or having to go in one direction.").
186. See Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 997 (3d Cir. 1951) (Maris, J.) (opinion
adopted by Black, J., Frankfurter, J., and Jackson, J., dissenting in Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 12):
Nor is there any danger to the public interest in submitting the question of
privilege to the decision of the courts. The judges of the United States are public
officers whose responsibility under the Constitution is just as great as that of the
heads of the executive departments.... [J]udges may be depended upon to protect
with the greatest of care the public interest in preventing the disclosure of matters
which may fairly be characterized as privileged.
See also 120 CONG. REC. 36,870 (1974) (Sen. Muskie):
I cannot imagine that any Federal judge would throw open the gates of the
Nation's classified secrets, or that they would substitute their judgment for that of
an agency head without carefully weighing all the evidence in the arguments
presented by both sides. On the contrary, if we constrict the manner in which
courts perform this vital review function, we make the classifiers themselves
privileged officials, immune from the accountability necessary for Government to
function smoothly.
187. See Wald, supra note 31, at 672-73,675,676-77 and testimony of intelligence officials
cited therein ("Neither the FBI nor the CIA [as of 1984] has yet identified a court-ordered
[FOIA] disclosure that has been carried through to endanger lives or operations."); James Zagel,
The State Secrets Privilege, 50 MINN. L. REV. 875, 900 (1966) ("The courts have clearly shown
they are not about to run wild in declaring information unprivileged.").
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b. The Executive Is Overrated
In contrast, the Executive's spotty track record at intelligence and
security analysis invites consideration of whether the Judiciary might
actually be a superior decision-maker than the Executive. This hypothesis
has both procedural and substantive elements.
Procedurally, intelligence is collected, analyzed, and reconciled with
policy within a closed system. The people who make policy head that
system. If intelligence does not support policy, executive policymakers have
two options. They can change policy, or they can change intellig-
ence-most easily by changing the intelligence collectors and analysts. 88
Consequently, intelligence workers face institutional pressures to tell
policy-making superiors what they want to hear.
8 9
The CIA, for example, recently has been criticized for the quality and
integrity of its intelligence product during the 1980s. A few senior CIA
officials and analysts have testified to Congress that an atmosphere of
politicization and intimidation existed at the CIA throughout the decade,
corrupting intelligence analysis.'9 Similarly, according to an internal CIA
survey, a widespread impression exists among CIA managers and analysts
that agency reports currently are tailored to please superiors. 9 Fur-
thermore, career secret-keepers no doubt possess the natural human tendency
of overestimating the importance of one's own bailiwick-a prevalent
phenomenon, apparently, in executive agencies (a phenomenon Judge
188. According to George Reedy: "[Y]ou can be ... certain that none of the people close
to [the President] ... are going to apply sceptical judgment [to the information on which the
President is acting]. At least they aren't going to apply sceptical judgments and remain close
to him very' long." BERGER, supra note 11l, at 344 n. 11.
189. Cf DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST 456-57 (1972) ("[N]o one
tells the President he is wrong."); In Awe of the President, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1973, at 6
("The 10 weeks of [Watergate] hearings brought forth witness after witness who by his own
account was afraid to speak his mind to Mr. Nixon .... The quintessence of this attitude was
exemplified in [the behavior of L. Patrick Gray, acting director of the FBI, and General Walters,
of the CIA.]").
190. E.g., Elaine Sciolino, Gates Almost a Side Issue in Hearings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,1991,
at A19; see also Excerpts from Gates's Testimony on His Record at the C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
4, 1991, at A12 (transcript of then-nominee CIA Director Robert M. Gates' testimony at
confirmation hearings) ("Again and again, Inspector General Reports and studies by the
directorate's product evaluation staff found pockets of perceptions of politicization ....").
191. E.g., Elaine Sciolino, C.LA. Chief Is Upset Over 'Politicization'Seen Within Agency,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1992, § 1, at 7; At C.I.A., Word and Deed-Still Slanted, N.Y. TIMES,
April 2, 1992, at A22.
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Stephen Breyer has dubbed "tunnel vision"'). Former CIA Director
Stansfield Turner has written that the quality of United States intelligence
analysis is disappointing in general, attributing this in part to bureaucratic
stifling of incentives for analytic initiative and rigor, and in part to pressure
to reconcile intelligence with established executive policy.
9 3
The judicial decision-making process is less prone to "slanted" security
assessments. In a disclosure dispute between an independent counsel and
the Executive, our adversarial system and the rules of evidence would ensure
a robust dialogue within a highly structured analytic framework.' 94 Each
side would have to marshal facts and submit its interpretation of the facts
to scrutiny and challenge. If necessary, the independent counsel could
obtain expert witnesses among former intelligence, military, or foreign
affairs officials. If necessary, the court could appoint a similar expert to aid
the court as a special master. 95 Most important, the judicial decision--
maker would possess neither an institutional nor a personal interest in the
outcome of the dispute.
192. "Tunnel vision, a classic administrative disease, arises when an agency so organizes
or subdivides its tasks that each employee's individual conscientious performance effectively
carries single-minded pursuit of a single goal too far, to the point where it brings about more
harm than good." STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE
RISK REGULATION 11 (1993). Regarding "tunnel vision" in the intelligence community, see
also, e.g., John Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part II: The Unconstitutionality of
the War They Didn't Tell Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1115 (1990) ("bureaucracies
generally like to operate without scrutiny whenever they can get away with it, and ... the CIA
in particular displays this preference with a vengeance"); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior
Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409,435 (1983); Elaine Sciolino, Panelfrom C.I.A. Urges Curtailing
ofAgency Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1992, at Al, A 14 (quoting Steven Aftergood, director
of the Project on Secrecy and Government at the Federation of American Scientists: "The
intelligence community reflexively classifies information and refuses to release it .... It pushes
the limits of absurdity. But it's built into their mindset.").
193, Stansfield Turner, Intelligence for a New World Order, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Vol. 70,
issue 4, Fall 1991, at 150, 161-64.
194. On the executive decision-making process, compare Derek Bok, BOSTON SUNDAY
GLOBE, July 22, 1973, at 44, ("The central staff may not be ... open enough to debate and
discussion with those holding contrary points of view.").
195. Cf Robert P. Deyling, Judicial Deference and De Novo Review in Litigation Over
National Security Information Under the Freedom of Information Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 67,
105-12 (1992) (advocating more vigilant judicial oversight of claims of national security
exemption from FOIA requests, including reliance on special masters to assist courts in fact-
finding); Washington Post v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, 766 F. Supp. 1, 4-5, 13-14 (D.D.C. 1991,
and subsequent proceeding, 789 F. Supp. 423,425 (D.D.C. 1992) (both involving use of special
master to assist court in examining soundness of executive claims of national security
exemption from FOIA requests).
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Substantively, administration bureaucracies are notorious for overclas-
sifying security information."9  William G. Florence, formerly the Air
Force's Deputy Assistant for Security and Trade Affairs, once testified that
disclosure of 99.5 percent of classified documents would not prejudice the
nation's defense interests. 97 Specific examples of questionable security
classifications include the withholding from a member of Congress of a
report that water flows downhill'98 and a confidential file on troop move-
ments in Europe dated April 15, 1917, which remains under lock and key
today.' 99 Regular United States prosecutors, not just independent counsel,
have clashed with the intelligence community over protecting security
information to the detriment of law enforcement. 200
In addition, high executive officials frequently have exaggerated, or at
196. See, e.g., Tamanaha, supra note 91, at 312-13 & n.199, and authorities cited therein
("The classification system has a well-documented history of chronic abuse resulting in the
unnecessary or overclassification of information."); cf also Shedding the C.I.A. 's Cloak, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 1992, at A20 ("The C.I.A. is notoriously unresponsive to requests for
information.").
197. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 344 (1973).
198. Zagel, supra note 187, at 898-99. See id. for similar examples. See also, e.g., David
Margolick, Seeing F.B.I. Files on Lennon: A Hard Day's Night, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1991, at
B5 (John Lennon lyrics classified "confidential" for 10 years though 15,000 people attended
same concert as FBI informer who transcribed lyrics and lyrics were later printed on cover of
Beatles' record album).
199. Elaine Sciolino, Panel from C.LA. Urges Curtailing ofAgency Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 1992, at A 1, A 14 (attributing Steven Aftergood, director of the Project on Secrecy and
Government at the Federation of American Scientists: "Government documents are routinely
classified, often with little regard to whether their disclosure would damage national security.");
see also, e.g., Graymail, Legislation: Hearings on H. 4736 Before the Subcomm. on Legislation
of the PermanentSelect Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong., 1 st Sess. 106 (1979) (statement of
Philip Lacovara: most classified information is overclassified); Security Classification Reform:
Hearings Before a Subcomm. on Government Operations on H.R. 12004, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess.
(Jul. 11, 25 and Aug. 1, 1974) (statement of Representative Dante Fascell: "[lI]n the field of
foreign affairs ... a lot.., doesn't need to be classified."); id. (statement of Representative
Alan Steelman, quoting Senator William D. Hathaway: "[wlidespread overclassification").
200. Graymail, Legislation, 1979: Hearings on H. 4736 Before the Subcomm. on
Legislation of the Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1979)
(statement of Michael Scheininger, Assistant U.S. Attorney); A.B.A. COMM. ON LAW AND
NAT'L SEC., LITIGATING NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES 7 (1982) (statement of attorney Earl
Silbert: before CIPA, intelligence agencies were reluctant to recommend prosecutions
involving classified information); Sylvester, Break in CIA-U.S. Attorney Bond, NAT'L L.J., Apr.
19, 1982, at 3 (U.S. Attorney fired for disclosing that CIA had prevented prosecution from
continuing for national security reasons.). Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 708 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (Justice Department and intelligence agencies are often in disagreement
over whether getting a conviction is worth the disclosure of national security information).
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least egregiously misread, national security risks even in the face of strong
public attention. In 1952, President Truman sought to take control of most
of the nation's steel mills because of impending strikes by steelworkers.
The Truman Administration asserted that its action was "necessary to avert
a national catastrophe which would inevitably result" from a stoppage of
steel production during the Korean War.20' Scholars have concluded,
however, that "[i]t is ... clear in hindsight that the Truman Administration
greatly exaggerated the seriousness of the problem. '20 2 After the Supreme
Court ruled that the President lacked the power to nationalize the steel
industry,20 3 the steelworkers struck for fifty-three days. "[N]o steel
shortage materialized, and the strike had no discernible impact on the war
effort."21 4
Similarly, the U.S. military now is widely regarded to have greatly
overstated the danger of subversion by Japanese-Americans during World
War II. "[Jiournalists and researchers have stocked library shelves with
studies ... [which] demonstrate that there could have been no reasonable
military assessment of an emergency at the time ... "205 In a detailed
and chilling account, Peter Irons has written that Justice Department lawyers
representing the government in Korematsu v. United States2°6 learned that
the military's evidence that Japanese-Americans posed a security threat was
extremely weak, but that the lawyers did not reveal this to the Supreme
Court when they argued in favor of interning Japanese-Americans.20 7
Other instances of executive exaggeration relate specifically to the
consequences of disclosing national security information. In 1969, Senator
Stuart Symington headed an investigatory committee which discovered that
201. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,582 (1952) (emphasis added).
202. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET. AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 380 (2d ed. 1991) (citing MAEVA
MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER
147-48 (1977); A. WESTIN, THE ANATOMY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CASE (1958); Paul G.
Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case: Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court, 51 MICH. L.
REV. 141 (1953); Edward S. Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw,
53 COLUM. L. REV. 52 (1953)).
203. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588.
204. See STONE, supra note 202.
205. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing, for example,
PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983); R. DANIELS, THE DECISION TO RELOCATE THE JAPAN-
ESE AMERICANS (1975); M. GRODZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED (1949); Eric K. Yamamoto,
Korematsu Revisited-Correcting the Injustice of Extraordinary Government Excess and Lax
Judicial Review: Time for a Better Accommodation of National Security Concerns and Civil
Liberties, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (1966)).
206. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
207. PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR ix-x, 278-310 (1983).
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the United States had been waging a secret war against the Pathet Lao in
northern Laos. After the Symington Committee forced the administration
to admit in closed session that the Committee's findings were accurate, the
Committee tried to publicize the information over the Executive's objec-
tions. The Executive predicted that dire consequences would result, but the
Committee prevailed and the information was publicized. As a Committee
counsel later observed: "None of the parade of horrors which the State
Department imagined did in fact occur."2'
In New York Times Co., the Executive represented that unless publica-
tion of the Pentagon Papers was prevented, "the nation's security will suffer
immediate and irreparable harm," including one or all of the following: "a
definite break in diplomatic relations affecting the defense of the United
States, an armed attack against the United States or its allies, a war, or the
compromise of military or defense plans or intelligence operations, or
scientific or technological developments vital to the national defense."2"
Today, there appears to be a consensus that the Executive's evidence
was "woefully weak"2 ' and that no dire consequences have occurred."'
Leslie Gelb, who authored the Pentagon Papers, has written recently that he
"did not think then or now that the publication would compromise U.S.
national security."2 2 Erwin Griswold, solicitor general during the Nixon
Administration, was the lawyer who asked the Supreme Court to suppress
the Pentagon Papers. He has since written, in reference to the suppression
of evidence needed for the North trial, that although he "thought there was
a substantial risk" at the time, he has "never seen any trace of a threat to
national security" since the papers were published.213 According to
Griswold, "the lesson of the Pentagon Papers experience" is that there is
"massive overclassification and that the principal concern of the classifiers
is not with national security, but rather with governmental embarrassment
208. ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 203 (1973); see generally John
Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part II: The Unconstitutionality of the War They
Didn't Tell Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1093 (1990).
209. SCHLESINGER, supra note 208, at 345-46.
210. David Rudenstine, Pentagon Papers, 20 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1991, § 4,
at 15.
211. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Vietnam; Truth of Reputation?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1990,
at A4.
212. Leslie H. Gelb, Foreign Affairs; The 100 Questions, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1991, § 4,
at 17.
213. Eleanor Randolph, Ex-Solicitor General Shifts View of 'Pentagon Papers,' WASH.
POST, Feb. 16, 1989, at A52.
1994] 1843
141
: Nova Law Review 18, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
of one sort or another. 214
Excluding instances of politically motivated or hysteria-induced
exaggeration, due to the imprecise nature of much intelligence and foreign
affairs analysis, the Executive often is plain wrong.215 According to
Senator Daniel Moynihan, "[flor a quarter century the CIA has been
repeatedly wrong about the major political and economic questions entrusted
to its analysis. 21 6 Some of the intelligence community's blunders have
been embarrassingly glaring. Relatively recent examples which have been
widely cited include the Executive's failure to predict or assess the Iranian
revolution, 217 the extent of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's bellicosi-
ty,2I and the Soviet Union's economic decline and subsequent disintegra-
211tion. It is unlikely that an educated layperson, much less a judge who
had perused relevant intelligence information, would have done a worse job
of prognostication.
214. On Pentagon Papers, Court Drama Fell Flat; Intercept Was in Public Records WASH.
POST, March 19, 1990, at A4.
215. The Gates Hearings: Excerpts from Gates's Testimony on His Record at the C.I.A.,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1991, at A12 (transcript of then-nominee CIA Director Robert M. Gates'
testimony at confirmation hearings):
Obviously, C.I.A.'s analysts are capable of and do turn out high-quality work. But
we also turn out work that is irrelevant, uninteresting, too late to be of value, too
narrow, too unimaginative, and too often just flat wrong.
C.I.A.'s analysts missed the likelihood and significance in 1975 of the
massive Soviet supply of military hardware to Angola, . . . missed similar
developments in Ethiopia in 1977 and failed to foresee the invasion of Afghanistan
in 1979.
216. Turner, supra note 193, at 161.
217. See, e.g., id. at 151, 152-53, 155, 157-58, 161, 163.
218. See, e.g., id. at 152-54; Anthony Lewis, Who Fed This Caesar?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15,
1992, § 4, at 17; Dean Baquet, Investigators Say U.S. Shielded Iraqisfrom Bank Inquiry, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 1992, at Al, A9.
219. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 193, at 162 ("We should not gloss over the enormity of
this failure to forecast the magnitude of the Soviet crisis .... [T]here were many Soviet
academics, economists, and political thinkers ... who understood long before 1980 that the
Soviet economic system was broken.... Yet I never heard a suggestion from the CIA or the
intelligence arms of the Departments of Defense or State that numerous Soviets recognized a
growing, systematic economic problem."); Elaine Sciolino, Director Admits C.I.A. Fell Short
in Predicting the Soviet Collapse, N.Y. TIMS, May 21, 1992, at A6; Pozner & Donahue,
Unmonitored, Unchecked, Unelected: Is the CIA Necessary? (Multi-media Entertainment
television broadcast, March 20, 1992) (statement of former CIA Director William Colby) (in
1989 CIA overstated the Soviet Union's rate of economic growth for 1980-85).
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4. The Judicial Forum vs. The Political Process
At least since McCulloch v. Maryland, a theory has existed that the
relative ability of the political process itself to ensure against improper
government conduct is a reason for greater or lesser judicial involvement in
220various cases. In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court articulated an associ-
ated, if somewhat tautological, concern that courts should avoid decisions
involving "an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion." '
While Baker's vague statement may encompass McCulloch's view of
judges as referees of the representation process, it may also be interpreted
to express a separate intuition about the role of courts which distinguishes
policy making from fact finding and policy application. Judges are
supposed to find facts and apply law, according to this intuition. They are
not supposed to make pure value judgments, which, in the main, our society
prefers to leave to majoritarian democratic processes. Of course, the
contours of these three activities-policy making, fact finding, and policy
application-are difficult to discern. Equally, if not more, difficult to
discern must be the contours of the distinction Baker draws between two
kinds of policy making, that which is appropriate and that which is
inappropriate for judicial discretion.
I suggest that Baker's identification, but vague definition, of a non-
justiciable variety of policy determination clearly does not encompass two
types of dispute which might arise out of an independent counsel's challenge
of a President's invocation of the state secrets privilege. Each type involves
judicial activity which is more properly characterized as "policy application"
or "fact finding" than as "policy making." I also submit that a third type of
dispute exists in which an independent counsel asks a judge to make an
initial policy determination of the kind which Baker indicates is appropriate
for judicial discretion. If I am correct that even one of these three types of
dispute is appropriate for judicial resolution, a blanket refusal by the courts
to evaluate executive invocations of the state secrets privilege at the request
of independent counsel would be a mistake. As Baker cautions: "Much
confusion results from the capacity of the 'political question' label to
220. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 428 (1819) ("The only security against the
abuse of [this tax] power, is found in the structure of the government itself.... The people...
prescribe no limits to the exercise of this right, resting confidently on ... the influence of the
constituents over their representatives ... to guard them against its abuse."). See generally
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
221. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1982).
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obscure the need for case-by-case inquiry."
The first type is a dispute about whether the material the President
claims is privileged is sufficiently related to military and foreign affairs even
to be considered a "state secret," much less a privileged state secret.
Suppose, for example, that in 1993 the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS")
does not want to reveal publicly that it is contemplating closing a Savings
and Loan institution ("S&L") because it fears that disclosure would
precipitate a depositors' run on the S&L. While a strong reason would exist
for the OTS's deliberations to be kept secret, absent other circumstances, it
probably would not be protected by the heavy-duty executive privilege for
military and foreign affairs matters which Nixon contemplated. Any judicial
decision to this effect could aptly be characterized as an application of law
rather than policy formation. The Constitution expresses the President's
military and foreign affairs duties ("policy formation"), and the Judiciary
must interpret their scope ("policy application").22
The second type is a dispute in which the President's concerns clearly
fall within the scope of his or her military and foreign affairs authority, but
where the independent counsel only challenges the President's factual
assessment of the dangers involved, not whether avoidance of the contem-
plated dangers would be desirable. Here, judicial evaluation of the Presi-
dent's claims is much more in the nature of "fact-finding" than "policy
determination." This is a distinction between ends and means, of course,
and every means can be redefined as an end. That is why choice of means
is a kind of policy determination too. However, is the proposed judicial
inquiry the kind of initial, or primary, policy determination with which
Baker was concerned? To take an easy hypothetical, suppose that the
President's concerns are patently irrational: for example, the President
alleges that a foreign country will invade the United States if it learns that
our military has prepared a report on the tendency of water to flow
downhill.223 Would not the "initial" policy determination here be the
judgment whether the independent counsel's prosecution or the avoidance
222. "[C]ourts possess power to review either legislative or executive action that
transgresses identifiable textual limits .... .[W]hether the ... action exceeds whatever
authority has been committed ... is a responsibility of [the Supreme Court] as ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution."' Walter L. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 740 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S.
at 211).
223. Cf Zagel supra note 187; cf also Walter L Nixon, 113 S.Ct. at 748 (Souter, J.,
concurring) ("If the Senate were to [impeach and convict an officer of the United States]...
upon a coin-toss, or upon a summary determination that [an] officer... was simply 'a bad guy,'
... judicial interference might well be appropriate.").
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of an invasion is more important? The independent counsel and the
President do not disagree on the undesirability of being invaded, or that
prevention of an invasion is more important than the independent counsel's
prosecution; they disagree on whether invasion will result from disclosure
of our military's report that water flows downhill.
The third type is a dispute in which the independent counsel asks the
Judiciary to make the initial policy determination whether the independent
counsel's prosecution or the avoidance of certain security risks is more
important. Might some or all of the disputes of this kind involve the kind
of initial policy determination which Baker identifies as appropriate for
judicial discretion? Here, a McCulloch-style inquiry into the adequacy of
the alternative political process can profitably be brought to bear.
Catch-22 of the "leave it to politics" refrain in the independent-coun-
sel/state-secrets-privilege context is that the political process cannot operate
when the issues at stake are secret.224 As far as the electorate is con-
cerned, it cannot evaluate the pros and cons of disclosing information of
which it is ignorant. An independent counsel is uniquely situated to seek
congressional assistance, thus obtaining an advantage over most parties who
have litigated disclosure issues with the Executive. But even a purely
republican approach to the dilemma is deficient.
If Congress sides with the independent counsel, it can try to extract
Executive concessions by publicly browbeating the Executive or by offering
it political horsetrades. Public browbeating is of limited value, however,
when the browbeaters cannot publicize their arguments, and horsetrading's
effectiveness is diminished by security constraints which restrict informa-
tional access to small subsets of the Legislature (often the House and Senate
intelligence committees). Horsetrading and public browbeating share certain
drawbacks as well. Both increase the danger that legislators will leak
security information to the press. And both are clumsy and time-consuming
in the context of a criminal trial. An independent counsel cannot fairly ask
a judge to put a trial on hold for an indefinite period while Congress and the
Executive hash out an evidentiary issue. And what if Congress fails to
convince the Executive? Without an arbiter of some kind, the Executive
"wins" by default. Procedurally, this seems unsatisfying, perhaps because
Congress's negotiating weapons-not counting impeachment-are so weak
224. Cf. Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 95 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("[W]ith the people and their representatives reduced to a state of ignorance, the
democratic process is paralyzed.").
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to begin with. 25
As for impeachment, it is either an inapplicable or an inappropriately
blunt instrument. What would be the impeachable offense? It is unlikely
that the refusal to declassify evidence necessary for a criminal trial amounts
to an impeachable "high crime" or "misdemeanor." '26 But even if the
Senate were willing to construe the Impeachment Clause so that it covered
a policy disagreement with the Executive, 227 whom would the Senate
impeach? Impeaching the Attorney General or intelligence agency officials
might intimidate the President into appointing replacements who would
declassify evidence at Congress's bidding. But if it did not, the Senate
ultimately would have to impeach the President. Such a scorched-earth
tactic would be incommensurate with congressional objectives. Congress
should not have to paralyze the government to ferret out and deter criminal
wrongdoing which might be limited to former second-tier executive officials,
or because it disagrees with classification experts whose judgment, but not
integrity, it questions. Such an approach would sacrifice the patient to cure
the disease.
Moreover, even a credible threat of impeachment might be insufficient
to persuade an administration nearing the end of its second term. Such a
circumstance is unlikely to arise, but the concern cannot be disregarded.
The central North charges, for example, were dismissed on January 13, 1989
with less than a month remaining in Ronald Reagan's presidency.2 28
Lastly, those who would still argue that impeachment is a reasonable
alternative to legislatively mandated judicial review of executive security
classifications must respond to an obverse argument. If the President feels
that protecting certain security information is more important than an
independent counsel's prosecution, the President already is able to protect
the information by exercising his or her pardon power. Why then does the
President need a judicially created state secrets privilege when the Constitu-
225. Professor Ely argues that Congress has demonstrated in the latter half of the twentieth
century that it actually lacks appropriate incentives to oversee secret executive actions in the
national security context. "In this area ... there exists a tacit understanding between the two
political branches-the President acts, Congress looks the other way and avoids the heat." Ely,
supra note 192, at 1135.
226. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.").
227. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments....
And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members
present.").
228. Final Report of Independent Counsel, supra note 8, vol. I, at 52.
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tion explicitly grants him or her a satisfactory alternative recourse? One
response is that a pardon, like impeachment, is an overly blunt, one-sided
device for resolving evidentiary issues in a criminal trial. But that is
precisely the point.
The pardon power also is a far more flexible and user-friendly
instrument than the impeachment power. A pardon can be narrowly tailored
to protect only the security information at issue, leaving the defendant
accountable for any crimes that can be tried without using the information
as evidence.229 Impeachment, on the other hand, must entirely remove an
executive officeholder, and cannot direct the office-holder (or the office-
holder's successor) to permit the disclosure of the security information. In
exercising his or her pardon power, the President also does not have the
enormous collective action problem that Congress faces in mounting an
impeachment. What the President can do alone, with the stroke of a pen,
the Congress must do by actuating hundreds of people-a majority of
representatives and a two-thirds majority of senators 230-- over a sustained
period of time.
5. Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Criteria
If a statute is passed which assigns to the judiciary the task of
reviewing executive invocations of the state secrets privilege at the request
of independent counsel, how should a judge approach such an evaluation?
If the statute is silent on the question-as was Section 594(a)(6) of the
Ethics Act-the judiciary will have to develop its own guidelines.
It would seem best for a judge to begin by considering the nature of the
inquiry. What he or she has to determine is the optimal use for the
particular information at issue. Should the information be kept secret in
order to pursue certain foreign policy or national defense objectives? Or,
should it be made public in order to pursue certain law enforcement objec-
tives?
The judge certainly has the option of borrowing from the dominant line
of Reynolds jurisprudence and from New York Times Co. The dominant
Reynolds line purports to consider only whether disclosure might cause
recognizable harm to security interests and to ignore any countervailing need
229. See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
230. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6, supra note 227; id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 ("The House of
Representatives... shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.").
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for disclosure.23' Similarly, New York Times Co. does not weigh the need
of the individual litigant seeking disclosure, although it requires that the
government demonstrate an extraordinarily high likelihood and magnitude
of harm. In the independent counsel context, too, the judge could ignore the
need for disclosure and subject the Executive position to some intermediate
standard of review, requiring for example that the Executive demonstrate a
"significant chance of significant harm" in order to prevent disclosure. Such
a one-dimensional, "prejudicial impact" test, however, results in a distorted
evaluation of United States interests. As the Supreme Court noted in CIA
v. Sims, for example: "The national interest sometimes makes it advisable,
or even imperative, to disclose information that may [reveal] intelligence
sources."
232
Instead, the judge should be concerned with the totality of societal costs
and benefits which would result from either disclosure or nondisclosure.
"National Security" is an expansive and malleable term. 233 It encompasses
abundant and diverse possibilities, vesting each with equally ponderous
evocations. Yet vast gradations of harm exist. Does the Executive allege
that disclosure will almost certainly push the nations of the world to the
brink of Armageddon-a not implausible claim during the Cold War; or,
merely that it might arouse the pique of an aged, terminally-ill despot in a
small, poor, and distant foreign country of dubious strategic value to the
United States?
A judge should be sensitive to such gradations. What is the nature and
magnitude of the damage to national security which allegedly would result
from disclosure? What is the probability that it will occur? Can it be
mitigated by other governmental action? As for nondisclosure, what impact
is it likely to have upon the independent counsel's prosecution and
investigation? How serious a crime is the defendant accused of, and how
important is it that the public learn more about his or her activities? What
deterrence objectives would be served by prosecuting the defendant?
231. I write "purports" because Reynolds allows a judge to consider the need of the
disclosure-seeking litigant in deciding how far to probe in ascertaining whether the occasion for
the privilege is appropriate. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. Theoretically, cases
could exist where the need of the litigant is great enough so that no amount of probing could
satisfy the judge that the occasion for the privilege is appropriate.
232. 471 U.S. 159, 180 (1985). The Court goes on to decide that under the specific statute
involved in the case, Congress had determined that it was "the responsibility of the Director of
Central Intelligence, not that of the judiciary, to weigh the variety of complex and subtle factors
in determining whether disclosure of information [is warranted]."
233. AccordNew York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 719 (per curiam) (Black, J., concurring) ("The
word 'security' is a broad, vague generality .... ").
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Since the Executive will emphasize those costs and benefits indicating
the wisdom of nondisclosure, and the independent counsel will emphasize
those costs and benefits indicating the wisdom of disclosure, the judge
should apply a balancing test in deciding between the parties. A balancing
standard fits comfortably between the existing standards of the Reynolds tort
claimant and the New York Times Co. prior restraint contexts. "[Nor is it]
unusual for Congress to instruct a ... judge conscientiously to weigh
several different factors without specifying precise weights for each."234
An ad hoc consideration of the totality of the circumstances and a
balancing-test review standard need not leave a judge unacceptably afloat in
a sea of personal discretion. Regarding judicial evaluation of the "inform-
er's privilege"-an evidentiary privilege which enables the government to
keep secret the identity of persons who furnish information to domestic law
enforcement officers-the Supreme Court has long held that "[t]he problem
... calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of informa-
tion [to the government] against the ... [criminal defendant's] right to
prepare his defense," and "[w]hether a proper balance renders nondisclosure
erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each
case...." 235  In criminal trials governed by the Classified Information
Procedures Act, some courts of appeals seem satisfactorily to have been
applying a similar approach in adjudicating questions of discovery,
relevance, admissibility, and adequacy of proffered evidentiary substitu-
tions.236 In doing so, judges have evaluated the defendant's need for
234. United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 384 (1 st Cir. 1985). Compare also the executive
order in force from 1979 to 1982 which required declassification of security information
whenever the "public interest in disclosure outweigh[ed] the damage to national security that
might reasonably be expected from disclosure." Exec. Order No. 12,065 § 3-303, 32 C.F.R. §
2700.11 (1979-82). See Afshar v. Department of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1129, 1133 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
235. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957).
236. See United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985) (balancing public interest
in nondisclosure of classified information against defendant's need for disclosure in ruling on
relevance and admissibility of evidence under CIPA); United States v. Zettl, 835 F.2d 1059,
1064-67 (4th Cir. 1987) (following Smith); United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 965 (9th
Cir. 1988) (on issues of discovery, court can engage in balancing national security concerns
against defendant's need for documents); United States v. Juan, 776 F.2d 256, 258 (11 th Cir.
1985) ("In appraising materiality [under CIPA], the court is not to consider the classified nature
of the evidence. However, in passing upon [adequacy of proposed evidentiary substitutions]
the trial judge should bear in mind that the proffered defense evidence does involve national
security."); United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 426-28 (1st Cir. 1984) (classified
information properly excluded from discovery because defendant did not need it and because
disclosure to defendant would damage national security). In United States v. Yunis, 681 F.
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disclosure and the national interest in keeping security information secret,
and balanced the two quantities against each other.
In a CIPA dispute between the Justice Department and an independent
counsel, these same courts of appeals should not hesitate to engage in the
same analysis they perform in CIPA disputes between the Justice Depart-
ment and criminal defendants. Functionally, the intellectual exercises are
virtually identical. Nor are the stakes appreciably higher in the independent
counsel context. In a discovery, relevancy, admissibility, or substitution
dispute between the Justice Department and a criminal defendant under
CIPA, deciding against the Justice Department forces the United States to
"disclose or dismiss." In a state secrets privilege dispute between the Justice
Department and an independent counsel, deciding against the Justice
Department forces the President to "disclose or pardon. 237
In the independent counsel context, judges can derive criteria from
ordinary CIPA opinions of the kind mentioned above, and from a few other
sources as well.23' First, judges can look to the Justice Department's own
criteria for deciding whether to prosecute criminal defendants when there is
a possibility that classified information will have to be revealed. CIPA
required the Attorney General to issue such guidelines and transmit them to
Congress in 198 1.239 Judges should expect the Executive to apply its own
guidelines equally in Justice Department and independent counsel prosecu-
tions.
Second, judges can look to the Justice Department's own prosecution
practices. Since 1981, every time the Justice Department decided not to
prosecute a criminal defendant for fear of disclosing security information,
CIPA has required that the Department prepare written findings detailing the
reasons for its decision not to prosecute and that the Department report on
Supp. 909 (D.D.C. 1988), the District Court for the District of Columbia balanced the
defendant's interest in disclosure against the government's need to keep security information
secret in ordering the discovery of security information. The court of appeals reversed on other
grounds, and neither accepted nor rejected the trial court's adoption of a balancing test for
discovery. United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617,625 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See also Salgado, supra
note 93 at 428 & n.15.
237. A pardon, narrowly tailored and conditionally applied, can achieve the same
discriminating objectives available under CIPA for properly classified information. These
include alternative methods of disclosure (CIPA, § 6(c)) and measured sanctions against the
prosecution which are less stringent than outright dismissal (CIPA § 6(e)(2)). See supra text
accompanying note 142.
238. CIPA has only existed thirteen years. With the passage of time, a more substantial
body of case law is likely to develop.
239. 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 12(a) (1981).
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its decision to Congress.2" Thus a source exists of detailed reports on
prosecutions which were forgone in order to protect security information.
Cases in which security information was disclosed in favor of prosecution
are matters of public record.
Finally, the Executive frequently discloses security information to
advance interests unrelated to prosecuting criminals. For instance, to the
consternation of intelligence community officials in 1986, the Reagan
Administration sought to justify United States air strikes against Libya by
publicly revealing information it had obtained from interceptions of Libyan
diplomatic communications. As a result, intelligence about Libya became
much more difficult to obtain.241 Another example is the Administration's
official disclosure of detailed intelligence on North Vietnamese forces
operating in South Vietnam to gain domestic support for the United States
military effort there.242 A catalogue of such executive disclosures, while
not directly analogous to criminal prosecutions, could aid a judge in ranking
the relative weights the Executive accords to various categories of security
information, and in gauging the magnitude of countervailing interest for
which the Executive is willing to disclose a particular category of security
information. Such a catalogue might also support or contradict executive
assertions about the consequences it believes will result from the publication
of certain types of security information.
6. Finality and the Judicial Capacity
to Fashion Relief
In the political question area, the Supreme Court has made clear that
lack of finality to a judicial resolution and the difficulty of fashioning
240. Id. §§ 12(b), 13.
241. See, e.g., Don Oberdorfer & Lou Cannon, How U.S. Decided to Pressure Gadhafi;
Renewal Surprised Public, Some TopAides, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1986, at A18; Molly Moore,
Prosecution of Media for Leaks Urged; NSA Director Cites Intelligence Setbacks, Criticizes
Reagan Officials, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 1987, at A4.
242. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362. 1369 (4th Cir. 1975); see also id.
(noting official disclosure of United States development of Multiple Independently Targeted
Reentry Vehicles to counter public and congressional pressure to construct more missiles).
During the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy released a "great deal" of security
information concerning Soviet missile installations in Cuba in an attempt to justify administra-
tion policy. Sims, 471 U.S. at 180 n.24 (quoting statement of CIA Director, Admiral Stansfield
Turner). In 1978, Admiral Turner decided to disclose the identities of certain academic institu-
tions affiliated with the CIA's MKULTRA project because "the benefits of... disclosure...
outweighed the costs ... ." Id. at 180-81.
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judicial relief "counsel against justiciability."243 Gary Schmitt has raised
finality and fashionability-of-relief concerns specifically in regard to review
of executive privilege claims.244  As review of privilege claims would
arise in the independent counsel posture, however, the concerns are not
serious.
Schmitt focuses exclusively on the executive refusal of congressional
information requests where, if the Court were to order disclosure, it would
ultimately depend upon the aid of the political branches for the efficacy of
its judgment. What distinguishes the independent counsel context is that the
parties seeking disclosure already possess the relevant information. For its
judgment to be effective, the Court would only need the Executive to refrain
from affirmatively halting the trial, an extremely unlikely event, especially
where the President has the more politically palatable option of pardoning
the defendants.
A different flavor of finality concern also is apposite in the independent
counsel context. In Walter L. Nixon v. United States, six justices recently
suggested that judicial relief is inappropriate where it would disrupt the
political life of the country by reopening a previously settled issue the
necessary resettlement of which would render aspects of government uncer-
tain or ineffective for a significant period of time.24 If a court grants
relief in the independent counsel context, however, the rest of the hand plays
out simply. Either the information will be disclosed or the President will
have issued pardons in due course.
7. Prevention of Tyranny
When our government has encroached upon civil liberties and property
rights2" it often has done so secretly, or for secret reasons, in the name
of military or foreign affairs necessity. Americans of Japanese ancestry, for
example, were interned during World War II because the military alleged
that it was necessary to avoid the "gravest imminent danger to the public
243. See Walter L Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 739 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 210).
244. Schmitt, supra note 9, at 182.
245. See Walter L Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 739. But see id. at 745 n.3 (White, J., concurring)
(expressing skepticism regarding the risks of disruption).
246. Regarding property rights, see for example, Clift v. United States, 597 F.2d 826 (2d
Cir. 1979), and Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1958), two cases involving
United States invocation of the state secrets privilege to avoid compensating patent holders for
the United States' appropriation and exploitation of inventions with national security
applications.
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safety." 247 Similarly, it appears that only beginning in late 1993, spurred
by the efforts of Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary, are the nature and
extent of secret, federally funded radiation experiments on unwitting human
subjects from 1945 until the mid-1970s now being revealed. 24 Numerous
other civil liberties violations have figured directly in countless legal battles
over the nondisclosure of national security information. The plaintiffs in
CIA v. Sims, for example, sought information about a CIA program which
involved, among other things, the conducting of mind control experiments
on unwitting human subjects, at least two of whom died as a result.249 In
Patterson v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, (a case involving less
nefarious matters of more recent vintage), Todd Patterson, an otherwise not
unusual elementary school student, sought access to his FBI file because he
wanted to know why the Bureau had been opening his mail and tapping his
phone.' Concern that executive civil liberties violations could occur
behind a curtain of secrecy privileges, and in the name of military and
foreign affairs necessity, was evident in congressional deliberations on the
247. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944) ("Nothing short of
apprehension by the proper military authorities of the gravest imminent danger to the public
safety can constitutionally justify ... [exclusion of Japanese Americans from the West Coast
war area or from their homes].").
248. In several federally sponsored experiments, scientists injected toxic plutonium into
gravely injured hospital patients; exposed indigent cancer patients to whole-body radiation;
placed prison inmates' testicles in irradiated water; and served poor pregnant women a drink
containing radioactive iron filings. Melissa Healy, Science of Power and Weakness, L.A.
TIMEs, Jan. 8, 1994, at A 1; see also, e.g., John H. Cushman, Jr., Study Sought on All Testing on
Humans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1994, at A12 (secret military experiments exposed 4,000
unwitting sailors and soldiers to mustard gas and other poison gases); Keith Schneider, A
Spreading Light on Radiation Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1994, at A14.
249. 471 U.S. at 162 n.2; see also, e.g., Wald, supra note 31, at 673-74. If it were not for
the Freedom of Information Act, we would never have learned that "[in 1979, the CIA confined
the head of a foreign political party to a mental hospital and considered disposing of him
because he refused to stay put"; or, that "[in the late 1960s, the CIA infiltrated black civil rights
groups even though the Agency's own research showed the groups posed no threat to national
security;" or, that "[t]he CIA once conducted experiments on young boys to determine whether
circumcision affected the boys' development." Id.
250. 705 F. Supp. 1033 (D.N.J. 1989). The reason: Todd had solicited information from
foreign governments in furtherance of his elementary school project to compile an encyclopedia
of the world. See also, e.g., Wiener v. FBI, 943 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1991) (FOIA suit by
historian seeking records of FBI's investigation of rock star John Lennon in the late 1960's and
early 1970's); Margolick, supra note 198, at B5; Wald, supra note 31, at 675-76 (recounting
more serious FBI excesses disclosed publicly through FOIA).
19941 1855
153
: Nova Law Review 18, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
1856 Nova Law Review Vol. 18
passage of the independent counsel legislation"' and is expressed in the
Senate report on CIPA. 2
Consider also the two most prominent occasions when our country has
resorted to the independent counsel or special prosecutor mechanisms. The
Watergate scandal involved a President's attempt to conceal a burglary
which his reelection committee tried to commit at a rival political party's
presidential campaign headquarters; the Iran-Contra Affair involved the
Executive branch's attempt to conceal its secret support of a foreign war
which the Legislature had voted to stop funding. Both are paradigmatic
examples of the danger government secrecy poses to a democratic system
and its proces-ses."'3
Section 594(a)(6) of the Ethics Act, as part III above advocates that it
be construed, vested the independent counsel and the Judiciary with an
important democracy reinforcement function. 2' The section made it less
likely that a President would be able to use some subordinates to subvert
democratic processes secretly and then shield the subordinates from
investigation and prosecution by pointing to other, "expert" subordinates'
representations that the necessary evidence was just too sensitive to be
251. See Special Prosecutor Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 2835 and Related Bills Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 40
(1977) (testimony and statement of Jerry J. Berman, Legislative Associate, ACLU); id. at 59
(statement of Fred Wertheimer, Vice President for Operations, Common Cause).
252. Senate Judiciary Comm., Classified Information Procedures Act, S. Rep. No. 823,96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294,4296 ("The purpose of this bill
is to help ensure that the intelligence agencies are subject to the rule of law and to help
strengthen the enforcement of laws designed to protect both national security and civil
liberties."); see also Graymail, S. 1482: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1980) (statement of Morton
Halperin of ACLU):
For executive officials who perform or are even tangentially connected with the
performance of intelligence functions, 'graymail' can mean a virtual immunity
from Federal criminal investigation or prosecution 'in the interest of national
security' .... From a civil liberties point of view, the rights of individuals cannot
be fully and effectively protected if... criminal conduct by Government officials
cannot be investigated and prosecuted ....
253. Cf New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 724 (per curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring)
("Secrecy in government is fundamentally anti-democratic."); id. at 719 (Black, J., concurring)
("The guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative
government provides no real security for our Republic.").
254. Cf McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (separate statement of
Judge Wald) ("By not weighing the value to the public of knowing about particularly relevant
episodes in the intelligence agencies' history, we may undermine the public's ability to assess
the government's performance of its duty.").
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disclosed. Given the history which preceded the Act, and presuming that
prevention of tyranny is a proper object of separation of powers, it was quite
reasonable for Congress and at least one President to have concluded that
the Executive branch needed to be checked in this manner.2
55
Gary Schmitt, on the other hand, expresses a converse fear that
"democracy's natural and largely salutary suspicion of secrecy will
overwhelm the prudent constitutional design of a vigorous and independent
executive." He suggests that democracy's natural distaste for secrecy,
independent of judicial aid, is enough to prevent any prolonged or serious
abuse of executive privilege. 6
Schmitt's argument is more sophisticated than a mere denial of the
dangers inherent in executive privilege. Rather, he questions whether we
can achieve an increase in safety that would be worth the concomitant
diminution in the instrumental and protective benefits of the Executive.
While Schmitt concedes it is possible that today "the main threat to liberty
comes from the Presidency, 2 57 he maintains that "the solution to execu-
tive excess is not elimination of the power from which that excess may
come but rather the vigorous use by Congress of those tools it has at its
disposal. '258 The quest is for symmetry. We do not want to "trad[e] one
imperial crown for another.
259
Regarding the vulnerability of the Presidency's instrumental virtues,
Schmitt's argument is most germane in the context he addresses: whether
255. Signing the Ethics Act, President Carter declared: "I am... announcing my support
for legislation which would require the appointment of a Special Prosecutor .... The American
people must be assured that no one, regardless of position, is above the law." MESSAGE FROM
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITrING A DRAFT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION
TO PRESERVE AND PROMOTE ETHICAL STANDARDS THROUGHOUT THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, H.R. Doc. NO. 139, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977). Six years
before the passage of the Ethics Act, Justice Stewart noted that the "Executive['s]... power in
the two related areas of national defense and international relations.., since the advent of the
nuclear missile age" has experienced an "absence of the governmental checks and balances
present in other areas of our national life .... New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 727-28 (per
curiam) (Stewart, J., concurring); see also, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707
(1974) ("[Tlhe separate powers were not intended to operate with absolute independence.");
THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison) ("[U]nless these [legislative, executive, and judicial]
departments be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the
others, the degree of separation.., essential to a free government, can never in practice be duly
maintained.").
256. Schmitt, supra note 9, at 183-84.
257. Id. at 176.
258. Id. at 178.
259. Id. at 176.
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the courts should allow Congress to enlist their aid in demanding that the
President provide to Congress any information it wants whenever it wants
it. Such demands are potentially limitless. They are an instrument with
which Congress could hound the everyday executive function, or bludgeon
particular, delicate Presidential initiatives into oblivion. In the independent
counsel context, however, it is doubtful that the Presidency would be
seriously enervated by the inherently more limited number of occasions
when courts could or would allow independent counsel to use national
security information as evidence in criminal trials. Moreover, on such
occasions, the President can adequately protect any particular covert initia-
tives with the pardon power.
Regarding the Executive's role as a check against congressional
oppression, a general executive privilege of the Nixon variety may well be
an important tool for the President's fulfillment of that function. Schmitt's
example of President Eisenhower's expansive use of executive privilege in
reaction to the Army-McCarthy hearings is well taken.2 ° Similarly, as a
prosecution mechanism, independent counsel undoubtedly add an increment
to Congress's oppressive potential (though not an unconstitutional increment
the Supreme Court has ruled). 261 However, the ability of an independent
counsel to seek the disclosure of information kept secret for reasons of
national security does not itself contribute to this increment.
While some disclosure mechanisms can be instruments of oppression,
it is difficult to envision how a disclosure mechanism directed only at
putative state secrets could be (unless, perhaps, through a long and
attenuated chain of causation). The Ethics Act did not authorize indepen-
dent counsel specifically to seek the disclosure of citizens' marital confi-
dences, voting histories, or other private matters. It authorized independent
counsel specifically to contest claims of privilege on grounds of national
security. The only extra danger posed by this disclosure mechanism was to
military preparedness and diplomatic relations. Conversely, a special,
extra-strength state secrets privilege is not a check on tyranny, and adds
nothing in this regard to a generic executive privilege. It does not seek to
protect citizens' religious beliefs, political associations, or other privacy or
liberty interests. It seeks to protect covert military and diplomatic initia-
tives.
In addition, several damping mechanisms in the Ethics Act prevented
independent counsel from becoming tools as directly manipulable by
260. Id. at 192 n.70.
261. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
1858 Vol. 18
156
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss3/1
Kaplan
Congress as are its inquiry and contempt powers. First, an independent
counsel was in charge of a separate office which Congress had no legal
authority to direct. Second, the Executive and Judicial branches had legal
authority to direct aspects of an independent counsel's office. A special
judicial panel appointed the counsel and defined the scope of his or her
prosecutorial jurisdiction.262 The decision whether to allow the indepen-
dent counsel to disclose national security information would also have
belonged to the Judiciary. The judicial panel only could have appointed an
independent counsel in the first place if the attorney general requested it to
do so.263 And, the attorney general could have removed an independent
counsel for "good cause,' 26 which, presumably, would have been judicial-
ly defined if the attorney general's action were contested.
That Congress could not have directly manipulated an independent
counsel does not eliminate the model of an independent counsel as a
Frankenstein's monster or self-directed doomsday device designed and set
loose by Congress. To reiterate, though, the state secrets privilege is not a
safeguard against the independent counsel's oppressive prosecutorial
potential, and adds nothing to the safeguards which already exist in that
area. There is no reason to think that grand juries, juries, the Judiciary, the
Bill of Rights., and the Executive's pardon power would not protect citizens
from overreaching independent prosecutors equally well whether the
prosecutors could challenge executive security classifications or not.
V. CONCLUSION
Widespread dissatisfaction with the course of the prosecutions arising
out of the Iran-Contra Affair has spawned a number of curative proposals.
These range from dispensing with the independent counsel mechanism
entirely265 to Harold Koh's call for a wholesale restructuring of our
military and foreign affairs apparatus through omnibus legislation.2" In
between are three other proposals which specifically address the conflict that
arises when the President and an independent counsel disagree on the proper
use of classified evidence. Ronald Noble proposes the creation of another
262. Ethics Act, 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (expired).
263. Id. § 592 (expired).
264. Id. § 596(a)(1) (expired).
265. Robert H. Bork, Against the Independent Counsel, COMMENTARY, Feb. 1993, at 21.
266. KOH, supra note 8.
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inferior executive office called the "Independent Special Arbiter" ("ISA"). 267-
The ISA would review disputes between independent counsel and the
President over whether sensitive evidence should be made public, but the
ISA's opinions would be advisory only. Sandra Jordan proposes the
development of procedures for criminal trials to be held in secret. 6 '
Independent Counsel Walsh's final report states:
Independent Counsel suggests that the attorney general implement
standards that would permit independent review of a decision to block
a prosecution of an officer within the Executive Branch and legitimate
congressional oversight.269
I suggest that we stay the course on which we only recently embarked.
Scrapping independent counsel would likely be a regression to Teapot
Domes and Saturday Night Massacres. Koh's plan for wholesale reorganiza-
tion seems precipitous, and, as he himself admits, politically impractical.
As for the wrinkles Noble and Jordan propose adding to the independent
counsel mechanism, one seems superfluous and the other, I fear, is exactly
the kind of pernicious encroachment on civil liberty which Schmitt warns
can result from a congressional overreaction to executive excess.27' It is
unclear from the public volumes of Independent Counsel Walsh's final
report (a classified volume still has not been made public) whether he
proposes that the Attorney General promulgate disclosure guidelines or
create an actual mechanism for delegating the disclosure decision to another
official. The latter proposal would be the stronger prescription, but it
appears to have only slightly more bite than Nobel's ISA proposal. Any
voluntary delegation of authority by the Attorney General presumably could
be revoked by the Attorney General.
No legal form can eliminate the uneasy tension between our legitimate
needs for secrecy, security, and expediency on the one hand and our pursuit
of democracy, accountability, and justice on the other. A good procedural
design, however, should remove such delicate balancing decisions from the
hands of excessively interested parties. The independent counsel provisions
of the Ethics Act did just that, and they seemed a viable means of restoring
public confidence in the rule of law. Stymied by congressional grants of
267. Noble, supra note 8, at 590-97.
268. Jordan, supra note 8, at 1694-97.
269. Final Report of Independent Counsel, supra note 8, vol. 1, at xxi.
270. KOH, supra note 8, at 185.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 256-60.
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immunity and executive claims of security privilege, a number of Iran--
Contra prosecutions floundered, precipitating suggestions that new bells and
whistles be added to the Ethics Act.
Whatever independent counsel may have lacked under the previous
legislative scheme, it was not statutory authority. The independent counsel
provisions of the Ethics Act plainly empowered independent counsel to
contest in court Presidential assertions of security privilege, and the
provisions were easily harmonized with CIPA. Whether that statutory
authority was constitutional, of course, is a closer question.
As Congress considers the bills which would reenact the independent
counsel provisions of the Ethics Act, it should consider enumerating criteria
of decision for judicial review of executive claims of state secrets privilege.
This could improve the constitutional viability of that portion of the statute
by narrowing one possible barrier to justiciability, the absence of "judicially
discoverable and manageable criteria." But even if the statute provides no
rules of decision, this article has suggested, the judiciary can adequately
fashion its own criteria. Congress also might want to require independent
counsel to obtain the kind of relevance, admissibility, and inadequacy of
substitution rulings that defendants must obtain under CIPA before indepen-
dent counsel may challenge the propriety of executive security classifications
pertaining to prosecution evidence. Such a requirement would flesh out the
"if necessary" limitation on independent counsel's contestation powers, and
might provide an added safeguard against unripe or unnecessary challenges
by independent counsel. 2  Whether or not Congress adopts these propos-
als, judicial review of executive invocations of the state secrets privilege in
the independent counsel context readily comports with existing state secrets
jurisprudence and separation of powers doctrine. Most important, our
experience of executive secrecy abuses in the twentieth century indicates
that it would conduce to safer government.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 83-86; note 95 and accompanying text; notes 148-
49 and accompanying text. Congress also might want to indicate that it disagrees with the
interpretation of the word "withhold" in section 594(a)(6) of the Ethics Act suggested by United
States v. Fernandez, 887 F.2d 465, 471 n.6 (4th Cir. 1989). See supra notes 86-90 and
accompanying text.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Art instructs.
- JOHN GARDNER, ON MORAL FICTION 39 (1978).
In his collection of essays, Punishment and Responsibility, Hart asserts
that "[n]o one expects judges or statesmen occupied in the business of
sending people to the gallows or prison, or in making, or unmaking, laws
which enable this to be done, to have much time for philosophical
discussion of the principles which make it morally tolerable to do these
things."' Hait devotes much time and effort to rationalizing principles of
criminal punishment, responsibility and retribution, so perhaps we should
expect the time to be made. For those with the time, these concerns are
occasionally addressed through less pedantic and more vicarious ways, such
as drama, fiction or poetry.
This challenge to rationalize the impact of political and moral decisions
with the daily practice of law and adjudication makes the study of literature
a fruitful area for illuminating the discussion of punishment and retribution
* B.A., summa cum laude, Drew University, 1977; J.D., cum laude, New York
University, 1980. Steven M. Richman is counsel to Herrick, Feinstein in Princeton, New
Jersey, and practices in the fields of commercial litigation, international law, andbankrnptcy.
He also serves as a municipal public defender in Plainsboro, New Jersey. Mr. Richman's
poetry has appeared in various literary journals.
1. HL.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBIrrY: EssAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 2 (1968).
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in a legal context. As one commentator in the now-established "law and
literature" field has noted, "[t]he virtue of literary stories about law is that
they force us to grapple with the unique elements that often come to the fore
when law acts on people."2 The use of a "fictional world" to provide "a
dramatic enactment" of normative claims has been attempted elsewhere.3
In this regard, Maxwell Anderson's 1935 verse play Winterset, taking its
theme from the Sacco-Vanzetti case,4 is one of the more prominent
examples of law in literature, and to use a phrase of Judge Richard Posner,
provides a cynosure here for a discussion of "the literary indictment of
legal injustice."' Such an enactment of claims has provided fodder for a
debate between Professor Richard Weisberg and Judge Richard Posner with
regard to Billy Budd, Sailor and the role of literature in illustrating injustice.
Winterset as a contemporary play should be considered along with Billy
Budd, Sailor in its development of themes of revenge and "ressentiment"6
that have framed a significant portion of the law and literature debate. It
is a debate as to whether authority or reason will predominate.8 This article
explores Winterset in the context of that debate, and as an example of the
ressentiment in the form of rancor identified by Weisberg as underlying
2. Richard H. Weisberg, Entering With a Vengeance: Posner on Law and Literature,41
STAN. L. REV. 1597, 1612 (1989).
3. See, e.g., Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the
Moral and Political Visions ofFranz Kalka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384, 386
(1985); see also Richard A. Posner, The Ethical Significance of Free Choice: A Reply to
Professor West, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1431 (1986); Peter R. Teachout, Lapse of Judgment, 77
CAL. L. REV. 1259 (1989); Robin West, Law, Literature and the Celebration of Authority,
83 Nw. U. L. REV. 977 (1989); Robin West, Submission, Choice, and Ethics: A Rejoinder
to Judge Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1449 (1986).
4. Commonwealth v. Sacco, 158N.E. 167 (Mass. 1927); Commonwealth v. Sacco, 156
N.E. 57 (Mass. 1927); Commonwealth v. Sacco, 151 N.E. 839 (Mass. 1926).
5. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 132
(1988).
6. Weisberg defines "ressentiment" to loosely involve the misuse of power through
legalistic language that cloaks the actor with authority. RICHARD A. WEISBERG, THE
FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER IN MODERN FICTION 4-5 (1984).
Posner refers to it as "the rancorous envy of the naturally weak toward the naturally strong."
Richard A. Posner, From Billy Budd to Buchenwald-The Failure of the Word: The
Protagonistas Lawyer in Modern Fiction, 96 Yale L.J. 1173, 1174 (1987). The word itself
derives from Nietzsche. Id.
7. Compare RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD
RELATION 132-71 (1988) with RicHARD H. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE
PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER IN MODERN FICTION 131-76 (1984); seealsoWeisberg, supranote
2, at 1597.
8. Weisberg, supra note 2, at 1606.
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Billy Budd, Sailor and its recurrence, like a bad sore, in this century in the
context of Winterset and the Sacco-Vanzetti case. Before proceeding to a
more specific discussion of the debate, a few words are in order about the
play itself.
II. WlNTERSET-THE PLAY ITSELF
It is difficult to understand the absence of attention paid in law and
literature discussions to Maxwell Anderson. Although not an attorney,
several of his plays have jurisprudential themes and build around them.
Anderson's principal literary efforts occurred in the 1930's; Winterset
among them. His more significant plays include judges and trials in a
variety of settings, such as Joan of Lorraine, dealing with Joan of Arc, and
Second Overture, set during the Russian Revolution. An historical
playwright and realist, Anderson deliberately used poetic verse to make an
often harsh social reality transcend its time and place into a more universal
and lasting commentary.9 He is no Homer or Aeschylus in ability;
nonetheless, like them he was working with history, myth, and legend as
well as dramatic tragedy, although in a modem setting in the case of Sacco
and Vanzetti. Aware of this, he wrote "the playwright will also try to make
that fable coincide with something in himself that he wants to put into
words" and those words must be written for the time and place in which the
older fable is, in essence, re-created.1"
Winterset appeared in 1935, several years after the execution of Nicola
Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, two anarchists and alleged murderers, and
9. The most recent and comprehensive, if biased, biography of Anderson appears to be
ALFRED S. SHIVERS, THE LIFE OF MAXWELL ANDERSON (1983) (while not particularly
critically oriented, and often assuming a sometimes distracting familiarity with its subject, it
serves as an introduction to Anderson). See also DRAMATIST IN AMERICA: LETTERS OF
MAXWELL ANDERSON 3-25 (Laurence G. Avery ed. 1977) [hereinafter LETERS]; MABEL
DRISCOLL BAILEY, MAXWELL ANDERSON, THE PLAYWRIGHT AS PROPHET (1957); BARRETT
H. CLARK, MAXWELL ANDERSON: THE MAN AND HIS PLAYS (1933); ALFRED S. SHIVERS,
MAXWELL ANDERSON (1976) (a predecessor work). For source material relating to
Anderson, see A CATALOGUE OF THE MAXWELL ANDERSON COLLECTION AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS (1968); ALFRED S. SHIVERS, MAXWELL ANDERSON: AN ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY WORKS (1985) [hereinafter SHIVERS,
BIBLIOGRAPHY].
10. Randall J. Buchanan, Maxwell Anderson's Rules of Playwriting and Their Use in
His Plays, in MAXWELL ANDERSON AND THE NEW YORK STAGE 59, 60 (Nancy J. Doran
Hazelton & Kenneth Kraus eds., 1991) (citing MAXWELL ANDERSON, OFF BROADWAY:
ESSAYS ABOUT THE THEATER 47 (1947)).
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earned Anderson a Pulitzer Prize." Anderson had previously utilized the
Sacco-Vanzetti case as the subject of a co-authored play, Gods of the
Lightning, which appeared in 1928.2
The historical facts of the Sacco-Vanzetti case involve the murder of
a paymaster in Braintree, Massachusetts. It occurred during a time of
intense nationalistic and xenophobic feeling that found some expression in
the arrest of two Italian-American anar6hists, Sacco and Vanzetti. Although
convicted, the two defendants aroused intense sympathy among the
intellectual and civil rights community.
Winterset revolves around its three protagonists seeking revenge or
vindication, and each is mad in his own way. Judge Gaunt, the presiding
judge at the Romagna trial in Winterset and putatively based upon Judge
Webster Thayer, the actual trial judge in Sacco and Vanzetti's trial,13
roams the streets of New York, dislocated and obsessed, like the Ancient
Mariner, with his self-justifying tale. Trock Estrella, the "actual" gunman
in the context of the play who committed the murder for which the wrongly
accused man was executed, has six months to live and is seeking to silence
those who may give away his guilt. He may be compared to one of the
gang members who was actually involved in the real case. Mio Romagna,
son of the Vanzetti-styled innocent Bartolomeo Romagna, 4 is also
11. Others have found inspiration in the Sacco-Vanzetti affair. See, e.g., EDNA ST.
VINCENT MILLAY, JusticeDenied in Massachusetts,in COLLECTED POEMS 230, 231 (Norma
Millay ed., 1956) ("We shall die in darkness, and be buried in the rain."); JOHN Dos PASSOS,
TiE BIG MONEY 520-21 (1979) ("they have clubbed us off the streets they are stronger
they are rich they hire and fire the politicians the news papereditors the old judges the
small men with reputations ... the immigrants haters of oppression lie quiet in black suits
in the little undertaking parlor in the North End") (spacing in original). A comprehensive
review of the Sacco- Vanzettitrial in literature is found in G. Louis JOUGHIN & EDMUND M.
MORGAN, THE LEGACY OF SACCO & VANZETTI 375-454 (1948).
12. JOUGHIN & MORGAN, supra note 11, at 402.
13. The inspiration for the play came from a lawyer friend and college classmate,
attorney Robert H. Montgomery, who Anderson said told him that the trial judge, Webster
Thayer, "really deserves your sympathy." LETTERS, supra note 9, at 313 (quoted in an
interview with Anderson conducted by Louis M. Starr and transcribed as "Anderson
memoir"). Montgomery authored his own version of the case, which is found in ROBERT H.
MONTGOMERY, SACCO-VANZETTI: THE MURDER AND TIE MYTH (The Americanist Library
ed., Western Islands 1965) (1960). Shivers disputes the notion that the idea came from KING
LEAR, apparently suggested in some quarters. SHIVERS, BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 9, at 147-
48. Anderson himself claims not to remember much about the writing of Winterset.
LETTERS, supra note 9, at 313.
14. See JOUGHIN & MORGAN, supra note 11, at 418. In actuality, Sacco had a son but
Vanzetti did not, although some have suggested that what is said about Romagna render him
consistent with the persona of Vanzetti. See id.
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obsessed with the case and seeks vengeance upon those who would continue
to slander his father.
There was another part-time member of the gang, a driver named Garth
Esdras, who knew the truth but was never called as a witness at trial. This
is consistent with the actual case, as there was a witness whose testimony
was never taken. 5 In reality, the "new evidence" was a confession from
a convict named Madeiros and was the subject of a motion before Judge
Thayer; however, the motion was denied and the conviction upheld by the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts. 6
Briefly summarized, in Act One, Trock Estrella, a small-time hoodlum,
has been released from prison. Garth Esdras becomes the witness that was
not called and the time frame is altered, since the execution of Romagna in
the play occurred eleven years prior to the action. As in the framework for
a revenge play, the actions precipitating the revenge have occurred
elsewhere and previously, and only alluded to in the "present" of the play.
Estrella is looking for Garth as a result of a Professor Hobhouse (presum-
ably, based upon Felix Frankfurter's work) 7 stirring up new evidence.
Estrella has been given no more than six months to live by his doctor and
plans his revenge upon the world with impunity. He is accompanied by his
subordinate, Shadow. With little imagination, we can add "of doubt."
Nearby, Garth Esdras wrestles with his conscience. He has received a
letter from a lawyer telling him "[d]on't get me wrong, but stay in out of
the rain the next few days, just for instance."'" He knows Romagna was
not guilty, but he never came forward with his evidence. 9
Estrella comes to Garth's house to find out what he may have told
others in light of the new investigation and the mention of Garth's name in
"the professor's pamphlet." Estrella claims that the trial judge, Judge Gaunt,
has "gone off his nut. He's got that damn trial on his mind, and been going
15. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETrI: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
FOR LAWYERS AND LAYMEN 92-119 (University Library ed., Little, Brown, and Company
1962) (1927). As impressed as Frankfurter was by this evidence, Montgomery dismisses it
with equal zealousness. MONTGOMERY, supra note 13, at 205-23, 233-50.
16. See Weisberg, supra note 2.
17. See FRANKFURTER, supra note 15.
18. MAXWELL ANDERSON, WINTERSET act 1, sc. 2.
19. One wonders who the lawyer was who wrote it. Was it Garth's? Was it Romagna's
lawyer trying to warn Garth? If so, should he not have come forward with the information?
Could it have been Estrella's lawyer and, if so, had he breached a confidence? While the
professional ethics issues are of more than a passing interest to the lawyer, it should be noted
that "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client." MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmiLrrY Canon 4 (1981).
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round proving to everybody he was right all the time and the radicals were
guilty .... "20
In the final scene of the first act, Judge Gaunt makes his way to
Garth's house, where Garth shelters him. By his own admission, he is a
man on an errand. While the judge retreats to the shadows, Mio Romagna,
son of the wrongly executed man, comes to the same place searching for
evidence of his father's innocence. Eleven years have passed since that
time, but the "same old business" consumes him. He meets Miriamne
briefly. He is part of a lost generation, cut off:
When the State executes your father, and your mother dies of grief, and
you know damn well he was innocent, and the authorities of your home
town politely inform you they'd consider ii a favor if you lived
somewhere else-that cuts you off from the world-with a meat-ax.
2
'
Mio Romagna, also aware of the professor's research, has come for his
own vengeance. He tells Miriamne that "all roads are mine that might
revenge" his father.22 In the hidden recesses of the surrealistic set (with
detail, however, still vague and unsettling), Estrella and Shadow exchange
threats as Shadow fears that Estrella's plans to kill witnesses and the judge
may incriminate him. Almost immediately afterward, as they part, Estrella's
men ambush and shoot Shadow.
In Act Two, Judge Gaunt comes to the Garth house, introduces himself,
and feels compelled to recite his version of the case and justify his actions
in light of Professor Hobhouse's recent published account. Mio returns and
asks Garth about the crime. He recognizes Judge Gaunt and they debate the
fairness of the trial. Trock finds the house. He wants to "remove" the
judge and ascertain what Garth has said. Shadow, who still lives, comes in
and threatens Trock at gunpoint, but then collapses. Mio takes the gun and
keeps Trock at bay as Gaunt attempts to call the "court" to order. As in the
paradigm of revenge tragedy, Winterset has its own play within a play; in
this case the play being the mock trial at gunpoint in the Esdras house. Mio
accuses Trock of the murder; Trock claims it was Shadow. Again, Judge
Gaunt recites the justifications for the result and the manner in which the
legal system operated. They are interrupted by the police, who have been
looking for the judge. They take Gaunt away, after failing to find Shadow's
body at Mio's urging. Trock simply walks out, leaving Miriamne, Esdras
20. MAxw'ELL ANDERSON, WINTERSET act 1, sc. 2.
21. Id. act 1, sc. 3.
22. Id.
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and Garth behind. Mio pursues Trock Estrella into the rainy night.
In Act Three, the star-crossed lovers Mio and Miriamne are ambushed
and killed by Trock and his men. Mio's own indecision, or change of heart,
lead to his own end. The play ends with Esdras lamenting the "masterless
night."
III. WINTERSET AND THE ABUSE OF LEGAL AUTHORITY
We can now frame the parameters of the discussion by placing
Winterset within the viewpoints generally set forth by both Posner and
Weisberg by beginning with the former. Winterset is a striking example of
Posner's "revenge literature,"23 because the revenge at issue occurs against
a backdrop of a fairly well-developed and sophisticated criminal justice
system. Anderson, as a student, was familiar with Elizabethan drama and
therefore the vehicle of revenge as exemplified in that period's works.24
Anderson hypothesizes the legal system itself as a form of legitimized
societal revenge, as opposed to law itself being a replacement by a more
rational means of dispute resolution and criminal retribution, and his
sympathies appear mixed.25 Even if mistakes are made, they must be
legitimized because the political ramifications of such mistakes would be
worse than the legal miscarriage itself. Despite the existence of that order,
tragedy still results; an innocent man has been executed. It was not the
result of a lone judge exercising discretion. In the play as well as in the
real case, reference is made to the imprimatur the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts gives to the judge's rulings.26 Therefore, Winterset stands
for the proposition that a developed legal system may be seriously flawed
and does not necessarily replace revenge as an appropriate mechanism in all
cases. In other words, a legal system-its configuration and viability-is
23. Posner identifies this genre and discusses it in depth. POSNER, supra note 5, at 25-
70.
24. SHIvERs, BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 9, at 39.
25. Anderson was no stranger to direct involvement in the court system. An individual
named Francis Hackett sued Anderson for plagiarism in Anderson's play Anne of the
ThousandDays. Anderson, representedby JohnWharton of Paul Weiss Wharton & Garrison,
counterclaimed for libel. LETrERS, supra note 9, at 238. The suit was settled approximately
a year after it began. Id. at 240. Anderson was also sued by a typist/secretary named Orrie
Lashin, who claimed Anderson plagiarized her work; that case settled as well. Id. at 239.
26. At least one source has called Thayer inconsequential, and attempted to focus more
blame and attention upon the appellate judges who upheld his evidentiary and motions
rulings. JOUGHIN & MORGAN, supra note 11, at 509.
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only a function of public tolerance, a type of "rule of recognition" that
might find favor with some positivist thinkers as discussed below.
In his discussion on revenge literature, Posner suggests that vengeance
is an inefficient means of legal control that evolved from private to public
enforcement of law.27 He notes, however, that instead of eliminating
revenge, law "channels" it and "replaces it as system but not as feeling. 28
It is that persistence of feeling which causes law, in Posner's view, to create
the conditions so that the revenge "will not endanger social order."29 To
the extent that Posner considers law a foolproof replacement for revenge,
that is disputed. In his own contribution to the law and literature field,
Gewirtz has argued, for example, that Oresteia, by Aeschylus, is an early
example of revenge literature demonstrating that law and legal process
cannot be made, nor should be made, wholly rational.30 This tension
between primal instincts towards revenge and the attempt of a legal system
to harness and redirect such instincts in an acceptable fashion is at the core
of Winterset. Stated differently, if Posner is correct that a legal system is
the natural evolution to a more controlled method of channelling revenge,
then such a position will have to accommodate the observable phenomenon
of misuse of that legal system or, more accurately, a specific use of the legal
system to exact a political purpose, such as revenge, upon certain segments
of society.
We therefore return to the question initially posed, what Winterset can
demonstrate with regard to Posner's argument on the one hand that a legal
system replaces revenge, and Weisberg's on the other that a legal system
can provide the opportunity for misuse of authority in the guise of judicial
correctness, otherwise denominated ressentiment. It is the play's combined
plotline of three separate characters set on three separate courses of revenge,
critical to Posner's themes,3' that gives the play part of its interest from a
jurisprudential perspective in terns of Posner's parameters and those
challenged by his anti-authoritarian critics, and must be considered part and
parcel of the discussion of ressentiment and authority.
The current focus of those utilizing literature for legal purposes is, at
its core, the abuse of law and its language by those professing to uphold the
law. At its most basic, this appears to be the focal point for the debate
27. POSNER, supra note 5, at 32.
28. Id. at 33.
29. Id.
30. Paul Gewirtz, Aeschylus'Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1043, 1049 (1988).
31. POSNER, supra note 5, at 25-70. Judge Posner argues for a category of literature
entitled "revenge literature," with more focus on revenge as a legal theme. Id. at 69.
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between Weisberg and Posner. Weisberg may be generally read as
suggesting that literature involving legal themes sheds light upon ethical
questions32 or, more particularly, as arguing that literature demonstrates the
dangers of legal formalism and the destructive ramifications of that.33
Posner, on the other hand, argues extensively through Law and Literature
that such a use of literature is itself a destructive type of formalism because
it becomes too literal, and that literary use of law is no more than a
metaphoric use of law as symbolic of fate, or adversity.
For example, although Posner insists on considering Hamlet a revenge
play,34 Weisberg finds Hamlet himself a prototype of ressentiment.35
Weisberg, discussing ressentiment as a persistent rancor, argues that through
narrative, through a "legalistic proclivity," protagonists in fiction have acted
in legal capacities to legitimize otherwise unjust results within the frame-
work of a legal system.36 He posits, through a variety of literary texts, the
notion that ressentiment is antithetical to the concept of justice, and that an
authoritarian figure can utilize the language, or mock language, of law to
achieve political ends. This concept is approached from a different angle
by Professor James Boyd White, who argues that law is in reality an
exercise in rhetoric, in community, and should be seen as having social, as
opposed to purely positivist, implications."
The scheme of ressentiment is "a series of creative verbalizers [who]
organize criminal proceedings against a nonverbal defendant whose moral
systems differs from their own."38  The effort is deemed "considerate"
communication, since the communicator seems at heart to believe in the
necessity of politeness and of giving due deference to form and process.39
32. See John D. Ayer, Aliens are Coming! Drain the Pool, 88 MICH L. REV. 1584
(1990) (reviewing STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT CoiMs NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC
AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989) and RIcHARD A.
POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988)).
33. Nancy T. Hammar, Book Review, 88 Mich L. Rev. 974 (1990) (reviewing RIcHARD
H. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER IN MODERN
FICTION (1984)).
34. POSNER,, supra note 5, at 54-70.
35. Richard H. Weisberg, More Words on The Failure of the Word: A Response to
Heinzelmanand Levinson, 7 CARDOZO L. REv. 473, 480-81 (1986); see generally POSNER,
supra note 5, at 64 n.34.
36. WEISBERG, supra note 6, at 4.
37. JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF
THE LAW X-XiV (1985).
38. WEISBERG, supra note 6, at 133-34.
39. Id. at 139.
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Weisberg states his theme as culminating in Herman Melville's Billy Budd,
Sailor as finding ressentiment prevailing, that such "verbal formalism and
reactive hatred are the principal legacy of the old value system."4 One
could also view this embodiment of ressentiment as the prevailing authority
to justify status quo, regardless of the actual law or a sense of justice.
Given Weisberg's approach to certain literary works from the standpoint of
whether they exemplify the workings of a ressentiment as he has argued,
this approach finds fertile terrain in Winterset, where the analogy to Billy
Budd and Captain Vere are present in the verbalization and fictionalization
of the judge in the Sacco-Vanzetti case.
Posner is dismissive of these types of arguments to the extent that he
suggests they read too much into the literary works they discuss, although
applauding the thoughtfulness about legal issues they engender.4' In direct
counterpoint to Weisberg's discussion of Billy Budd, Sailor, for example,
Posner finds a sympathetic figure in the form of the officer who tries Budd,
Captain Vere, performing in a fully consonant manner with the spirit and
letter of the law.42 In Billy Budd, a young sailor, Billy Budd, was framed
for mutiny by the ship's petty officer, Claggart. In the presence of Captain
Vere, Budd was unable to respond to the allegation because of his speech
impediment. Vere interpreted this as Budd needed more time. Vere put his
arm around Budd, at which point Budd's arm shot out and hit Claggart,
killing him. Vere convened a drumhead court and after hearing the case,
convicted Budd and sentenced him to be hanged. Whereas Weisberg has
devoted considerable effort to questioning the legal premises underlying
Vere's action and presenting him as a prototype of ressentiment,43 Posner
has objected to this reading in a defense of Vere and authority.44
Posner would argue that Winterset and its legalistic themes are merely
metaphors for something else, that is, it is not a play about procedure or due
process, but uses those features to build a classic story dealing with classic
themes of envy, revenge and love. He would emphasize mitigating factors
in support of Judge Gaunt's actions as he did in his defense of Captain Vere
40. Id. at xiv.
41. POSNER, supra note 5, at 174-75.
42. Id. at 164.
43. WEISBERG, supra note 6, at 131-76; see also Richard H. Weisberg, How Judges
Speak: Some Lessons on Adjudication in Billy Budd, Sailor with an Application to Justice
Rehnquist, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1982) [hereinafter Weisberg Judges].
44. PosNER, supra note 5, at 155-65; see also Richard A. Posner, From BillyBudd to
Buchenwald-The Failure of the Word. The Protagonist as Lawyer in Modern Fiction, 96
YALE L.J. 1173 (1987)
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and find numerous examples within the play of Gaunt's own statements. In
the case of Sacco and Vanzetti, for example, there was a jury.45 Although
there is evidence that one juror was tainted and malicious, the remaining
eleven jurymen were considered impartial.46 Posner would presumably
find Judge Gaunt vindicated to a large extent by the fact that he was not the
ultimate fact-finder and, equally significant, he was sustained on appeal.
Weisberg's textual approach would serve well, however, in bringing
Winterset back within the fold of a work about ressentiment. Gaunt uses
poetic language, highly formalistic language, which is the essence of the
authority figures who are embodiments of ressentiment. Such language is
used to rationalize the acts that are causing the defensiveness in the first
place. It is most arresting to note the dramatic and fictional, if hauntingly
accurate, commentary of Winterset's Judge Gaunt in attempting to justify his
conduct at the trial:
Suppose it known,
but there are things a judge must not believe
though they should head and fester underneath
and press in on his brain. Justice once rendered
in a clear burst of anger, righteously,
upon a very common laborer,
confessed an anarchist, the verdict found
and in the precise machinery of law
invoked to know him guilty-think what furor
would rock the state if the court then flatly said;
all this was lies-must be reversed? It's better,
as any judge can tell you, in such cases,
holding the common good to be worth more
than small injustice, to let the record stand,
let one man die. For justice, in the main,
is governed by opinion..."
This is an expression of an analogous type of rationale that Weisberg
argues is employed by Captain Vere in his judgment and sentencing of Billy
Budd in terms of its reference to social and political expediency of the day.
45. See JouHIN & MORGAN, supra note 11, at 201-20 for a general discussion of the
jury.
46. Id. at 203. Notwithstanding this, Joughin and Morgan still consider the verdict
tainted and the result of an overriding fear of anarchy; as they note, "[a] sick society makes
sick decisions." Id. at 205.
47. MAXWELL ANDERSON, WINTERSET act 2.
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It is precisely the situation described by Weisberg when he notes that in The
Brothers Karamazov and Billy Budd, Sailor "the now fully developed verbal
character uses the language of the law to control a less articulate, more
popular, and basically well-adjusted criminal defendant.1 48
That this is so is supported by the comments of the non-lawyers in the
play. For example, these views are consistent with those held by Garth
Esdras himself. As Garth explains to his sister, "everybody knew Romagna
wasn't guilty! But they weren't listening to evidence in his favor. They
didn't want it. They don't want it now. 49 Presumably, "they" refers to
the jury that convicted Romagna. As to why he wasn't called, he says "[s]o
far as I know they never'd heard of me-and I can assure you I knew
nothing about it." Early in the play there is the notion planted of law as the
avenger; the paymaster was murdered, an Italian scapegoat was available, 0
and justice would be done in accordance with what is convenient for the
State as opposed to the individual. For example, Romagna's friend, Carr,
tells him "[t]he State can't afford to admit it was wrong, you see. Not when
there's been that much of a row kicked up over it. So for all practical
purposes the State was right and your father robbed the pay roll.""1  To
which Mio Romagna replies, "[t]here's still such a thing as evidence." 2
Part of the backdrop of this discussion of Judge Gaunt's literary
exposition and its comparison with the actual Judge Thayer, as well as
Captain Vere in Billy Budd, are the basic tenets of positivism. Although not
discussed by either Posner or Weisberg in their argument over the interpreta-
tion of Vere's actions in Billy Budd, the literary argument over ressentiment,
authority and use of language and theme can also be viewed against a
48. WEISBERG, supra note 6, at xii.
49. MAXWELL ANDERSON, WINTERSET act 1, sc. 2.
50. One recent commentator on American legal history sees the case as nothing more
than this. See CHARLES REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND: THE EVOLUTION OF OUR LEGAL
SYSTEM 368 (1980).
51. MAXWELL ANDERSON, WINTERSET act 1, sc. 3.
52. Id. To which Carr states:
It's something you can buy. In fact, at the moment I don't think of anything
you can't buy, including life, honor, virtue, glory, public office, conjugal
affection and all kinds ofjustice, from the traffic court to the immortal nine. Go
out and make yourself a pot of money and you can buy all the justice you want.
Convictions obtained, convictions averted. Lowest rates in years.
Id.
Mio Romagna's reply sets the tone for the play; he is out for vengeance, to "go back,
and hang the carrion around their necks that made it!" He will "find out who did it and
make them see it till it scalds their eyes and make them admit it till their tongues are
blistered with saying how black they lied!" Id.
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jurisprudential setting. In other words, it is not only a question of whether
Judge Gaunt in Winterset is operating with rancor and misusing language,
but even conceding that, the issue is also whether he is operating within the
bounds of acceptable behavior as an example of a type of jurisprudential
philosophy. In this regard, having begun this essay with a quote from Hart,
it is possible to shift the focus of the discussion slightly to view Judge
Gaunt as a literary exposition of a judge acting in accordance with positivist
principles.
Hart noted, for example, in Punishment and Responsibility, that
obedience to law exists "because it offers a guarantee that the antisocial
minority who would not otherwise obey will be coerced into obedience by
fear."" Therefore, in order to have a legitimate legal system, the only
"minimum conditions" are
rules of behavior which are valid according to the system's ultimate
criteria of validity must be generally obeyed, and, on the other hand, its
rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules
of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common
public standards of official behavior by its officials.54
Indeed, Hart has argued that a legal system may claim authority even though
its citizens may challenge its moral legitimacy, provided that there is
continued acceptance of the law based upon the actions of officials and their
criticisms of officials who deviate from the accepted law." Morality is
irrelevant provided that acceptance of a rule of recognition, which itself
defines how other rules are determined, exists.
In this regard, then, a positivist would find the legal system discussed
in Winterset an effective one, particularly since there is acceptance of moral
aberrations by those subject to the particular legal system who are, in
essence, all of those who are not judges.56 Deviations from the rule are
met by coercion; the fictional Judge Gaunt as well as the actual Judge
Thayer both find support in the affirmance by the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts. This is significant because the real judge, like the fictional
judge, was upheld in his exercise of discretion in rulings on various points,
particularly regarding the scope of cross-examination.57 This is also
53. HART, supra note 1, at 50.
54. H.L.A. HkRT, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 113 (1961).
55. For a recent criticism of Hart's positivism as ultimately self-serving, see David
Dyzenhaus, Law and Public Reason, 38 McGILL L. J. 366 (1993).
56. HART, supra note 1, at 50.
57. See Weisberg, supra note 2.
1994] 1875
172
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss3/1
Nova Law Review
meaningful in analyzing this work of literature and its portrayal of a judge
seemingly steeped in positivism and using that positivism as a basis for
acting, as Weisberg would have it, with rancor. In other words, this was not
the work of a single judge, but of a system that sustained that judge's
rulings on appeal. Winterset, then, through its portrayal of a real judge
through a fictitious judge that nonetheless speaks against a legitimate
jurisprudential background, demonstrates the arguments for and against that
jurisprudence by vivid example in a way that the more academically
oriented essay could not. Language becomes critical, whether in the hands
of a playwright or judge. In Winterset, poetic language emphasizes the
philosophy being set forth.58
Judge Gaunt espouses a primitively worded rule of recognition concept,
which Garth Esdras seems to confirm, that finds its source in the historical
record of the real trial. In reality, during much of 1924, Arthur D. Hill, a
Boston attomey then representing Sacco and Vanzetti, had a variety of
conversations with Judge Thayer in which he later recalled that Judge
Thayer expressed himself "about the danger of our institutions from
foreigners and radicals, and the importance of respect for the law and of a
firm hand in the administration of justice. ' 5  It is the use of literature in
its mirror of reality that renders such works directly relevant in viewing the
"real world" impact of legal decisions. To the extent that Posner argues that
literature is really not useful in this regard, such a view ignores the use to
which other critics put legal themes in literature. For example, the words
of Judge Gaunt in Winterset provide justifications that the reader will
assume are similar to those in the "real life" practice of law. These are
precisely the types of justifications that West attacks, through her use of
58. Poet and dramatist T.S. Eliot has noted that language "will only be 'poetry' when
the dramatic situation has reached such a point of intensity that poetry becomes the natural
utterance, because then it is the only language in which the emotions can be expressed at all."
T.S. ELIOT, Poetryand Drama, in ON POETRY AND POETS 75, 78 (1957). The critical view
of the poetry utilized by Anderson, however, is far from unanimous. For example, see
POETIC DRAMA 40 (Alfred Kreymborg ed. 1941) (calling Anderson's plays "devoid of real
poetry and the prose more poetic than the verse.... The public swallowed the verse because
of the exciting action and not because they were listening to the march of poetic drama.").
Kreymborg called Winterset "a melodrama dressed up in picturesque verse." Id; see also
Walter J. Meserve, The Dramatistand theirPlays, in 8 THE REVELS HISTORY OF DRAMA IN
ENGLISH 147, 260 (1977) (Anderson "approached the probing concern for modem man that
distinguishes the best dramatists, but he was usually hampered by an inability to achieve the
kind of poetry and the well-structured play that would show the theatre to be that cathedral
of the spirit in which he believed.").
59. MONTGOMERY, supra note 13, at 272 (quoting Arthur Hill) (emphasis added).
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Kafka, as prevalent in Posner.6" West argues, for example, that Posner's
central claim that the state of affairs resulting from an expressly commercial
transaction is a moral one, is belied by the representation of such market
transactions in Kafka's works.6 Similarly, then, Winterset can be dis-
cussed critically and used to criticize jurisprudential viewpoints.
The statements from Judge Thayer are reality, and provides proof of
the dangers of the type of legal ressentiment discussed by Weisberg, and a
contemporary snapshot of the awful dangers of wrongful persuasion
identified by White in his discussion of Philoctetes, in which Odysseus
manipulates Neoptolemus to persuade Philoctetes to give up his bow.62 It
is the veneer of authority that colors law and its proper fumction; it is
literature that provides the focus through its use of heightened language to
make the point. Having said this, we can return to the original question
posed, namely, whether Winterset is a contemporary Billy Budd and, in that
regard, whether it represents a form of legal ressentiment, or rancor, such
as described by Weisberg and objected to by Posner.
IV. WINTERSET IN THE CONTEXT OF OTHER ANDERSON PLAYS
It is a theme of this essay that Winterset, in exemplifying Hart's legal
positivism, helps focus the Weisberg-Posner debate over whether literature
can really provide such a forum in the first place. Even if one were to find
the Sacco-Vanzetti rulings aberrational, as did the contemporaneous
academic community,63 Judge Gaunt's justification, such as it is, finds a
comfortable place within Hart's discussion of finality and infallibility in
judicial decisions.64 These legal and procedural errors find analog in the
discussions of Billy Budd, Sailor, particularly in terms of Captain Vere's
effort to legitimize his result within the veneer of process.65 Despite the
outcry of the intellectual and artistic community, Sacco and Vanzetti were
executed, and the Massachusettsjudiciary was not ousted. Morality does not
enter into the discussion. Judge Gaunt appears more introspective by what
60. Robin West, Authority. Autonomy and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral
and Political Visions of Franz Kajka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REv. 384 (1985).
61. Id. at 391.
62. WHTrE, supra note 37, at 3-27.
63. Comment, Cross-Examination to Impeach, 36 YALE L.J. 384 (1927).
64. HART, supra note 1, at 138-44.
65. See WEISBERG, supra note 6, at 147-59; see also Weisberg Judges, supra note 43,
at 1.
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he has done than Judge Thayer in the "mock" trial of the play.66 In this
regard as well, he is like the fictional Captain Vere who chooses his "duty"
over his own humanistic feelings, having already pre-defined that duty in
accordance with prevailing political standards.67 In further support for a
reading of Winterset as a play about legal authority, similar themes may be
found in other verse plays by Anderson. Again, this "rule of recognition"
that Hart has defined is utilized by "resentful" authority figures-in these
cases, judges-who utilize their position to justify otherwise legally
indefensible positions. It is the literary exposition of these protagonists, and
their abbreviated, poetic dialogue, that drives home the point.
Anderson develops this theme of legal authority relying, in essence,
upon policy arguments to justify the results, in two other poetic works, Joan
of Lorraine and Second Overture. In Joan of Lorraine, Peter Cauchon,
Bishop of Beauvais, was the chief judge in the inquiry of Joan of Arc by the
faculty of the University of Paris.6  Joan had been captured by troops
loyal to the Duke of Burgundy, who with the English opposed Charles VII's
ascension to the throne of France. The English, under the Duke of Bedford,
bargained for her custody and placed her on trial to undo political damage.
Putting her to death would ensure her martyrdom, and it therefore was
necessary to the English to defuse the situation and establish an independent
ground for finding Joan guilty. Here, as in Winterset, extrinsic political
considerations are part of a legal order, accepted by the judges. Cauchon
explains and gives insight into the role of a trial not as fact-finding exercise,
but as a political expedient:
First, I believe that many who have sat with us misunderstood the
character of this trial.... We sit as an ecclesiastical court to examine
in a case of alleged heresy, blasphemy and sorcery. But if that were
our only business we should have concluded the matter long ago. It is
obvious that Joan the Maid is guilty on all three counts. She has freely
admitted enough heretical beliefs and actions to bum all the virgins in
66. Judge Thayer, apart from the illness, was not a perfect match, temperament-wise,
for Judge Gaunt. JOUGHIN & MORGAN, supra note 11, at 418.
67. One might make a comparison with the so-called Rodney King trials, where the
reverse situation occurred: The prevailing political climate disapproved of the jury acquittal
after full process, whereas in the Sacco- Vanzetti case, there was a conviction but only
intellectual outcry.
68. The Law asLiterature,in THE WORLD OF LAW 335, 335-45 (Ephraim London ed.,
1960). Of interest as well is George Bernard Shaw's preface in his play Saint Joan and the
brief discussion in BARBARA W. TUCHMAN, A DISTANT MIRROR: THE CALAMrrous 14TH
CENTURY 588-89 (1978).
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Europe. In my mind she is condenmed and the trial is over. And yet
we must go on with it. And we must be more skillful and resourceful
than we have been so far or we shall be beaten.69
In Joan of Lorraine, one of the inquisitors expresses his doubt as to the
guilt itself, prior to the trial, stating "I shall not allow any temporal
influence, whether French, English or Burgundian, to touch my judg-
ment.""7 Cauchon responds in language that recalls Judge Gaunt's own
philosophical underpinnings:
Why, sir, I would not myself judge a case in opposition to my belief.
But when it happens, as it happens now, that the just thing is the politic
thing-when it happens that the laws of the church require of us the
same verdict which is demanded of us by the heads of the state-is
there any reason why we should not render that verdict?7
As in Winterset, Anderson here portrays a judge who looks to politics and
the politics that. the general populace will accept as legitimate in determining
the lengths to which he may go in deciding a legal issue.
Similarly, in Second Overture, a verse play in one act, set in January,
1918 in a small town near Moscow, the same "rule of recognition" operates
to justify analogous results." A group of refugee-prisoners are awaiting
a decision on their future. The commissar who speaks for the new govern-
ment advises that "[w]e have neither time nor use for legalistic forms. ' ' 3
In his exchange with his former colleague Gregor, the same conflict raised
with Judge Gaunt and Bishop Cauchon arises. Commissar Charash declares
all the prisoners guilty of crimes of counter-revolutionary activities and
sympathy, except his former colleague and now prisoner Gregor. Charash,
convinced of his moral basis, states:
I shall not lose my faith.
But we shall win, and after we have won
There will be time for justice. The task now
Is a cleansing of the empire of the filth
Of a thousand years. I have no more time
And this is a fruitless argument. Come with me.
69. MAXWEL. ANDERSON, JOAN OF LORRAINE act 2, sc. 5.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See MAxwELL ANDERSON, SECOND OVERTURE act 1.
73. Id.
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I have my orders and my own convictions.
You will not change them.74
Anderson has taken ressentiment to its outermost extreme. Charash has his
"orders" and they are legitimized, much as Vere's and Gaunt's "orders"
have come from somewhere else, namely, the world of the political. It is
the poetic language that also reinforces the veneer of authority.
V. WINTERSET AND BILLY BUDD, SAILOR COMPARED
This essay began with the proposition that literature does have
something to say about law, and that Winterset and some of Anderson's
other plays have been too long ignored in these discussions. It cannot be
assumed that Anderson would have intended these plays as celebrations of
authority, as discussed. That is likely how Posner would read them
consistent with his themes in Law and Literature and his critic's interpreta-
tions of those themes.75 Indeed, Posner criticizes Weisberg for presenting
"prosecutors as villains and criminals as heroes."76  Posner specifically
notes the textual absence in Billy Budd, Sailor of any suggestion of illegality
in the court-martial and execution of Billy Budd.77 Posner finds legitimi-
zation of Captain Vere within the system; there is a parallel to Judge
Gaunt's real-life model, Judge Thayer, in that his rulings were sustained on
appeal .78
One of the critical features of the Posner-Weisberg debate over Billy
Budd in particular is the exposition of authority figures in literature in
general. In this regard, Posner has attempted to categorize two distinct
theories of law that flow roughly along positivist and natural law lines. The
analysis, which Posner used to discuss issues in The Merchant of Venice that
are not dissimilar to those raised in both Billy Budd and Winterset, contrasts
a vision of law as a more objective, dispassionate, rule-oriented system, with
a vision of law as a more personal, subjective, flexible and equitable
notion.79 Utilizing this framework that he finds applicable to various
works of literature relating legal themes, Posner argues against the one-sided
portrayal of Vere that he finds in Weisberg's analysis, and puts forwards
74. Id.
75. See POSNER, supra note 5.
76. Id. at 137.
77. Id. at 157.
78. See Weisberg, supra note 2.
79. POSNER, supra note 5, at 107-08.
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Vere as embodying a duality of both columns." He does this by finding
justification for Vere's actions in the legal system in which he operates, and
renders him sympathetic because of the arguable emotion and regret Posner
finds in the text. One could also argue, in such a vein, that there is a
similar dualitv in Judge Gaunt in Winterset as a result of his rationalization.
In many respects, Judge Gaunt seems the literary apologist for positivist
jurisprudence, ajudge insistent on removing morality from his consideration.
He views his role as piercing through the cunning of defense attorneys, to
make sure the "proofs" he held "in his hands" were found by the jury. Of
interest in this regard are Gaunt's comments describing his function as the
ideal judge:
Certain laws
seem cruel in their operation; it's necessary
that we be cruel to uphold them. This cruelty
is kindness to those I serve."
One might recall Captain Vere's remark upon the fatal blow struck by
Billy Budd which killed the ship's officer Claggart, a blow that was clearly
an accident: "Struck dead by an angel of God! Yet the angel must
hang!"2 The cruelty of the result is a kindness; angels who kill must hang.
Gaunt like Vere is therefore a judge who rules out moral and historical
considerations, and even this extreme view of his retributive function might
still find a place within Hart." Similarly apt comparison could be made
to the speech of Captain Vere in which he defends loyalty to the king even
at the expense of loyalty to natural law or one's feelings; "let not warm
hearts betray heads that should be cool."84 Gaunt does not say whom it is
that he services because Gaunt the man is only Gaunt the judge. The
question is raised as to whether he can function as a human being, or if as
judge he must be guided by different standards. Ironically, when he is not
deciding a case but rather advising the police officer in the play how to deal
with hobos, Gaunt cites the First Amendment and urges gentleness.8" On
the other hand, when functioning as judge, he will not question the intent
behind the laws.
80. Id. at 165.
81. MAXWELL ANDERSON, WINTERSET act 2.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. HART, supra note 1, at 235-37.
84. HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, SAILOR 110-11 (1962); see also Weisberg Judges,
supra note 43, at 12-13.
85. See MAXWELL ANDERSON, WINTERSET act 1, sc. 2.
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The manner in which Anderson portrays Gaunt and his other authority
figures allows for sympathetic interpretation. As noted, Anderson was
moved by his friend's sympathy towards Judge Thayer, even though most
observers of the play would be offended by the result in light of the truth
that was revealed in Winterset as to the innocence of Romagna. In viewing
Gaunt's pronouncements, Posner would be struck by their sincerity, as he
was by those of Captain Vere.s6 They are the statements of a conscience-
driven man, justifying his actions in law, not from a sense of justice or
politics. The fictional Gaunt has "scanned and verified and compared the
transcripts of the trial,"" and yet came to a result that not only in the light
of his fictional history, but even of the contemporary analysis of the
Hobhouse equivalent of Frankfurter, was wrong. The real Judge Thayer,
after listening to the lengthy final speech of Vanzetti prior to pronouncing
the death sentence, took refuge in the jury verdict, claiming the judge had
no role whatsoever, and that he had been vindicated by the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts in that court's review of the numerous exceptions taken."8
Gaunt is convinced of the rightness of his decision, yet states "even I am not
free of regret-even I."'  He lacks "the homing instinct."90 Interestingly,
these remarks may be contrasted with the persona displayed by the actual
Judge Thayer because, according to Montgomery, as noted above, it was the
depression or madness of Judge Thayer that led to the inspiration of the
play.
Posner finds sympathy with similar comments made by Captain Vere
in Billy Budd.9 As with Vere, much of Gaunt's justification for his
actions results from a sense of "Rule of Law," that is, of the necessity to
have enforcement and toleration of authority, despite harsh results, for the
public good and for the maintenance of order.92 One imagines that Gaunt,
like Vere, was acting against a backdrop of mutiny: Sacco and Vanzetti
were self-avowed anarchists at a time in American history when tolerance
for such viewpoints was at a lower ebb than usual. Anderson, long a
champion of individual liberties and clearly offended by the result in the
Sacco-Vanzetti matter, nonetheless has taken Montgomery's comments to
86. POSNER, supra note 5, at 164.
87. MAXWELL ANDERSON, WINTERSET act 2.
88. Speeches to the Court, in THE LETTERS OF SACCO AND VANZETrI 377-78 (Marion
Denman Frankfurter & Gardner Jackson eds., 1928) [hereinafter SACCO AND VANZETrI].
89. MAXWELL ANDERSON, WlNTERSET act 1, sc. 3.
90. Id. act 2.
91. See POSNER, supra note 5, at 162.
92. Id.
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heart. Gaunt admits that he has been "ill," and accuses the academic
troublemaker Hobhouse of writing with bias and "malicious intent to
undermine the public confidence in justice and the courts."93 Since the
"case was clear," and "Romagna was known guilty," Gaunt did not call
Esdras as a witness.94 (Anderson takes a liberty here; the prosecution or
defense would have called such a witness, not the judge.) Gaunt refuses to
see the bias and accuses Mio of having his own bias. Mio accuses the judge
of pandering to mob hysteria in order to convict.
Having considered a Posnerian reading of the play, then, viewing it
from the other end of the spectrum provides ample grounds for considering
Winterset as a play presenting the perspective of ressentiment. There is
some biographical support for this reading as well. For example, Anderson
was a rabid anti-Communist in the 1950's, lending an ambiguity to his
persona and attitudes towards tolerance and authority. Some of this
ambivalence is recognizable in Winterset; at least one Anderson critic reads
Winterset to find an ambivalent justice, not being the whole truth or at least
not a one-sided polemic.95 This shade of gray would be visible to Posner,
but probably decriable critics such as West, who views his argument as one
that renders order, not justice, as its goal; law is good solely because it is
authoritative.96 On the other hand, Anderson himself was a pacifist in
World War I, which cost him his teaching position in North Dakota early
in his career.97 He taught at Whittier College in California, where he left
after one year, precipitated by his controversial defense of a conscientious
objector.98 This history of opposition to intolerance, which Shivers
suggests makes Anderson a "champion of liberty and justice, particularly as
these applied to the individual citizen in conflict with overly zealous
minions of the law."99  There is an ambiguity to the playwright that
textures the play with sarcasm and sympathy-readings available in Billy
Budd, Sailor as well. Nonetheless, Anderson's portrayal of Gaunt is that of
one using the language of the law and of authority to oppress the innocent.
Gaunt will not question the intent behind the laws. In some ways, he
is an extreme positivist:
93. MAXWELL ANDERSON, WINTERSET act 2.
94. Id. act 2.
95. BAILEY, supra note 9, at 139.
96. Robin West, Law, Literature, and the Celebration ofAuthority, 83 Nw. U. L. REV.
977, 989 (1989).
97. SHIVERS, BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 9, at 6-7.
98. Id. at 55.
99. Id. at 111.
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For always, night and day,
there lies on my brain like a weight, the admonition:
see truly, let nothing sway you; among all functions
there's but one godlike, to judge. Then see to it
you judge as a god would judge, with clarity,
with truth, with what mercy is found consonant
with order and law. Without law men are beasts,
and it's a judge's task to lift and hold them
above themselves. Let a judge be once mistaken
or step aside for a friend, and a gap is made
in the dykes that hold back anarchy and chaos,
and leave men bound but free.'00
Posner suggests that legalism is, if anything, "the pariah's protec-
tion."'10' Yet, there are suspicions of madness in Captain Vere expressed
by the ship's surgeon in Billy Budd, much as there are clearer statements of
Judge Gaunt's madness in Winterset. These are irrelevant to Posner's
reading of Billy Budd and would be, we presume, in a reading of Winterset.
He would point to the almost fatherly way that Gaunt speaks to Mio,
attempting to make Mio see that Mio himself is as biased the other way and
therefore incapable of perceiving not only the truth, but what the evidence
showed.
It is difficult to rationalize the protestations of "mercy" consonant with
law, in light of the remainder of the statement. Clearly, in Gaunt's mind,
mercy is not a separate factor, but a presumed and inherently inchoate
ingredient in the ordained nonns embodied in society's laws. Despite his
own human regrets, as judge he defends the system; injustice occurs only
"by regrettable chance." ''"2 Such is the statement of abusive authority.
It is not only Judge Gaunt whose actions and statements bear upon the
analysis of the play in terms of its portrayal of authority and ressentiment.
Mio Romagna's sarcastic and knowing accusation as to whom the judge
serves elicits further refuge by Judge Gaunt in strict obedience to the letter
of the law:
Would I have chosen
to rack myself with other men's despairs,
stop my ears, harden my heart, and listen only
to the voice of law and light, if I had hoped
100. MAXWELL ANDERSON, WINTERSET act 2.
101. POSNER, supra note 5, at 136.
102. MAXwELL ANDERSON, WNTERSET act 2.
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for some private gain for serving?...
For hope of heaven or place on earth, or power
or gold, no man has had my voice, nor will
while I still keep the trust that's laid on me
to sentence and define.10 3
Gaunt calls Romagna guilty, and while admitting some injustices in
court from time to time, assures Mio Romagna that that did not happen
here. In a vein reminiscent of Captain Vere, Gaunt says "Romagna was
found guilty by all due process of law, and given his chance to prove his
innocence."' 4 In actuality, a contemporaneous criticism of the Massachu-
setts Supreme Court's rulings in the Sacco-Vanzetti case on critical points
of cross-examination suggests otherwise.' 0 5
Mio Romagna raises the jury charge as a refutation to the judge's effort
to hide behind process and the jury, calling the judge the "fountain-head of
the lies that slew" his father." 6 As Mio states, "[e]very word you spoke
was balanced carefully to keep the letter of the law and still convict."107
The argument between Gaunt and Mio is about evidence sought and not
found; Mio claims Gaunt led the jury astray and Gaunt replied "[a]nd if the
jury were led astray, remember it's the jury, by our Anglo-Saxon system,
that finds for guilt or innocence. The judge is powerless in that mat-
ter."' 08
What Judge Thayer stated in full is worth repeating. Like Captain Vere
pronouncing sentence, he shows no more remorse in real life than his
fictional counterpart in Winterset. Posnerjustifies Vere's reaction as due to
shock and extreme emotion; there is a convenience to that and perhaps
Posner would apply the same to Judge Thayer, whose response is close to
the poetic version created by Anderson:
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Comment, Cross-Examination to Impeach, 36 YALE L.J. 384, 386 (1927). The
commentators argue that the Massachusetts rule, holding "that as long as the evidence
admitted has a degrading tendency, there can be no abuse of discretion," interpreted literally,
"is an interpretation which in the present state of American jurisprudence, at least, may lead
to the conviction of defendants for crimes which they never committed," Id. at 385-86. See
also FRANKFURTER, supra note 15, at 25.
106. MAXWELL ANDERSON, WINTERSET act 2.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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Under the law of Massachusetts the jury says whether a defendant is
guilty or innocent. The Court has absolutely nothing to do with that
question. The law of Massachusetts provides that a Judge cannot deal
in any way with the facts. As far as he can go under our law is to state
the evidence.'l 9
And yet Frankfurter, like Judge Gaunt reviewing the "many thousand
pages" of the record, concluded "that the trustworthiness of the testimony
which placed Sacco and Vanzetti in Braintree on April 15 is the foundation
of the case." ' ° There were fifty-nine witnesses for the prosecution and
ninety-nine witnesses for the defendants on the issue of the identity of the
murders, which Frankfurter indicates raises by sheer numbers the implication
that identification was far from clear-cut."' It is that very trustworthiness
that Judge Gaunt refuses to question. Posner is able to find affection
between Captain Vere and Billy Budd, and cites the final words of Vere
("Billy Budd") and Budd ("God Bless Captain Vere") as evidence of the
relationship between the two of them. Interestingly, the last words of
Vanzetti were that he forgives some of those who were his enemies." 2
Winterset fully develops and stands within the range of discussion of
Weisberg's theme of ressentiment, and bears strong comparison with the
literary and legal analyses of Billy Budd. It has not been my intention to
embark upon yet another analysis of the actual trial of Sacco and Vanzetti.
It is within the context of the literary work Winterset that implications for
lawyers, and particularly judges, are found. As such, Winterset can be read
as an attack upon injustice but, at the same time, find textual threads that fit
within the fabric of the Weisberg-Posner debate.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have attempted to bring to the table a significant play that has been
all but ignored in the recent discussions of law and literature. That this
should happen to Winterset is surprising in light of the significant twentieth-
century parallels to a work such as Billy Budd, Sailor. I agree with those
who, in growing number, are looking to literature to gain (if not regain) a
perspective on law-what it is and what it is meant to achieve. We are
109. SACCO AND VANZEMTI, supra note 88, at 377-78.
110. FRANKFURTER, supra note 15, at 11 (emphasis added).
111. Id.
112. Vanzetti's Last Statement, in THE LE=RS OF SACCO AND VANzETrI 404 n.1
(Marion Denman Frankfurter & Gnardner Jackson eds., 1928).
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creatures of metaphor and analogy, often incapable of grasping the
complexities of life except by vicarious vision. Winterset provides that
vision. While the play may have its critical faults, it nonetheless encapsu-
lates a modern legend no less powerful than those employed by ancient
writers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to discriminate against an employee
on the basis of sex.' The language of Title VII does not specifically
address the issue of whether sexual harassment constitutes sexual discrimina-
tion under the Title. As a result, courts initially dismissed sexual harass-
ment claims for failure to state a claim for relief under Title VII. 2
In 1980, the lack of uniformity and confusion in construing Title VII
prompted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") to
develop guidelines for analyzing sexual harassment claims.3 The guidelines
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
2. See Garber v. Saxon Business Prod., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977); Tomkins
v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d
Cir. 1977); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated on
procedural grounds, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
3. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1993).
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affirmed the position that sexual harassment in the workplace is a violation
of Title VII." According to the guidelines, hostile environment sexual
harassment need not result in denial of employment opportunities.' It is
harassment that creates an "intimidating, hostile or offensive work
environment." Although the EEOC Guidelines articulated the concept of
"hostile environment" sexual harassment, because the commission is only
an administrative agency and its promulgations do not carry the weight of
binding law, some courts were unwilling to recognize hostile environment
claims.7 In 1986., the Supreme Court for the first time attempted to put an
end to the confusion when it decided Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.!
One of the ways the Supreme Court helped ease the debate was by
recognizing that claims of hostile environment sexual harassment were
actionable as sex discrimination under Title VII. 9 The Court further held
that although the EEOC Guidelines are not binding on the courts, they are
a body of experience and informed judgment that courts and litigants should
look to.'0 The Supreme Court set a standard for when hostile environment
sexual harassment is actionable: the conduct must be sufficiently "severe
or pervasive" so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an
abusive work environment."
The Supreme Court thought it was ending the controversy in this area;
however, the decision failed to address the disagreement between the circuit
courts in defining hostile environment sexual harassment. The biggest
problem the circuit courts have faced since Meritor has been in defining
precisely what conduct would create a sexually hostile environment. 2 The
Court did not define "severe" or "pervasive." This left lower courts without
a guideline which, in turn, has led to inconsistent results. Some courts have
4. See id. § 1604.11 (a). There are two forms of sexual harassment under the guidelines:
(1) quid pro quo, which is when sexual conduct is made a term or condition of employment;
and (2) hostile environment, which is when the conduct unreasonably interferes with the work
performance or the conduct creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment.
Id.
5. Denial of employment opportunities may result in "quid pro quo" sexual harassment.
See id. at § 1604.11 (a)(2).
6. Id. § 1604.11(a)(3).
7. See Jeffrey A. Gettle, Comment, Sexual Harassment and the Reasonable Woman
Standard Is It a Viable Solution?, 31 DuQ. L. REV. 841, 845 (1993).
8. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
9. Id. at 65.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 67.
12. See Gettle, supra note 7, at 846.
1890 Vol. 18
186
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss3/1
Gomez
decided that in light of Meritor, the plaintiff must show that the alleged
conduct caused psychological harm. 3 At the same time, other courts have
held that psychological harm is not a necessary element of the claim.
1 4
On November 9, 1993, the Supreme Court decided Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., ("Harris If). 5 By deciding this case, the Supreme Court
was hoping to resolve the issues it left unresolved in 1986. The Court did
not overrule Meritor; rather, it broadly interpreted its prior holding and
decided that the conduct need not cause a tangible psychological injury to
be considered sexual harassment. 16 The Court took the middle ground
between making a mere offensive utterance a valid cause of action and
requiring that victims suffer a nervous breakdown as a requirement for a
cause of action. 7 The petitioner argued in her brief, and the Supreme
Court agreed, that requiring psychological injury is inconsistent with the
prophylactic objectives of Title VII' 8 The Supreme Court stated that to
question whether the conduct "seriously affected plaintiff's psychological
well-being" or "led her to suffer injury" is a needless inquiry that focuses
the factfinder's attention on concrete psychological harm, an element Title
VII does not require.' 9 The Court was trying to set a standard for lower
courts to follow, but it remains to be seen how this decision will be
interpreted by the lower courts.
This comment will analyze the state of the law before the Supreme
Court's decision and whether Harris II has changed the meaning of hostile
environment sexual harassment. There is concern that the elimination of the
psychological harm element makes it too easy for plaintiffs to prove their
cases.2" The goal of this comment is to determine whether Harris II in
fact, does make hostile environment sexual harassment easier to prove. The
Harris II decision by no means resolved all the questions dealing with
sexual harassment. This comment will analyze the ambiguities left by
13. See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3rd Cir. 1990); Rabidue v.
Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1040 (1987); and
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (1 th Cir. 1982).
14. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879
F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990).
15. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
16. Id. at 370.
17. Id.
18. Petitioner's Brief at 23, Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) (No. 92-
1168).
19. Harris 1H, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
20. See Linda Greenhouse, Sex Harassment Easier to Prove, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
1993, at Al.
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Harris II and how one appellate court has dealt with the Supreme Court's
holding. Many issues are unresolved in this area, one being the fairness
or unfairness of the reasonable person standard in evaluating sexual
harassment cases. Although this comment focuses on Harris JJ,22 the pros
and cons of the reasonable person standard and the viability of the
reasonable woman standard will also be discussed. This comment will also
address the issue of whether the Federal government's restriction of speech
in the workplace through Title VII is offensive to the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court should be visiting these two issues in the very near
future.
II. STATE OF THE LAW BEFORE HARRIS
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Congress passed Title VII as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.24
Its primary goal was to eliminate employment discrimination. 5 Title VII
makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's sex.26 As part
of Title VII, the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was
created to help carry out the law.27 By 1972, although the federal law was
in place, Congress realized that the EEOC was not meeting desired
expectations.
21. See Saxton v. AT&T, 10 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1993).
22. The Supreme Court framed the issue as whether a plaintiff needs to show she was
psychologically injured in order to recover for hostile environment sexual harassment. The
Court did not evaluate the reasonable person standard. It reversed the district court's decision
and remanded the case to a factfinder who will apply the rule that it set forth. Harris 11, 114
S. Ct. at 371.
23. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof- or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
24. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 113 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.-
C.A.N. 2391, 2401.
25. Id.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988).
27. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 113 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.-
C.A.N. 2391.
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Due to the ineffectiveness of the EEOC, Congress amended Title VII
by passing the Equal Employment Opportunity Act.2" Congress realized
that the EEOC had been established in 1964 but that its power was limited
to conciliation.29 It became evident that the EEOC needed to have quasi-
judicial power with the authority to obtain enforcement of its orders.3" The
legislative history of the amendment demonstrates Congress' growing
concern with discrimination against women based on gender and its desire
to put a stop to the problem.3' Congress became concerned that discrimi-
nation against women was being regarded by many as either morally or
physiologically justifiable.3" Trying to change society's view of discrimi-
nation based on gender, Congress announced that "[d]iscrimination against
women is no less serious than other forms of prohibited employment
practices and is to be accorded the same degree of social concern given to
any type of unlawful discrimination."33
By 1980, the EEOC had set up guidelines to help courts determine not
only what conduct constitutes sexual discrimination but, more importantly,
what conduct constitutes sexual harassment.34  The guidelines made
harassment on the basis of sex a violation of Title VII." They went on to
recognize two forms of sexual harassment: "quid pro quo" and "hostile
environment."36  When evaluating a sexual harassment claim, the record
is to be looked at as a whole and a decision is to be made based on the
totality of the circumstances.37
Despite the guidelines, some courts were unwilling to allow hostile
environment claims because administrative agency guidelines do not carry
28. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1972), reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2137.
29. Id. at 2138.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 2139. The persistence of discrimination and its detrimental effects require
a reaffirmation of our national policy of equal opportunity in employment. Id.
32. See H.R. REP. No. 238 at 2141.
33. Id.
34. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1993).
35. Id.
36. Id. Quid pro quo sexual harassment exists when submission to unwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
is made a term or condition of employment. Id. § 1604.11 (a)(1). Hostile environment sexual
harassment is defined by the guidelines as "conduct hav[ing] the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment." Id. § 1604.11 (a)(3). Hostile environment sexual
harassment is the focus of this comment.
37. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1993).
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the weight of binding law. 8  By 1981, courts were still refusing to
recognize sexual harassment that did not affect tangible job benefits.39 In
Bundy v. Jackson,4" the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
recognized hostile environment sexual harassment as actionable under Title
VII.4' This was a boost for women because they could file their claims
without having to prove the harassment detrimentally affected tangible job
benefits.42 But women still had a long road ahead of them because the
court in Bundy stated that the psychological aspect of the work environment
is a "condition of employment" under Title VII.
43
B. The Supreme Court Steps In: Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson
4
Another five years passed before the Supreme Court decided to step in
and lay the foundation in this new area of the law.4 5 This was the first
time the Supreme Court had taken a stand and held that hostile work
environment is a form of sexual harassment that violates Title VII. 46 The
Court reaffirmed the position that Title VII is not limited to "economic" or
"tangible" discrimination. 47  This decision appeared to be the answer
women were waiting for. However, it left many questions unanswered
which, inevitably, have led to controversy.48 According to the Supreme
Court, for lower courts to find that plaintiffs have stated a claim for sexual
harassment, the harassing conduct must be sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of employment and must create an abusive working
environment.4 9
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' remand to the
38. See Gettle, supra note 7, at 845.
39. See Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Tomkins v. Public
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654
(D.D.C. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
40. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
41. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
42. See id. at 945.
43. Id. at 944.
44. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
45. See id.
46. Id. at 64.
47. Id.
48. See Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experiences vs. Legal Defini-
tions, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 55 (1990).
49. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
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district court to dispose of Vinson's hostile environment claim.5" The
district court, like many other courts, had previously decided that since there
was no quid pro quo sexual harassment the claim should fail.5' The
respondent, Mechelle Vinson, brought the action against Meritor Savings
Bank, her employer, and Sidney Taylor, claiming that during the four years
she was employed by the bank Taylor had constantly sexually harassed
her.52 Vinson claimed that after her probationary period as a teller-trainee,
Taylor invited her out to dinner, and during the meal suggested that they go
to a motel to have sexual relations." She refused at first, but because she
feared losing her job she eventually agreed.54 Taylor subsequently made
repeated demands for sexual favors, both during and after business hours.55
Over the next several years, they had intercourse forty or fifty times. 6
Taylor fondled Vinson in front of other employees, followed her into the
women's restroom, exposed himself to her, and on several occasions
forcibly raped her." These activities ceased when she started going with
a steady boyfriend. 58 On the stand, the testimony was the typical "he
said/she said." Taylor contended that Vinson made the accusations because
of a business-.related dispute.59 The district court held that since Vinson's
and Taylor's sexual relationship was voluntary and unrelated to her
continued employment at the bank, there was no actionable sexual
harassment.6°
In reviewing these facts, the Supreme Court decided that the EEOC
Guidelines support the view that harassment leading to noneconomic injury
can violate Title VII.6 ' The guidelines undercut the district court's holding
because under Title VII the fact that sex-related conduct was voluntary, is
not a valid defense to sexual harassment.62 The gravamen of any sexual
50. Id. at 73.
51. Id. at 57.
52. Id. at 60.
53. Id.
54. Meritor. 477 U.S. at 60.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 61.
60. Id at 57. This language indicates the court did not find "quid pro quo" sexual
harassment. But for hostile environment sexual harassment, sexual favors need not be made
a condition of continued employment. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(a)(3) (1993).
61. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
62. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1993).
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harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were "unwelcome." 3
The harassment need not be "quid pro quo;" it can be "hostile environment,"
because Title VII "affords employees the right to work in an environment
free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult."'64 In arriving
at its decision, the Supreme Court relied on Rogers v. EEOC.65 Rogers
recognized a cause of action for discriminatory work environment based on
race under Title VII. 66  The court held that a mere utterance which
engendered offensive feelings in an employee is not enough for a claim
under Title VII. 6' On the other hand, a "working environment so heavily
polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the worker's emotional
and psychological stability" is actionable.6" Although nowhere in Meritor
does the Court say that plaintiffs must show they were psychologically
damaged, quoting from Rogers created great confusion among the circuit
courts and seemed to set a higher threshold for finding sexual harassment
than under the EEOC Guidelines.69 One scholar has suggested that Meritor
leaves room for much legal sexual harassment, which is what the Court set
out to end."0 The Court failed to define how much conduct is lawful-
from this stems the inconsistency that has pervaded this area.
C. Split in the Circuit Courts
In 1986, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Rabidue v. Osceola
Refining Co.,' 2 ("Rabidue 11") based on the Meritor decision. 3 Although
this court purports to follow the Meritor reasoning, it denied relief to a
plaintiff who was subjected to an "extremely vulgar and crude" supervisor
who "customarily made obscene comments about women generally, and on
occasion, directed such obscenities to plaintiff."' 4  In the course of the
supervisor's (Douglas Henry) obscene comments about women, he used
63. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).
64. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
65. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
66. Id. at 236.
67. Id. at 238.
68. Id.
69. See Pollack, supra note 48, at 60.
70. See id. at 61.
71. See id.
72. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
73. Id.
74. Id at 615.
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words like "cunt," "pussy," and "tits."' 5 On at least one occasion, Mr.
Henry called plaintiff a "fat ass. 76 In addition to this, other male employ-
ees displayed, in their offices and work areas, pictures of nude or partially
clad women, to which plaintiff and other female employees were ex-
posed.77 The court of appeals decided that based on the EEOC Guidelines
and legal precedent, for plaintiff to prevail in a Title VII offensive work
environment sexual harassment action, she had to prove that the work
environment seriously affected her psychological well-being. 7 The court
required psychological harm for a valid cause of action, although neither
Meritor nor the EEOC Guidelines make psychological harm an element of
the claim for relief.
79
The court, in Rabidue II, decided that based on the totality of the
circumstances approach espoused by the guidelines, the lexicon of obscenity
that pervaded the work environment before and after plaintiff's introduction
to it must be considered together with the plaintiffs reasonable expectation
when she voluntarily entered the environment." This language makes it
seem as though plaintiff assumed the risk of being harassed based on her
sex when she accepted employment at Osceola Refining Co. By affirming
the status quo in this way, the court legitimized sexual harassment. What
is good for society is good for the workplace; or more aptly, what is good
for the gander is good for the goose."1 Even more disturbing is the district
court's opinion, which was quoted by the appellate court in justification for
its holding:
Indeed, it cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environ-
ments, humor and language are rough hewn and vulgar. Sexual jokes,
sexual conversations and girlie magazines may abound. Title VII was
not meant to - or can - change this .... Title VII was [not] designed
to bring about a magical transformation in the social mores of American
workers.8"
After reading this, it seems that Judge Newblatt totally misunderstood Title
75. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., ("Rabidue 1") 584 F. Supp. 419, 423 (E.D. Mich.
1984), affd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Rabidue 11, 805 F.2d at 619.
79. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1993).
80. Rabidue II, 805 F.2d at 620.
81. See Pollack, supra note 48, at 65.
82. Rabidue 1, 584 F. Supp. at 430; Rabidue II, 805 F.2d at 620-21.
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VII and its goal. Congress enacted Title VII and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act to change conduct that had become acceptable in a
pervasively male dominated workplace.8 3 Judge Keith, in his dissenting
opinion, stated: "In my view, Title VII's precise purpose is to prevent such
behavior and attitudes from poisoning the work environment of classes
protected under the Act." 4 He further stated that women should not be
subjected to environments where their sexual dignity and reasonable
sensibilities are visually, verbally, or physically assaulted as a matter of
prevailing male prerogative.8
5
The kind of attitude espoused by the Rabidue II majority reaffirms the
common belief that it is fine to joke sexually with a woman even if it is
offensive to her because it has become socially acceptable behavior. It must
be remembered that the Supreme Court said in Meritor that the gravamen
of sexual harassment is that the advances were "unwelcome" not whether the
harasser set out to cause harm. 6 It is evident that the Sixth Circuit
misinterpreted Meritor and makes it harder or virtually impossible for
plaintiffs to make out a prima facie case for sexual harassment by requiring
an element that is unnecessary. 7 It has been proposed that courts want to
see severe psychological harm because they simply do not believe in hostile
environment sexual harassment claims, although they have been recognized
by the EEOC and the Supreme Court. 8
The Third and Eleventh Circuits also require plaintiffs to show that
they were psychologically injured by the offensive conduct.8 9 In Andrews
v. City of Philadelphia, the plaintiffs were two female police officers who
claimed they were harassed by their fellow workers and supervisors. 9 In
their working division, women were regularly referred to in an offensive and
obscene manner and plaintiffs were personally addressed in such manner.
There was evidence of pornographic pictures of women in the locker room,
which plaintiffs contend embarrassed, humiliated, and harassed them. 91
The behavior by the male police officers included the showing of a
83. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1972) reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2137.
84. Rabidue 11, 805 F.2d at 626-27 (Keith, J., dissenting).
85. Id.
86. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
87. See Rabidue 11, 805 F.2d at 619.
88. See Pollack, supra note 48, at 67-68.
89. See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3rd Cir. 1990); Henson
v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901 (11 th Cir. 1982).
90. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1471.
91. Id. at 1472.
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pornographic movie in a squad room which was also used by the plain-
tiffs.92 Although plaintiffs were emotionally affected, scared, and nervous,
the court held that plaintiffs had to establish that the conduct was severe
enough to affect their psychological stability.93
Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit in Henson v. City of Dundee,94 made
psychological harm a question to be considered when deciding whether the
harassment complained of affected a "term, condition, or privilege" of
employment. 9'  The court did not find a Title VII violation, although
Henson's supervisor, Sellgren, subjected her and her female co-worker to
crude and vulgar language, and almost daily inquired into their sexual habits
and proclivities.96
The court in Henson enunciated the elements a plaintiff must prove in
order to successfully claim hostile environment sexual harassment: (1)
plaintiff must belong to a protected group; 97 (2) plaintiff was subjected to
unwelcome sexual harassment;98 (3) the harassment was based upon sex;99
(4) the harassment affected a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment;
and (5) employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed
to take action. ' °° The confusion comes into play when courts analyze the
92. Id. at 14-75.
93. Id. at 1482.
94. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
95. Id. at 904.
96. Id. at 901-02. The appellate court reversed the district court's order as to the
hostile work environment claim and remanded for a new trial on the issue. Id. at 901.
97. This requires a simple stipulation that plaintiff is a man or a woman. Id. at 903.
98. The conduct must be unwelcome in the sense that plaintiff did not solicit or incite
it and the plaintiff regarded it as undesirable and offensive. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
99. Plaintiff must show that but for her sex, she would not have been subjected to sexual
harassment. Id. at 904.
100. Id. at 903-05. The issue of imputed liability is not dealt with in this comment
because in Harris, the alleged perpetrator was the president of the company. Nevertheless,
the EEOC Guidelines hold an employer responsible for the acts of its agents and supervisory
personnel with regard to sexual harassment, regardless of whether the specific acts
complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether
the employer knew or should have known. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1993). The Commission
will examine the employment relationship to determine whether the employee was acting in
either a supervisory or agency capacity. Id.
The Supreme Court in Meritor decided not to issue a definitive rule on employer
liability, but agreed with the EEOC that Congress wanted courts to look to agency principles
for guidance in this area. 477 U.S. at 72 (1986). Although the Court did not announce a
rule, it did try to give some guidance to lower courts. For example, it stated that employers
are not always automatically liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors; absence of
notice to an employer does not necessarily insulate the employer from liability; and the mere
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fourth element-the harassment affected a "term, condition, or privilege" of
employment. The Eleventh Circuit, like others, claims that for the
harassment to be sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to affect a term,
condition, or privilege of employment, it must affect plaintiff psychological-
ly. ' Some courts have departed from this line of reasoning and only
require that plaintiffs show either the harassment interfered with their ability
to perform or significantly affected their psychological well-being or, even
bolder, that the conduct need not affect plaintiffs psychologically. 2
The standard of not requiring proof of tangible psychological harm is
fair because someone's job performance may be impaired without their
suffering a nervous breakdown. This shows the confusion that has led to
many inconsistent results. What plaintiffs must plead and prove depends on
what circuit they are in and not on any set standard. This creates uncertain-
ty and may even deter plaintiffs from filing their claims, which is a great
departure from what Title VII set out to accomplish. 0 3 It was evident that
somewhere along the line the Supreme Court would have to step in again
and try to set a standard for lower courts to follow in hostile environment
sexual harassment claims.
III. HARRIS V. FORKLIFT SYSTEMS, INC.
A. Lower Court Decision
The District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee was following
circuit precedent in 1991 when it decided that Teresa Harris had to show she
had been psychologically damaged in order to show she had been sexually
existence of a grievance procedure and a policy against discrimination, coupled with
employee's failure to invoke the procedure, will not always insulate the employer from
liability. Id. Courts since Meritor are split on whether notice is required. Compare Vance
v. Southern Bel. Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1515 (1 Ith Cir. 1989) (holding employer
liable for supervisor's conduct even without notice) with Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico,
864 F.2d 881, 902 (Ist Cir. 1988) (holding employer liable if he or she had actual or
constructive notice and failed to take appropriate action).
101. Henson, 682 F.2d at 904.
102. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). The harasser's conduct is what
must be pervasive or severe, not the alteration in the condition of employment. Id. at 876.
Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds, 900
F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990).
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1993).
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harassed. °4 The test is whether the harassment is conduct which would
interfere with a hypothetical reasonable individual's work performance and
seriously affect the psychological well-being of that reasonable person under
like circumstances." 5 The court cited Rabidue II to justify its hold-
ing.106 By requiring that plaintiffs be psychologically harmed, the courts
are denying relief when work performance has been affected but plaintiffs
have not suffered a nervous breakdown. This is contrary to Title VII. The
EEOC Guidelines were designed to punish people whose conduct unreason-
ably interferes with another's work performance.'0 7 The district court
found that Forklift's president often insulted Ms. Harris because of her
gender and made her the target of unwanted sexual innuendos and that his
inappropriate sexual comments offended her as they would a reasonable
woman.' 8 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the behavior was not so
severe as to be expected to seriously affect her psychological well-be-
ing.' 9 In like manner, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed."0
B. Facts
Plaintiff, Teresa Harris, was employed by Forklift Systems as a rental
manager from April 22, 1985 until October 1, 1987."' Charles Hardy
was at all material times president of Forklift. ' 2 Mr. Hardy made plaintiff
the object of a continuing pattern of sex-based derogatory conduct. In the
presence of other employees he would make comments like "you're a
woman, what do you know," "you're a dumb ass woman," "we need a man
as the rental manager," and once in front of employees and a Nissan
representative he said, "lets go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate your
raise."' ,3 Mr. Hardy would ask plaintiff and other female employees, but
not male employees, to retrieve coins from his front pants pocket." 4 He
104. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., ("Harris T') No. 3-89-0557, 1991 WL 487444 (M.D.
Tenn. Feb. 4, 1991) (following Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir.
1986)), afjd, 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
105. Harris 1, 1991 WL 487444 at *6.
106. Id,
107. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a)(3) (1988).
108. Harris 1, 1991 WL 487444 at *6.
109. Id.
110. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992).
Ill. Harris1, 1991 WL 487444 at *1.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 12-3.
114. Id.
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would throw objects on the ground in front of plaintiff and other female
employees and ask them to pick them up, and then make comments about
the female employees' attire."' As a result of Mr. Hardy's behavior,
plaintiff experienced anxiety and emotional upset. She did not want to go
to work, cried frequently, began drinking heavily, and her relationship with
her children became strained." 6 On August 18, 1987, plaintiff met with
Mr. Hardy to complain about his treatment towards her."7 He admitted
making the comments but said they were jokes."' He apologized, and on
his promise that the behavior would cease, plaintiff continued working for
Forklift."9 Shortly thereafter, Mr. Hardy continued to humiliate her by
suggesting that plaintiff secured an account for the company by promising
to do sexual favors for a customer.20 He said to her in front of other
employees, "what did you do, promise the guy... some 'bugger' Saturday
night?"''
On Thursday, October 1, 1987, plaintiff collected her paycheck and left
Forklift Systems.'22 Considering all the facts and the way plaintiff felt,
the court still refused to recognize she made a prima facie case for hostile
environment sexual harassment. Although the court called this a close case
and found that Mr. Hardy was a vulgar man who demeaned female
employees at his workplace, the court chose to characterize his conduct as
merely annoying and insensitive and dismissed plaintiffs case.'23
C. Supreme Court Holding
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the
circuits on whether conduct, to be actionable as "abusive work environment"
sexual harassment, must seriously affect an employee's psychological well-
being or lead the plaintiff to suffer injury.'24 The Supreme Court reaf-
firmed its holding in Meritor and attempted to expand upon it by setting a
standard. 5 The Court, borrowing from Meritor, said that Title VII is
115. Id at *3.
116. Harris 1, 1991 WL 487444 at *3.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Harris!, 1991 WL 487444 at *3.
122. Id.
123. Id. at *5-6.
124. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
125. Id. at 370.
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violated "[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimida-
tion, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working
environment." 26  The standard takes a middle path between making
merely offensive conduct actionable and requiring the conduct to cause
tangible psychological harm.'27 The conduct is measured both objectively
and subjectively. The conduct must objectively create a hostile or offensive
environment that a reasonable person would find hostile and the victim must
subjectively perceive the conditions as such. 2' The petitioner argued in
her brief, and the Court seemed by its holding to have agreed, that neither
the language of Title VII nor its legislative history requires proof of serious
psychological injury.129 The decision undercut the Sixth Circuit and
others that require tangible psychological harm because the Court announced
that "Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a
nervous breakdown." 3 ' Justice O'Connor, who rendered the unanimous
opinion, reasoned that psychological harm should not be an element of the
claim for relief because a discriminatorily abusive work environment, even
one that does not seriously affect employees' psychological well-being, can
and often will detract from employees' job performance, discourage
employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their
careers.' Such behavior is offensive to the goals of Title VII.
The Court further tried to ease the confusion by stating that the fact
that Meritor made reference to environments so heavily polluted with
discrimination as to completely destroy the emotional and psychological
stability of employees, merely showed an especially egregious example of
harassment.'33 This language was not meant to mark the boundary for
what is actionable.'34 This seems to be the language circuits were relying
upon to require tangible psychological damage as part of the claim for relief.
As correctly stated by petitioner in her brief, the Sixth Circuit test is based
on a misinterpretation of Meritor.35 Lower courts must now follow the
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. The appropriateness of the reasonable person standard was not an issue before
this Court.
129. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 18, at 15.
130. Harris II, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
131. Id. at 371.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 18, at 20.
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rule that as long as the environment would reasonably be perceived and is
perceived as hostile or abusive, there is no need for it also to be psychologi-
cally injurious.' This decision seems to be a major coup for women who
were kept from showing they were sexually harassed because they had not
endured a nervous breakdown. Nevertheless, the Court cautioned that this
is a difficult area of the law and that there cannot be a mathematically
precise test to determine when there has been a hostile environment sexual
harassment violation under Title VII. 13' This language shows that hostile
environment sexual harassment is far from being a defined area of the law.
The decisions will still vary because juries must look at the totality of the
circumstances and make decisions on a case-by-case basis.' Lower
courts should look at the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its
severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance, and whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with
an employee's work performance. Whether or not the plaintiff suffered
psychological harm may be relevant when determining if in fact plaintiff
found the environment to be abusive, but no single factor is determina-
tive.' In light of its holding, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment
and remanded the case because the district court's application of the
incorrect standard may have influenced its ultimate conclusion. 40  The
Court was further inclined to render this decision because the district judge
himself found this to be a close case.' 4' This does not mean that Ms.
Harris won, but at least her case should now be evaluated under the correct
legal standard, giving her a fair chance to prove she was sexually harassed.
IV. IMPACT
The impact the Supreme Court decision will have on Teresa Harris
depends on how the district court weighs all the evidence. This could very
well mean that the district court again finds she was not sexually harassed.
What the court cannot do is ask that she show psychological harm as a
result of Mr. Hardy's abusive behavior. The Supreme Court was not sure
if, or to what extent, the district court relied on the psychological harm
136. See Harris II, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. Id
140. Id.
141. Harris !!, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
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element when it decided that Ms. Harris did not state a claim for hostile
environment sexual harassment.' 42  Therefore, the decision the district
court will make will depend on whether or not it gave too much weight to
this element.
It seems from reading the district court opinion that the court accorded
great weight to the fact she could not show a tangible injury. 43 The court
did find that Hardy was vulgar and treated female employees in a demean-
ing fashion. 4" Further, the court even said that she was offended as
would any reasonable woman.' 4' This shows the court did not find Ms.
Harris to be an especially fragile or sensitive person who was merely
overreacting. In light of all the evidence and the fact that the court cannot
exclusively rely on psychological harm, there is a good chance the court will
change its prior judgment dismissing plaintiff's claim.
Of course, there exists the possibility, as respondent argued to the
Supreme Court in his brief, that the district court did not give any particular
emphasis to the psychological harm element. 46 If this is so, then Teresa
Harris stands to lose again. The Supreme Court was not attempting to cure
all the evils that pervade sexual harassment when it decided Harris II, but
it was a move in the right direction.
The Supreme Court's decision is strong legal precedent for new
plaintiffs who can now successfully argue that they need not show they were
psychologically injured to state a claim for hostile environment sexual
harassment. On December 3, 1993, less than a month after the Supreme
Court had decided the sexual harassment issue, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit decided a case based on Harris Il' 47 The U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in
favor of AT&T because it found insufficient evidence to establish hostile
environment sexual harassment. 48 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed. 19
Although the plaintiff in that case did not make out a claim for hostile
environment sexual harassment, it is important to note that the court
142. Id.
143. See Harris 1, 1991 WL 487444.
144. Harris 1, 1991 WL 487444 at *5.
145. Id. at *7.
146. Respondent's Brief at 12, Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) (No.
92-1168).
147. See Saxton v. AT&T, 10 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1993).
148. Id. at 531.
149. Id. at 537.
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followed the Supreme Court's decision and stated that psychological injury
is not a necessary element. 5 ' The court further stated that, even without
regard to the tangible effects, the very fact that there was discriminatory
conduct, which was so severe or pervasive that it created a work environ-
ment abusive to employees because of gender, offends Title VII's broad rule
of workplace equality. 1 ' The effect Harris II had on this case was that
the court had to take notice and realize that it could no longer require
plaintiffs to show they suffered anxiety and debilitation as it had in the
past.' Furthermore, this decision shows that Meritor is still alive and
well in this field, as the court relies on it for the basic elements that must
be proven to show hostile environment sexual harassment."13
As was evident with Meritor, lower courts do not always interpret
cases correctly and sometimes the Supreme Court does not convey the
message clearly. It still remains to be seen if lower courts are going to
interpret Harris II properly or are going to read something into it that is not
there. The Saxton decision is only one, and may not be the best, example
to measure how other lower courts will apply the hostile environment sexual
harassment test enunciated by Harris H because the facts are not the ones
commonly found in these types of cases.
The conduct by the supervisor in Saxton was inappropriate but not
severe or pervasive enough as to create a hostile work environment because
the behavior was limited to two instances and he stopped after she made her
lack of interest clear.'54 Saxton and her supervisor, Richardson, met for
drinks after work at Richardson's suggestion.' She had been trying to
meet with him in order to discuss her dissatisfaction with her lab assign-
ment. 56 After spending two hours at a nightclub, they drove to a jazz
club, again at Richardson's request.'57 While they were at the jazz club,
Richardson placed his hand on Saxton's leg above the knee several times
and once he rubbed his hand along her upper thigh.' 8 Saxton removed
his hand each time and told him to stop.' When they left the jazz club,
Richardson pulled Saxton into a doorway and kissed her for two or three
150. Id. at 533.
151. Id.
152. See Saxton, 10 F.3d at 533.
153. See id.
154. Id. at 534-35.
155. Id. at 528.
156. Id.
157. Saxton, 10 F.3d at 528.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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seconds until she pushed him away. 6 ' Saxton repeated her admonition
at work the following morning, and he apologized and assured her that it
would not happen again.' 6 '
About three weeks later, Richardson invited Saxton to lunch to discuss
work related matters.'62 As Richardson was driving her back to her car
after lunch, he took a detour, stopped the car and got out for a walk.'63
Saxton decided to do the same and walked off on her own, when he
suddenly lurched at her from behind some bushes, as if to grab her.'"
She dashed several feet away to avoid him and again told him his behavior
was inappropriate.'65 This was the last time he made any advances toward
Saxton. 66 These facts make the case easier to decide than Meritor or
Harris II, in which the conduct was obviously persistent and abusive. The
ultimate result of Harris II is that plaintiffs who find themselves in courts
that follow the Sixth Circuit test can now cite Harris IIto overrule the need
for psychological harm and remove the burden of proving any unnecessary
elements.
As an interesting alternative, professor Kathryn Abrams has proposed
two ways to prevent sexual harassment without the need to resort to
litigation.'67 The first is for the EEOC to enforce the guidelines which
provide an avenue for reform that is less adversarial than a full-blown
private action.6s The second is for employers to voluntarily implement
programs to train employees on sexual harassment.'69 This alternative is
more desirable because neither the decree nor the litigation will help
employers or employees understand what conduct caused the injury, nor do
they learn more acceptable forms of conduct.' 0 When courts decide
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Saxton, 10 F.3d at 528.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 529.
167. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1216-19 (1989).
168. Id. at 1216-17.
169. Id. at 1217. Under this model, the employers would create guidelines indicating
what conduct is proper and which is not proper for the workplace. Id. at 1218. Upon
imposing the guidelines, the employer must impress upon the employees that sexual
harassment in the workplace will not be tolerated and corrective measures will be taken. See
id.
170. Abrams, supra note 167, at 1219.
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sexual harassment they confine themselves to rendering the decision, not to
advising the employer or employees on how they should reform their
conduct. It seems that even if plaintiffs make it to court, the judicial
decrees will do little in improving that particular workplace and preventing
the event from recurring, unless employers get actively involved.
V. FUTURE CONCERNS
A. Psychological Harm Element
The Supreme Court in Harris II was attempting to set a standard that
would erase the confusion that was troubling lower courts. The Court said
that plaintiffs need not show they were psychologically injured in order to
state a claim for hostile environment sexual harassment.' This was the
standard enunciated by the Court, but there is no set definition. There still
exists no precise test to determine when someone has been the victim of
hostile environment sexual harassment. Harris II leaves us with no set
number of times the harasser must act; all that is evident is that it must be
more than once. Even after the Supreme Court attempted to clear the air,
there is no definition for how "severe" or "pervasive" the behavior must
be.'72  These are important items because they are vital to a correct
judicial decision. It is likely that lower courts are still going to encounter
problems when trying to apply Harris II. This will be especially true in
cases where the conduct was borderline. When the conduct is clear-cut one
way or the other, the court's decision is simplified. Unfortunately, in most
cases, the decision is not so simple because the conduct was neither
extremely blatant nor was it a mere one time occurrence. It then becomes
important what definition is applied and how much weight the elements are
given. It seems that these types of questions are always going to pervade
this area because of the Court's reluctance to set a test and its desire to
leave it up to lower courts to handle on a case-by-case basis.'73
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia points out that the Harris II
holding leaves lower courts unguided because there is no mention of how
much of each factor is necessary nor is a single factor identified as
determninative." 4 This does not help ease the uncertainty that already
171. Harris II, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. Id. at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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riddles this area of the law. Justice Scalia concurred because he did not
foresee at the time an alternative course other than the one taken by the
Court. 175  It seems the Court took the better approach, not the best
possible solution. He said that in an attempt to set a definite test, the Court
could rely on the factor of unreasonable interference with the employee's
work performance as the absolute test.'76 This would lend some guidance
to lower courts, but by the same token he pointed out that Title VII's
language does not give any indication that such limitation is appropriate."7
Therefore, it seems the answer to what constitutes hostile environment
sexual harassment is far from being fully answered.
A major concern after Harris II is that removing the psychological
harm element will make hostile environment sexual harassment claims easier
to prove. In other words, it will make it too easy for plaintiffs to show they
were harassed.' 8 However, the author submits that Harris II does not
make sexual harassment easier to prove. The Court simply removed an
unnecessary obstacle. Lower courts were requiring this element based on
a misinterpretation of precedent and aggrieved plaintiffs were the ones
paying the price. Under the new standard, the insurmountable obstacles
have been removed which makes it more fair to plaintiffs. 9 Under the
old standard, women who showed appalling behavior by co-workers and
superiors had their cases dismissed nonetheless, for failure to show tangible
psychological harm.' ° Plaintiffs can now prove the essential elements of
the claim without the need for unnecessary obstacles. Plaintiffs must show
that the conduct was severe or pervasive enough that it created a hostile
work environment in which an objective reasonable person would be
offended.' This is already a difficult task in and of itself without adding
to it unnecessary elements.
The elements of the claim will eliminate any frivolous claims.
Plaintiffs still have to make out a prima facie case. This diminishes the
chance that removing the requirement of showing psychological harm will
open the floodgates of litigation in this area. The judicial system cannot
175. Id.
176. Harris If, 114 S. Ct. at 372.
177. Id. Justice Ginsburg took a position similar to Justice Scalia's by stating that "the
adjudicator's inquiry should center, dominantly, on whether the discriminatory conduct has
unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff's work performance." Id. (Ginsburg, J., con-
curring).
178. See Greenhouse, supra note 20, at Al.
179. See Harris 11, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
180. See, e.g., Rabidue II, 805 F.2d at 611.
181. Harris 1R" 114 S. Ct. at 370.
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create unreasonable obstacles for legitimate claims in an effort to keep out
illegitimate ones. The positive aspect is that now plaintiffs with legitimate
claims will not be discouraged from filing their cases; this is exactly what
must occur if Title VII is to have any effect on preventing hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment.
B. The Reasonable Person Standard
The objective reasonable person standard is the standard that has been
used by most courts, and was the one applied by the district court to
determine if in fact Teresa Harris was offended by the conduct of Mr.
Hardy.'82 The conduct must be severe or pervasive enough to create an
objective hostile or abusive work environment--one in which a reasonable
person would be offended.'83 This is the so-called "sex blind" reasonable
person standard. The standard does not take into account the gender of the
person who was offended. This standard is the one most widely used by
judges and juries to determine if parties to a case acted reasonably.'84
The problem in this area of the law is that consistently women are the
plaintiffs and their perspective is not taken into account.'85 Men have
reported experiences with sexual harassment from women, but historically
it has been more common for women to face this behavior in the work-
place. "'86 "[M]uch of the behavior that women find offensive is behavior
that is accepted as normal heterosexual behavior by men."'87 If courts are
not willing to take into account that a plaintiff was offended because she is
a woman, then sexually harassing environments will remain unchanged
because men in male-dominated workplaces find such behavior normal and
acceptable.'88 It has been proposed that "the reasonable person standard
may even work against Title VII's goal of placing women on an equal
footing with men in the workplace."' 89 Some courts have been willing to
reexamine the reasonable person standard and consequently have decided
182. Id. at 369-70.
183. Id. at 370.
184. See Elizabeth A. Glidden, Note, The Emergence of the Reasonable Woman in
Combating Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1825, 1827-28 (1992).
185. See generally Pollack, supra note 48.
186. LILLIAN GLASS, PH.D., HE SAYS, SHE SAYS 208 (1992).
187. See Pollack, supra note 48, at 52.
188. See Glidden, supra note 184, at 1849.
189. See id. at 1839.
Vol. 1 81910
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that it was time for a change.'9
In Ellison v. Brady,'9' the Ninth Circuit decided it would evaluate the
severity and pervasiveness of sexual harassment from the perspective of the
victim.192 The court chose to take this innovative route because "[h]aras-
sers could continue to harass merely because a particular discriminatory
practice was common, and victims of harassment would have no reme-
dy. 193 Men, who are rarely victims of sexual assault, tend to view sexual
conduct without understanding the social setting or underlying threat of
violence perceived by women.'94 The court stated that taking into account
the reasonable woman's view does not establish a higher level of protection
for women than men.'95 A gender-conscious examination enables women
to be equal to men in the workplace by acknowledging the effects of sexual
harassment on a reasonable woman.' This standard will protect employ-
ers from the hypersensitive female employee because it considers only the
view of a reasonable woman.'97
The district and appellate courts judged Teresa Harris based on the
perspective of a reasonable sexless person.' This was the same standard
used by the Sixth Circuit in Rabidue II, which was the precedent the Harris
I court used.' 99 Interestingly, in Rabidue II, Judge Keith espoused in his
dissent the reasonable woman standard2 °0 five years before Ellison was
decided.20 ' He dissented from the majority because he felt that unless a
woman's view was taken, sexual harassment would continue.20 2 Hopefully
190. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Andrews v. City of
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482-83 (3rd Cir. 1990). The discrimination must "detrimen-
tally affect a reasonable person of the same sex" in the position of the plaintiff. Id. at 1482.
Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988); Rabidue II, 805 F.2d at
626 (Keith, J., dissenting) (indicating that women and men are different and the standard
should account for this), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
191. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
192. Id. at 878.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 879.
195. Id.
196. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
197. Id.
198. Harris 1, 1991 WL 487444.
199. Rabidue II, 805 F.2d at 611.
200. Id. at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting). "[U]nless the outlook of the reasonable woman
is adopted, the defendants as well as the courts are permitted to sustain ingrained notions of
reasonable behavior fashioned by the offenders, in this case, men." Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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someday soon, the voice of the minority will become that of the majority.
At the moment, the reasonable woman/reasonable victim standard remains
a minority view. As this area of the law has evolved, it has become evident
that men's and women's perspectives must be considered separately.2 3
The First Circuit, also taking the minority position, made the common
illustration that a male supervisor may believe it is perfectly correct for him
to tell a female subordinate that she has a great figure or nice legs.2 4 The
female may find the comments are not a compliment but offensive
behavior.20 5 The problem is that most men are not aware of how seem-
ingly innocent words, "labels," and terms of endearment may be perceived
as sexist; they simply deem them as a way of interacting.20 6 That is why
if the woman's perspective is not taken into consideration, the comments
will be dismissed as nothing more than a man complimenting a pretty wom-
an. 07 This is so regardless of the fact that the female was truly offended
and these types of sexual comments made her feel inferior and uncomfort-
able. More and more women have grown to resent this sort of behavior as
disrespectful and sexist.2°  This is the sort of behavior Title V11 209 was
designed to prevent and it will continue to surface under the current
reasonable person standard.210
The Supreme Court in Harris II did not consider whether or not it
should change the standard to account for the victim's views.2 1' The
Court only dealt with the issue at hand. t2 Perhaps if Teresa Harris would
have had the benefit of being judged based on a reasonable woman's
203. Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988).
204. Id.
205. Id; see also GLASS, supra note 186, at 210. Many may fail to see the reason
women get upset by being called "honey" or "sweetheart" in the workplace. This stems from
the socially acceptable view that the man is just being friendly. Dr. Glass suggests that terms
of endearment have no place in the workplace because they can easily be misinterpreted as
a sexist comment. Id.
206. GLASS, supra note 186, at 211.
207. Id.
208. In a 1984 study conducted by Newsweek, women were asked if it bothered them
when men referred to them as "girls." Only 34% of the women surveyed reported that they
were annoyed, while 51% said it did not bother them at all. This changed six years later
when in 1990, another survey conducted for Virginia Slims American Women's Poll revealed
that 53% of the women were annoyed (a 19% increase), while 44% were not. Id.
209. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
210. Id.
211. Harris !!, 114 S. Ct. at 368.
212. Id. at 371.
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perspective, she would have prevailed. 13 Even the district judge had to
admit that a reasonable woman would have been offended by the behavior
to which Ms. Harris was exposed.214
The viability of the reasonable woman standard has become a burning
issue, one the Supreme Court will not be able to ignore much longer. As
illustrated above, some lower courts have applied Harris II and have shown
the importance of the change. Realistically, it does not matter how severe
or pervasive the conduct was or whether plaintiffs must show tangible
psychological injury if their viewpoint and feelings are not going to be
accorded the weight they deserve by the court.
C. The First-Amendment
Another major concern which the Supreme Court has not addressed is
whether the federal government is unconstitutionally restricting speech in the
workplace through Title VII. The question that begs to be answered is
whether the Court's recent interpretation of Title VII and the expansion of
hostile environment sexual harassment claims is consistent with the First
Amendment." 5 Professor Kingsley Browne suggests that the definition
given to "hostile work environment" is too broad and for it to be consistent
with the First Amendment it needs to be narrowed.1 6 Some speech may
be regulated on the basis of content if it falls within a recognized exception
to the First Amendment such as defamation, obscenity, or fighting
words. 2 7 Traditionally, if the category of speech does not fall under one
of the recognized exceptions, it is protected.
The First Amendment has been invoked successfully to protect
expression even if it is offensive, harmful, or disagreeable to society.2"8
213. Harris 1, 1991 WL 487444 at *7.
214. Id.
215. See Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment
and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481 (1991).
216. Id.
217. See id. at 484. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983). There is no constitutional value in false statements. Id. at
340. Obscene materials have no First Amendment protection. Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 23 (1973). Fighting words-those which inflict injury or incite breach of peace-are not
protected by the First Amendment. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571
(1942).
218. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). The expression of ideas may not be
prohibited simply because society finds it offensive or disagreeable. An exception to this
principle has not been recognized even when our flag is involved. Id. at 414. "IT]he mere
presumed presence of unwitting listeners or viewers does not serve automatically to justify
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The Supreme Court stated in Pickering v. Board of Education,t 9 that the
"core value" of the First Amendment is "having free and unhindered debate
on matters of public importance.""22 This principle seems to be in direct
collision with the cases that have made hostile environment sexual
harassment actionable under Title VII because the person is held liable for
what he says.22" ' This conflict is also evident in racial discrimination
claims under Title VII.2 22 The Sixth Circuit said:
[T]he law does require that an employer take prompt action to prevent
• . . bigots from expressing their opinions in a way that abuses or
offends their co-workers. By informing people that the expression of
racist or sexist attitudes in public is unacceptable, people may eventually
learn that such views are undesirable in private, as well.22
This shows that courts are willing to restrict what people say in the
workplace.
It can be inferred from the case law that the workplace is sufficiently
different from the street or a social setting to merit a greater degree of
regulation, but courts have never explained the reason for this.224 Harris
curtailing all speech capable of giving offense." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21
(1971). Free speech in our system of government best serves its purpose "when it induces
a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people
to anger." Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). Public expression of ideas
will not be prohibited merely because ideas are offensive to some listeners when they can
simply "avert" their ears. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 916 (1978).
219. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
220. ld at 573.
221. E.g., Harris 11, 114 S. Ct. at 367.
222. Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1110 (1989).
223. Id. at 350.
224. See e.g., Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1987).
"[M]ost complaints of sexual harassment are based on actions which, although they may be
permissible in some settings, are inappropriate in the workplace." Id. at 1561 n. 13. See Doe
v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 863 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (striking the university's
policy prohibiting harassment of students on First Amendment grounds, but suggesting that
"speech which creates a hostile or abusive working environment on the basis of race or sex"
is unprotected); Snell v. Suffolk County, 611 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 782 F.2d
1094 (2d Cir. 1986). Courts do not interfere with what people say or do in their homes or
at social gatherings, but the workplace is different. Id. at 528. See also Robert Post, Free
Speech and Religious, Racial and Sexual Harassment: Racist Speech, Democracy and the
First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 267 (1991). Speech in the workplace does not
1914 Vol. 1 8
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II did not answer this question. The Court placed the case outside the
parameters of the First Amendment by stating: "This standard ... takes a
middle path between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive
and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury. 225
This is the manner in which the First Amendment issue was disposed of by
the Supreme Court. Since the Court refused to allow claims for sexual
harassment based on a mere offensive utterance, the holding is not
inconsistent with the First Amendment.226 This suggests that the conduct
displayed by Mr. Hardy against Ms. Harris and other female employees was
more than just an offensive utterance within the meaning of the First
Amendment. It was behavior that created an abusive and hostile working
environment, undeserving of First Amendment protection.227
Professor Browne notes that the First Amendment is seldom invoked
in these cases, although the defendant is held liable for expressing social and
political ideas.228 Professor Browne suggests that if the First Amendment
is going to be respected, hostile environment claims cannot be based even
partly on protected speech.229 This would mean that a person who brings
a claim based on employer's (or its agent's) inappropriate touching coupled
with posting of pornographic pin-ups on the walls should not be permitted
to introduce the latter into evidence.23 The problem with this proposition
is that to force plaintiffs to base their claims solely on the physical act
would go against the many judicial decisions on sexual harassment that do
not require touching for a successful claim."' The bulk of hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment claims are based on verbal abuse. This demon-
strates the tension between hostile environment claims and the First
generally constitute public discourse because that sort of dialogue would be patently out of
place. Id. at 289.
225. Harris 11, 114 S. Ct. at 370; see also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57 (supporting the
position that a mere utterance of an epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an
employee is not sufficient to implicate Title VII).
226. See id.
227. See Harris 11, 114 S. Ct. at 367.
228. See generally Browne, supra note 215.
229. Id. at 544.
230. Id.
231. E.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiffs must show they
were subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature. Id. at 875. See also
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1490 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(plaintiff was subjected in the workplace to "pictures of women in various stages of undress
and in sexually suggestive or submissive poses, as well as remarks by male employees and
supervisors which demean women").
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Amendment.
Due to the great public importance of the First Amendment issue, it is
likely that the Supreme Court will be confronted with this issue in the near
future. The Court will have to balance all the interests involved. Employ-
ees have the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult232 and employers likewise have the right
to have their workplaces free from this counterproductive behavior. On the
other hand, citizens have the protection of the First Amendment to give their
opinion on matters of pubic concern. Because the First Amendment is
highly valued, this is not going to be an easy decision for the Court, but
Congress has made clear its desire to stop discrimination in the work-
place.233 The author submits that a solution would be for the Court to
make expressions in the workplace which are targeted at a specific person
and are perceived by that person as offensive an exception to First
Amendment protection. If the Court does not resolve this conflict in favor
of sexual harassment, then the legislative and judicial efforts to stop sexual
harassment have been in vain. The harassment will continue and with more
frequency because the harassers will be clothed by the First Amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Harris II seems to be the panacea victims of harassment were waiting
for. Unfortunately, the questions have not been fully answered; if anything,
more questions have been raised. Justice O'Connor said that the Court need
not answer in its opinion all the questions raised by the hostile environment
sexual harassment test.234 This shows that the decision is not going to
solve all present inconsistencies and that sometime soon the Court will be
revisiting the issue. Although the potential remains for a myriad of
questions, the Court did take a positive stand in the struggle to give some
definition to hostile environment sexual harassment claims. Now, plaintiffs
like Teresa Harris will not have to endure a nervous breakdown before they
can prove they were sexually harassed. The Court was not trying to make
sexual harassment easier to prove. It was trying to determine the pertinent
elements of the claim for relief. To do this it reaffirmed Meritor and said
232. Harris II, 114 S. Ct. at 370 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986)).
233. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
234. Harris 1!, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
1916 Vol. 18
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psychological harm was never meant to be an element.235 The Court is
merely giving sexual harassment victims what was theirs in the first place:
the chance to show that abusive behavior created a hostile working
environment.
Litigation is not the best means of preventing sexual harassment. The
EEOC Guidelines seek prevention of sexual harassment as a means of
elimination.236 When litigation ensues it is an after-the-fact event geared
towards redress of the victim. The sexual harassment has already occurred
and plaintiff is obligated to relive what happened by recounting the story in
court. Professor Kathryn Abrams' suggestions on preventing sexual
harassment without litigation are a viable solution to the current problem
and merit consideration.23 The battle for preventing sexual harassment
is not only in the hands of Congress and the judicial system, but more
appropriately, at the root of the problem, the workplace.
These suggestions only illustrate ways sexual harassment can be
prevented without resorting to the courts. When preventive measures are
not in place or they do not function, plaintiffs must turn to the judicial
system for redress. They can expect to find inconsistencies in the courts,
because this is a highly uncertain area. There is no set test, even consider-
ing the Courts efforts in Harris II. The propositions set forth in Justices
Scalia and Ginsburg's concurring opinions do not lend any help at the
moment.23 Perhaps when the Court revisits the issue it will look to the
concurring opinions as an aid to reaching a defined test for hostile
environment sexual harassment claims. Until the Supreme Court takes up
the issue again, let us hope lower courts have enough sense to evaluate all
the factors fairly based on the totality of the circumstances, without adding
any unnecessary burdens, from the perspective of the reasonable victim and
not a sexless reasonable person.
Mary C. Gomez
235. Id. at 370-71.
236. 29 C.FR. § 1604.11(f) (1993).
237. Abrams, supra note 167-70 and accompanying text.
238. Harris I, 114 S. Ct. at 371-72 (Scalia, J., and Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 4, 1988, Stephen Buckley commenced a civil action seeking
damages under Title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code' from the
State's Attorney for DuPage County, Illinois, J. Michael Fitzsimmons and
other governmental officials,2 for allegedly fabricating evidence during the
preliminary investigation of a crime in which Buckley had been implicated.3
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to ihe deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
2. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2609 (1993). In his complaint, Buckley
listed seventeen defendants. Id. Fitzsimmons, the State Attorney for DuPage County, Illinois
at the time of Buckley's indictment, was the lead defendant. Id. The other defendants
included the DuPage County Sheriff, members of the Sheriffs police department, several
prosecutors of the State Attorney's office, two experts who analyzed evidence used against
Buckley, the estate of another expert who analyzed evidence, and DuPage County itself. Id.
3. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 919 F.2d 1230, 1235-36 (7th Cir. 1990). In addition to
seeking damages for the falsification of evidence claim, Buckley also contended that
Fitzsimmons violated his liberty rights by making false statements at a press conference
where it was announced that an indictment had been returned against Buckley.. Id. at 1236.
Buckley's complaint stated that everyone who participated in his prosecution was conspiring
to execute him even though they all knew he was innocent. Id. Buckley believed that
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The action arose out of Buckley's arrest and subsequent prosecution for the
murder of eleven year old Jeanine Nicarico.'
On February 25, 1983, Jeanine was kidnapped from her home in
Naperville, Illinois, when someone kicked in the front door and carried her
away in a blanket.5 The kidnapper drove Jeanine into the country where
he raped and sodomized her.6 The assailant beat her to death and threw her
body in the mud near a country path.7 Jeanine's body was found two days
later, and an intensive investigation commenced under the direction and
responsibility of the Illinois Sheriffs Department and the Illinois State
Attorney's Office.'
During the investigation, the authorities focused their attention on what
they considered to be a key piece of evidence: a bootprint the killer left on
the door of the Nicaricos' home when he kicked in the door.9 At approxi-
mately the same time in the investigation, a man named Alex Hernandez
told Sheriff's detectives that Buckley had been present during a post-murder
conversation in which Buckley discussed the murder of Nicarico.' °
Fitzsimmons wanted to strengthen his popularity for an upcoming election by quickly solving
the Nicarico murder. Id. Buckley also maintained that the press conference violated his
rights because the community turned against him, and his chances of obtaining bail or
receiving a fair trial were diminished. Id. However, this comment will limit its focus to the
falsification of evidence claim and subsequent decisions because the Supreme Court
unanimously decided that Fitzsimmons was not entitled to absolute immunity for those
statements he made at the press conference. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2617-18.
4. Id. at 2609.
5. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1234.
6. Id. The actual account of the crime is that after the kidnapper unsuccessfully
attempted to penetrate Jeanine's vagina, he raped her in the anus. Id.
7. Id. Jeanine's skull was caved in by five blows from either a tire iron or a baseball
bat. Id.
8. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1234.
9. Id.
10. Id. Hernandez was believed to be a mentally disturbed petty thief who was
subsequently arrested and convicted of Jeanine's murder along with Buckley and another man
named Rolando Cruz. Id. Hernandez and Cruz had both admitted to taking part in Jeanine's
abduction but neither confessed to the rape or murder, and both stated that Buckley drove the
car. Id. All three men were arrested and put on trial. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1235. A jury
convicted Hernandez and Cruz of murder, among other charges, and they were sentenced to
death. Id. In 1988, the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the convictions of Cruz and
Hemandez, but in reversing the convictions, the court did not forbid a retrial, concluding that
the evidence was sufficient enough for a jury to find guilt. Id. As a result, Cruz and
Hernandez were retried and Cruz was again found guilty and sentenced to death. Id. The
jury could not reach a verdict regarding Hemandez's guilt or innocence, and his case was
declared a mistrial. Id However, it was announced that the prosecuting attorney would take
1920 Vol. 18
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On the basis of the information supplied by Hernandez, detectives
tracked down Buckley and questioned him about the murder," When
detectives specifically asked Buckley if he owned any boots, he admitted to
having boots with soles similar to the print that was left on the door.12
Buckley's boots were examined by three separate experts who gave three
varying opinions. 3  Confronted with these three differing opinions,
prosecutors asked Louise Robbins, an anthropology professor at the
University of North Carolina at Greensboro, to analyze the boots and the
bootprint." Robbins affirmatively concluded that Buckley's boots made
the marks on the Nicarico's door.' Additional pieces of evidence linking
Buckley to the crime were two eyewitnesses; one placed Buckley at the
scene of the abduction and another placed him at the scene of the mur-
der.16
Prosecutors convened a special grand jury for the sole purpose of
investigating the murder. Ten months later, Fitzsimmons announced
Buckley's indictment at a news conference with the basis for the indictment
being Louise Robbins' testimony. 17 Buckley was eventually arrested, and
Hemandez to a third trial. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1235.
11. Id. at 1234. Buckley steadfastly maintained his innocence as to any involvement in
the murder throughout the entire proceedings. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. The boots were first examined by John Gorayczyk who was the head of the
identification section in the DuPage County crime laboratory. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1234.
He concluded that although the soles of the boots and the bootprint were the same, Buckley's
boots did not match the bootprint because the heels were a "little" different. Id. The boots
were next analyzed by Edward German, a forensic scientist in the Illinois Crime laboratory.
Id. He determined that Buckley's boots "could have at best" made the bootprint. Id.
Prosecutors then asked Robert Olsen of the Kansas Bureau of Identification to examine the
boots, and he concluded that Buckley's boot "probably" matched the marks on the door. Id.
14. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1234. The use of Louise Robbins as an expert was considered
to be controversial as she was thought to be an unreliable scientific evidence expert by other
forensic scientists due to continuing accusations against her alleging that she was willing to
fabricate her testimony. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2610.
15. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1234. During later testimony, Robbins stated that she could
identify the wearer of a shoe with certainty even if she only had the prints made with
different shoes. Id.
16. Id. Both eyewitnesses, one who was near the Nicarico's house and the other who
was near the muddy path where Jeanine's body was found, stated that they were positive they
saw Buckley driving a green Ford Granada leaving the neighborhood at the time of the
abduction and arriving at the path near the time of the murder. Id.
17. Buckle)', 113 S. Ct. at 2610-11. Buckley stated in his claim that Fitzsimmons
convened this special grand jury to bolster his campaign and to specifically secure an
indictment against him. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1236.
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his bond was set at three million dollars. 8 Buckley, unable to meet the
bond, remained incarcerated for three years.' 9
At Buckley's first trial, Louise Robbins' testimony about the bootprint
evidence provided the foundation of the prosecution's case against Buckley;
however, the jury was unable to reach a verdict, and the judge declared a
mistrial. 20 The State decided to retry Buckley, but before the retrial began,
Louise Robbins died.2' As a result, the charges against Buckley were
dismissed, and he was released in March of 1987 after three years of
incarceration.22
In 1988, Buckley filed suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, claiming that
virtually everyone involved with the arrest, investigation, and subsequent
malicious prosecution should pay damages because his constitutional right
to liberty was violated by their actions. 3 The theory of Buckley's case
was that to obtain the indictment against him, the prosecutors fabricated
evidence when they obtained Robbins' opinion about the bootprint
evidence. 4 Fitzsimmons moved to dismiss Buckley's action based on a
claim of absolute immunity.2
In addition, Buckley maintains that the announcement of his indictment by Fitzsimmons
to the press violated his right to liberty because the community turned against him, thereby
diminishing his chances of obtaining bail or receiving a fair trial. Id.
18. Buckley, 113 S. Ct: at 2611.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1235. During the two years between the first trial and the
second trial, Buckley remained in prison. In addition, as preparations were being made for
Buckley's retrial, a man named Brian Dugan who had recently been arrested for the
kidnapping, molestation, and murder of a seven year old girl, confessed to Jeanine's murder;
however, prosecutors in DuPage County determined that the confession was unreliable. Id.
22. Id. The prosecution found themselves in a bind because no other expert was willing
to testify that the bootprint evidence positively confirmed Buckley's guilt. Id.
23. Id.
24. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2610. Buckley's contention is that the prosecutors
manufactured false evidence linking Buckley's boot to the bootprint by shopping around for
experts until they found one who would provide them with the opinion they wanted. Id. at
2615.
25. Id. at 2611. Immunity is defined as the "freedom or exemption from a charge, duty,
obligation . . . penalty ... as granted by law to a person or class of persons," and as "a
freedom granted to a special category of persons from the normal burdens and duties arising
out of a legal relationship with other persons." WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1130-31 (15th ed. 1971) (emphasis added).
The importance of the immunity concept in this scenario rests on its implications at the
procedural level. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976). Absolute immunity
defeats a suit at the outset, provided the official's actions were within the scope of the
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The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division, held that the prosecutors were entitled to absolute immunity with
respect to the claim based on the alleged fabrication of evidence. 6 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed,
holding that the prosecutors had absolute immunity." The court concluded
that the fabricated evidence could have only caused injury at the judicial
phase, and therefore, the prosecutors were entitled to, and protected by,
absolute prosecutorial immunity. 2 The court reasoned that conversations
between the prosecutors and the bootprint evidence expert may not be the
foundation of liability because the out-of-court evaluation of evidence from
an expert witness causes no injury independent from that which transpires
in the courtroom. 29  Thus, "[p]rosecutors whose out-of-court acts cause
injury only to the extent a case proceeds will be brought to heel adequately
by the court,"30 and the defendant who has suffered the injury must rely
on the pending court to protect his interests." Buckley appealed the
decision to the United States Supreme Court and the Court granted his
immunity. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320-22 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232, 238-39 (1974). However, an official with qualified immunity must depend upon
the circumstances and motivations of his actions, as established at trial, to determine whether
he is liable for the claims against him. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 239. Under this form of
immunity, government officials are not subject to damages liability for the performance of
their duties when their actions do not "violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982).
26. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2611. The district court stated that absolute immunity should
be extended to the prosecutors effort to link the bootprint evidence to Buckley because that
act was in the nature of evaluating evidence for the purpose of initiating a criminal
proceeding. Id. The court further stated that the concept of absolute immunity covers the
entire investigation of a case which includes meetings with witnesses, presentation of
evidence to a grand jury, and the decision on whether or not to prosecute. Buckley, 919 F.2d
at 1243.
27. Id. at 1244. However, the court of appeals reversed the district court, and ruled that
the prosecutors were also entitled to the protection of absolute immunity with regard to the
press statements. Id. at 1242.
28. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2611.
29. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1243-44.
30. Id. at 1242.
31. Id. at 1:241. In addition to looking to the court to protect the defendant's interests,
in this scenario, the defendant also has the opportunity to utilize his own expert witnesses at
trial to rebut the expert testimony presented by the prosecution.
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petition for certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for
further proceedings.32
On remand, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its
decision.33 Buckley again appealed the court's decision, claiming that
absolute prosecutorial immunity only applies to the act of initiating the
prosecution and to acts that occur inside the courtroom during the presenta-
tion of the State's case.34 The Supreme Court once again granted certiorari
and reversed the court of appeals decision, holding that the prosecutors were
not entitled to absolute immunity,35 thereby allowing Buckley to seek
damages from the prosecutor for the alleged falsification of evidence.
This comment will focus on the potential harmful ramifications this
decision will have, as well as the contradictory nature of the decision itself.
Part II will discuss the doctrine of immunity, from the immunity granted to
those officials from common law liability, to the immunity afforded
governmental officials under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Part III will
specifically examine the historical development of prosecutorial immunity,
from the common law tradition of prosecutorial immunity, to a survey of the
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals' handling of the prosecutorial immunity
issues, and finally to Supreme Court precedent dealing with the issue of
prosecutorial immunity. Part IV will focus on the reasoning the Supreme
Court proffered in its holding in Buckley. Part V will criticize the
majority's decision in light of previous Supreme Court decisions which
clearly indicate that the prosecutors' actions in Buckley should have been
afforded the protection of absolute prosecutorial immunity. Furthermore,
this part will discuss the possible effects and harmful ramifications Buckley
will have on prosecutors and the public. Part VI will conclude that absolute
immunity should have been afforded to the prosecutors in Buckley in light
of the historical, common law, and case law support for extending absolute
immunity to those acts undertaken by the prosecutors.
32. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2612. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of
appeals in light of their recent decision in Bums v. Reed, I I I S. Ct. 1934 (1991). Burns,
discussed more in depth later in this comment, dealt with absolute prosecutorial immunity and
was decided after the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had already rendered its decision.
See infra pp. 1932-33 and note 95.
33. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 952 F.2d 965 (7th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The court held
that Burns did not undermine its initial decision that prosecutors are absolutely immune for
"normal preparatory steps." Id. at 966.
34. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2615, 2620.
35. Id. at 2612. The Court limited its inquiry to the issue of prosecutorial immunity in
regard to the bootprint evidence and the statements made to the press. See supra note 3.
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II. DOCTRINE OF IMMUNITY
Courts have granted immunity from liability to certain classes of federal
and state officials based on their status as government officials. This
immunity is based principally on the special status of the defendant as a
government entity, and is grounded in the belief that even though the
defendant may have committed a wrong, there exist greater social concerns
that mandate the defendant escape liability.36
When a court grants immunity to an official, it does not deny that a tort
exists. It deems that the defendant may not be subjected to a suit for the
alleged wrong based solely on the defendant's function as a government
official."
The courts recognize two types of immunity: absolute and qualified.3"
An official who has been granted absolute immunity is not subject to a tort
action provided his actions are deemed to be within the scope of his duties
as a government official, even if his actions are intentional or malicious.39
However, an official with qualified immunity is immune from liability if his
actions are within the scope of his authority and are performed in good
faith.40
The doctrine of immunity from common law liability is well settled and
firmly establishes thatjudicial officers acting within the scope of their duties
are immune from liability.4' The grant of absolute immunity to judges, 42
36. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at
1032 (5th ed. 1984).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D (1979).
38. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807-08 (1982). The Court noted that
"[olur decisions have recognized immunity defenses of two kinds:" absolute and qualified.
Id. at 807. The Court went on to state that absolute immunity applies to those officials
whose status requires "complete protection from suit" and that qualified immunity is the
normal standard for executive officials in general. Id.
39. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 418 n.12.
40. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247-48 (however, in Harlow, the Court modifies this standard
with regards to actions arising under 42 U.S.C. section 1983).
41. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 418, 424. The common law tradition of affording absolute
immunity to prosecutors for acts committed within the scope of their duties was found to be
preserved in claims brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, 554-55 (1967).
42. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423 n.20. The Supreme Court accepted the rule of judicial
immunity in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871). The Court has since described the grant
of judicial immunity as follows:
Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity
of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial
jurisdiction, as this Court recognized when it adopted the doctrine, in Bradley
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grand jurors,43 and prosecutors," for acts within the scope of their official
capacities has roots extending to the earliest days of the common law.
Courts have recognized these types of immunities to protect the public
interest by allowing those officials who were immune from liability to
perform their duties without the fear of retaliatory lawsuits.45
Under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, government officials acting under the
color of state law may be held personally liable for acts that deprive any
person of constitutionally protected rights.46 On its face, section 1983
grants no immunities.47 However, the United States Supreme Court has
held that certain government officials performing certain functions should
be afforded immunity from liability under section 1983 suits.4" The Court
has further held that it is the function the government official performed, not
his status, which determines whether an immunity defense is available to
that official. 9
A government official may be granted the defense of absolute
immunity and thereby be shielded from a section 1983 action if the
official's function passes the standard set forth by the Supreme Court.50
The Court states that "where the immunity claimed by the defendant was
well established at the common law at the time § 1983 was enacted, where
its rationale was compatible with the purposes of the Civil Rights Act, we
have construed the statute to incorporate that immunity."'" Therefore, if
the official's function satisfies that standard, it will be "incorporated" into
section 1983, and the official can successfully claim the defense of absolute
immunity.52 Accordingly, the Court has recognized absolute immunity
v. Fisher. This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting
maliciously and corruptly, and it "is not for the protection or benefit of a
malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interests it
is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with indepen-
dence and without fear of consequences."
Pierson, 386 U.S. at 553-54 (quoting Bradley, 80 U.S. at 355).
43. Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65 (1880).
44. Griffith v. Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001 (Ind. 1896).
45. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 418 n.12.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
47. Id.
48. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
49. Forrestor v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 342
(1983); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-13 (1978).
50. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980).
51. Id.
52. Id.
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from section 1983 suits for judges,53 witnesses,54 and prosecutors. 5' The
Court has reasoned that the same underlying justifications mandating
absolute immunity from liability in common law tort suits also apply to
section 1983 actions.56
The majority of cases regarding government official's immunity from
section 1983 liability have involved prosecutors and other officials with
functions that the courts have designated as "quasi-judicial.""57 The Court
stated that it is the "functional comparability of their judgments to those of
the judge that has resulted in both grand jurors and prosecutors being
" 58referred to as 'quasi-judicial' officers....
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY
The common law immunity of a prosecutor is derived from the same
considerations that form the common law grant of immunity to judicial
officers acting within the scope of their duties.59 One reason is a prose-
cutor's concern about harassment from retaliatory lawsuits that would inhibit
prosecutors from utilizing their lawyering skills to fully perform their
duties.6" This recognition that the common law tradition of judicial
immunity is extended to prosecutors ensures that prosecutors do not have to
be intimidated by the threat of civil litigation. Furthermore, it guarantees
that a prosecutor can retain and exercise the "independence of judgment
required by his public trust."6! In addition, judicial immunity extends to
prosecutors because prosecutors, like judges, are integrally involved in the
53. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554. The Court determined that judicial immunity is essential
to protect the judicial process and is therefore preserved under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Id.
54. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 325. The Court reasoned there was nothing in the legislative
history of section 1983 that indicated an intention to abrogate common law witness immunity.
Id.
55. See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554-55. The Court determined the common law tradition
of affording absolute immunity to prosecutors for acts committed within the scope of their
duties was found to be preserved in claims brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. See id.
56. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 418. The Court stated that "[section] 1983 is to be read in
harmony with general principals of tort immunities and defenses rather that in derogation of
them." Id.
57. Id. at 423 n.20.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 422-23.
60. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423.
61. Id.
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judicial process and also exercise discretionary judgment on the basis of
evidence presented to them.62
In light of the immunity historically granted to prosecutors at common
law, as well as the policy interests supporting prosecutorial immunity, state
prosecutors have been deemed to be absolutely immune from liability under
42 U.S.C. section 1983 for their conduct in commencing prosecutorial
proceedings and in presenting the State's case,6" as long as that conduct is
"intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process."64
Yet, before the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Buckley, the
question of whether absolute immunity protected certain preparatory actions
undertaken by a prosecutor before an indictment had been filed had
remained unanswered.65 The United States Courts of Appeal have declined
to establish a "bright line" test based on the commencement of judicial
proceedings, and have applied absolute immunity to several acts that
prosecutors perform, including those that have occurred prior to an
indictment.
66
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has divided the pre-
litigation actions of prosecutors into two categories. 67 The first category
involves those acts considered to be of a police nature and includes the
supervision of and participation with law enforcement agencies in acquiring
evidence that might be used during a prosecution. 6' Therefore, those
officials whose acts fall into this category would only be entitled to qualified
immunity. 69  The second category, categorized as prosecutorial in nature,
involves the organization, evaluation, and supervision of evidence that will
enable the prosecutor to decide whether or not to commence with judicial
proceedings.70 Accordingly, these functions qualify for absolute immuni-
ty.71 The Second Circuit has also extended absolute immunity to a
62. Id. at n.20. The Court notes it is this functional comparison of a prosecutor's
discretionary judgment to that of judges that has resulted in prosecutors being labeled as
"quasi-judicial" officers, and the immunity they are entitled to is also referred to in those
terms. Id.
63. Id. at 431.
64. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430.
65. Id. at 431 n.33.
66. See, e.g., Barbera v. Smith, 836 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1987); Powers v. Coe, 728
F.2d 97, 104 (2d Cir. 1984).
67. Barbera, 836 F.2d at 100.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id
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prosecutor's actions during the plea bargaining stage of a proceeding despite
misrepresentations by the prosecutor of certain facts.72
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that providing
advice to law enforcement officials concerning the existence of probable
cause and the legality of subsequent arrests is within the protected scope of
prosecutorial immunity.73 Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit has held that
commencing proceedings to terminate parental rights without notice to the
natural father is protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity.7" Addition-
ally, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has established that the act
of intimidating a plaintiff by continuing prosecutorial proceedings against
him unless he agreed to dismiss a damage suit he had filed against a
prosecutor was a protected prosecutorial function.7"
The United States Courts of Appeal have also established that the
prosecution's pre-indictment securing of evidence, whether through the
interrogation of witnesses or through other means, qualifies for absolute
immunity because these acts are essential to the prosecutorial functions of
pre-trial preparation.76 Specifically, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has held that a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity when the
coercion of false testimony leads to an indictment.77 The court reasoned
that the same injurious result from the decision to prosecute must flow from
the initiation of the criminal proceedings.7" The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit has stated that the interviewing of witnesses by prosecutors
72. Taylor v. Kavanaugh, 640 F.2d 450, 453 (2d Cir. 1981). In Taylor, the prosecutor
lied to the defendant and to the court during the plea bargaining phase of the judicial
proceedings, stating that an indictment had been returned by the grand jury when no such
indictment had been handed down. Id. at 45 1. The state attorney during this plea bargaining
stage also reneged on a promise he had made to the defendant that he would not make a
recommendation relating to the sentence to be imposed. Id.
73. Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1446 (8th Cir. 1987).
74. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1285 (8th Cir. 1980). In Martin, a man who
had been arrested for the murder of his wife sought damages from a variety of governmental
officials, including the District Attorney, claiming that he had not been given adequate notice
of the termination proceedings and accordingly, had been deprived of due process. Id. The
court stated that the claim against the District Attorney was barred by absolute immunity
because the acts complained of occurred as part of the initiation and prosecution of the
State's case. Id.
75. McGruder v. Necaise, 733 F.2d 1146, 1148 (5th Cir. 1984).
76. Myers, 810 F.2d at 1446; Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981).
77. Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,449 U.S. 861 (1980).
78. Id.
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before presenting their testimony to a grand jury, is also protected by
absolute immunity.79
In addition, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has similarly
established that the act of conferring with a potential witness for the
determination of whether or not to file charges is entitled to absolute
immunity. 0 Finally, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has
determined that certain case preparation that is deemed "investigative" can
be regarded as a necessary part of the prosecutorial function and thus
qualifies for absolute immunity protection.8'
Supreme Court precedent has firmly established that the principles for
determining whether certain actions of government officials are entitled to
immunity have their basis in historical practice, and have resulted in a
functional approach test being applied to determine whether or not immunity
should be afforded to those actions.82 The Court has stated that the
"immunity analysis rests on functional categories, not on the status of the
defendant." 3 The various functions that the prosecutor must perform in
his role as advocate for the State are the essence of the functional ap-
proach. 4 Yet, prior to the Buckley decision, the Supreme Court has only
79. Cook v. Houston Post, 616 F.2d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 1980).
80. Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1127 (1985). The court reasoned that the act of conferring with witnesses for this purpose
is necessary for the preparation for trial. Id.
81. Atkins v. Lanning, 556 F.2d 485, 488 (10th Cir. 1977).
82. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2620; Burns, I I I S. Ct. at 1935; Forrester,484 U.S. at 224;
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1986); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 201
(1985); Briscoe,460 U.S. at 342; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 810; Butz, 438 U.S. at 511-13; Imbler,
424 U.S. at 420-25.
83. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 342.
84. Note, Delimiting the Scope of Prosecutorial Immunity From Section 1983 Damage
Suits, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 173, 187 (1977). The note goes on to state that a prosecutor's
duties can be divided into seven general categories: 1) Quasi-judicial or prosecutorial duties,
considered to be the most important duties, include decisions on whether or not to prosecute;
2) Executive or administrative duties that consist mostly of office duties; 3) Investigatory
duties, similar to those undertaken by the police, may include the gathering of evidence and
being involved in the investigation of criminal activities; 4) Ministerial duties include those
matters in which a prosecutor cannot exercise his own discretionary judgment, such as
complying with court orders; 5) Advisory acts include the giving of advice to other
governmental officials and providing legal opinions; 6) Official public duties can comprise
a vast scope of activities that can range from attending public activities, making speeches, and
testifying at public hearings; and 7) Individual acts include job-related activities, like
campaigning, as well as those acts that are strictly personal in nature. Id at 187-88. The
functional approach only extends absolute prosecutorial immunity to those acts falling under
the quasi-judicial category. Id. at 188.
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had two opportunities to utilize the functional approach test to specifically
address the liability of prosecutors in a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C.
section 1983."
In Imbhr v. Pachtman,86 the Supreme Court first established that a
prosecutor is absolutely immune from a civil suit for damages under 42
U.S.C. section 1983 for alleged deprivation of an accused's constitutional
rights.87 In Imbler, the Court held that a state prosecuting attorney is
absolutely immune from liability in "initiating a prosecution and in
presenting the State's case.""8  The Court focused upon the functional
nature of a prosecutor's activities rather than his status as a prosecutor, and
stated that those activities which are "intimately associated with the judicial
phase of the criminal process" are the type of functions that absolute
immunity should apply to with full force.89 The Court reasoned that
although this immunity would leave the "genuinely wronged" criminal
85. However, the first American case to address the question of a prosecutor's immunity
to a suit for malicious prosecution was Griffith v. Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001 (Ind. 1896).
Despite allegations of malice, the Supreme Court of Indiana dismissed the action on the
ground that the prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity. Id. at 1002.
86. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
87. Id. at 409. In Imbler, the petitioner was charged with murdering the owner of a Los
Angeles market. Id. at 411. The State's case against Imbler consisted of identification
testimony from three men who claimed to have seen the victim's assailants fleeing the scene
and eyewitness testimony from the victim's wife. Id. Imbler was eventually convicted of
the murder and sentenced to death. Id. at 412.
After the Supreme Court of California refused to overturn the conviction, the man who
had prosecuted Imbler, the respondent in the case, wrote to the governor of California
claiming that he, along with a state correctional investigator, had discovered new evidence
after the trial had been completed. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 412. The new evidence consisted of
corroborating witnesses for Imbler's alibi, as well as indications that one of the prime
witnesses was less than trustworthy. Id. It was also noted that leads to some of this
information had been available before trial but had not been developed. Id. at 412-13.
Imbler then obtained his release from prison through federal habeas corpus proceedings when
it was determined that the prosecuting attorney had knowingly used false testimony and
suppressed evidence that was favorable to the defendant. Id. at 413-15.
After several unsuccessful appeals by the state, Imbler filed suit under 42 U.S.C.
section 1983, alleging that prosecutor Pachtman and other governmental officials unlawfully
conspired among themselves to deprive Imbler of his liberty. Id. at 416. The basis of
Imbler's complaint was that the prosecutor had intentionally and negligently allowed false
testimony to be given. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 416.
The district court held that the prosecutor was absolutely immune from liability, and
the court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 414-16.
88. Id. at 431.
89. Id. at 430.
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defendant without any type of civil action against the prosecutor whose
improper actions deprived him of his liberty, the alternative of only
affording a prosecutor the protection of qualified immunity would "prevent
the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor's duty that is
essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system." 9
The Court, however, did not attempt to draw a line between those
functions that a prosecutor undertakes in his preparation for the initiation of
the criminal process and for trial and those functions that require a
prosecutor to act as an administrator rather than as an officer of the court.9'
The Court recognized that the duties of the prosecutor in his role as
advocate for the State "involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a
prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom." 92 As a result, the Court
left the door open for further debate as to what prosecutorial acts would fall
under the broad categorization of allowing absolute prosecutorial immunity
for "initiating [and pursuing] a [criminal] prosecution" 93 and "presenting
the State's case.
94
In 1991, the Court revisited the issue of prosecutorial immunity in
Burns v. Reed.9 The Burns Court applied the "functional" test analysis of
90. Id. at 427-28.
91. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33.
92. Id. The court noted that preparation for both the initiation of the criminal process
and for a trial may require the obtaining, reviewing, and evaluating of evidence. Id.
93. Id. at 43 1.
94. Id
95. 111 S. Ct. 1934 (1991). In Burns, petitioner Cathy Bums had called the police to
report that an assailant had entered her house, knocked her unconscious, and shot and
wounded her two sons. Id. at 1937. Bums eventually became the prime suspect, even
though she passed a lie-detector test and repeatedly denied any involvement in the attack.
Id. It was then suspected that Bums had multiple personalities, one of whom had perpetrated
the attack on her sons. Id.
The police sought the advice of state prosecutor Reed to see if it would be a
permissible investigative technique to hypnotize Bums to determine if she did suffer from
multiple personalities, and if so, to elicit if one of the personalities was the assailant. Id
While Burns was hypnotized she referred both to herself and to the assailant as "Katie."
Burns, I I I S. Ct. at 1937. The police regarded this as support for their multiple personality
theory, and once again sought the advice of the state prosecutor for a probable cause
determination, who told them that they "probably had probable cause" to arrest her. Id. On
the basis of this assurance, Bums was arrested. Id.
During a subsequent probable cause hearing, one of the officers testified, in response
to prosecutor's Reed's questions, that Burns had confessed to the attack; however, neither the
officer, nor Reed, informed the judge that the confession was obtained while Bums was under
hypnosis. Id. Bums was ultimately charged with attempted murder, but she successfully
moved to suppress the statements elicited while she was under hypnosis, and the charges were
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Imbler to further define the scope of absolute prosecutorial immunity.96
The Court held that a state prosecuting attorney is absolutely immune from
liability for damages for his appearance as an advocate for the State during
a probable cause hearing, where the prosecutor examined a witness and
successfully supported the search warrant application. 97
The Court found support for this grant of absolute immunity both in the
common law and in the policy concerns stated in Imbler.9" The Court
reasoned that the prosecutor's appearance before the judge and the
presentation of evidence in support of an application for a search warrant
"clearly involves the prosecutor's role as advocate for the State."99
However, the Court also held that absolute immunity from liability for
damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 did not apply to the prosecutor's act
of giving legal advice to the police."'0 The Court noted that there was no
historical or common law support for extending absolute immunity to such
actions.'0 ' The Court explained the risk of vexatious litigation was not
present for this act because a defendant is not likely to be aware of the
prosecutor's role in giving advice as compared to a prosecutor's role in
initiating and conducting a prosecution.' "Absolute immunity is de-
signed to free the judicial process from the harassment and intimidation
associated with litigation.' 03  Therefore, only those actions that are related
to the prosecutor's role in the judicial process justify the protection of
absolute prosecutorial immunity.'0 4
dropped. Id. 'Bums then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 seeking compensatory
damages for the alleged violations of her Constitutional rights. Burns, I I I S. Ct. at 1937.
The district court granted Reed a directed verdict, and the court of appeals affirmed,
holding that prosecutor Reed was absolutely immune from liability for giving legal advice
to the police and for his conduct at the probable cause hearing. Id. at 1937-38.
96. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2614.
97. Burns, III S. Ct. at 1940.
98. Id. at 1941. The Court noted that the "duties of the prosecutor in his functional role
as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution." Id.
(quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. 431 n.33 (1976)).
99. Burns, III S. Ct. at 1942.
100. Id. at 1944-45. Prosecutor Reed advised the police that they could question Bums
while under hypnosis to try to asses whether she possessed multiple personalities and to
determine if one of those personalities was the assailant. Id. at 1937.
101. Id. at 1942.
102. Id. at 1943.
103. Burns, I I S. Ct. at 1943.
104. Id.
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IV. THE BUCKLEY DECISION
In 1993, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to define and further
specify what prosecutorial actions are protected under the umbrella of
absolute immunity. In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,"5 the Court, in a five to
four decision, narrowly held that prosecutors may be sued for damages
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for their participation in the investigative
stage of a criminal case." 6 Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the
majority, stated that the prosecutors' actions in trying to determine whether
the bootprint had been made by the petitioner's foot was investigative in
character and therefore was not protected by absolute immunity." 7 The
Court noted that their decision in Burns clarified the principle that "[a]
prosecutor's administrative duties and those investigatory functions that do
not relate to an advocate's preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or
for judicial proceedings are not entitled to absolute immunity.'10 8
However, the Court also reiterated the well established principle that
those prosecutorial acts which are in preparation for trial or for the com-
mencement of judicial proceedings and occur in the prosecutor's role as
advocate for the State are entitled to absolute immunity.'0 9 The Court
further noted that those acts which are entitled to the protection of absolute
immunity must include "the professional evaluation of the evidence
assembled by the police" and any other preparations undertaken for
presentation at trial or before a grand jury."0 Yet, instead of recognizing
that the evaluation of the bootprint evidence fell under the protection of
absolute immunity, the Court chose to compare the actions of the prosecutor
to that of a detective searching for clues and corroboration that might give
him probable cause to recommend an arrest."' The Court, by classifying
the prosecutor's actions of having the bootprint evidence examined by an
expert witness as that of a detective "searching for clues," had no choice but
105. 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993).
106. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2617.
107. Id. at 2616-17.
108. Id. at 2615.
109. Id.
110. Id. (emphasis added). It is important to note that it was the police, not the
prosecutors, who acquired the bootprint evidence. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1234. Accordingly,
the opinion rendered by Louise Robbins should have been regarded as evaluative, not
investigative, because the steps undertaken by the prosecutors in eliciting the testimony of
the forensic experts, and specifically Louise Robbins, was to evaluate and determine if
Buckley had made the bootprint. See discussion infra pp. 1936-38.
111. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2616.
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to determine that the prosecutors were only entitled to qualified immuni-
ty." 2 It was this classification where the Court made its error.
The Buckley Court also drew the distinction between evaluating
evidence and interviewing witnesses in preparation for trial, which are
advocacy functions, and participating in an investigation for evidence that
could provide probable cause for an arrest, which is an investigative
function."' The Court, in utilizing this distinction, determined that the
alleged manufacture of evidence was part investigatory in nature because the
prosecutors' actions involving the bootprint evidence occurred before the
prosecutors claimed to have probable cause to arrest Buckley or to initiate
judicial proceedings against him." 4 The Court went on to state that "[a]
prosecutor neither is, nor should consider himself to be, an advocate before
he has probable cause to have anyone arrested."'"1
5
However, the Court quickly retreated from what appeared to be a
"bright line" test of distinguishing activities before and after the probable
cause determination. The Court noted that "a determination of probable
cause does not guarantee a prosecutor absolute immunity from liability for
all actions taken afterwards.""' 6
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BUCKLEY DECISION
As previously indicated, Supreme Court precedent has created a
standard that, allows prosecutors to remain absolutely immune from a suit
seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for actions a prosecutor
undertakes in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case at
trial." 7 The Court has also acknowledged that because the "duties of the
prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary
to the initiation of a prosecution" and involve actions that take place outside
112. Id. Since a detective or a law enforcement agent would only be entitled to
qualified immunity, a prosecutor whose actions are comparable to those that a detective
would perform should only be afforded the same type of immunity because the focus is on
the functional nature of the actions, not on the status of the defendant. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2616.
116. Id. al: n.5.
117. Burns, Ill S. Ct. at 1934; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409. See discussion supra p. 1930-
1994] 1935
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of the courtroom, the protection of absolute immunity should also apply to
those actions.8
Accordingly, state prosecutors' attempts to link the bootprint evidence
to Buckley should be described as actions undertaken in preparation for trial.
In Buckley, Justice Anthony Kennedy's dissent emphasizes that "the decision
to use a witness" during any phase of the prosecution, "must be insulated
from liability."" 9 He further explained that this decision should not be
hampered by the damaging effects of a potential lawsuit. 20
Justice Kennedy notes how the bootprint evidence was a critical part
of the prosecution's case and that the consultations with the various experts
are "best viewed as a step to ensure the bootprint's admission into evidence
and to bolster its probative value in the eyes of the jury."'' Therefore,
the prosecutors' actions in obtaining, reviewing, and ultimately utilizing the
expert witness testimony should have been regarded as a function of the
prosecutor in his duties as an advocate for the State.'22
The majority's categorization of the prosecution's attempt to link the
bootprint evidence to Buckley through the use of an expert witness as
investigative in nature is incorrect when a careful look at the chronological
order of events is taken. According to the allegations, Buckley was first
implicated in the crime by Alex Hemandez.'23 This initial connection to
the crime was independent of the bootprint evidence. 24  Therefore, it
could be argued that the purpose of the development of the bootprint
evidence was to corroborate the information supplied by Hernandez.'25
The focus then becomes whether the prosecutors' attempt to obtain evidence
linking Buckley to the bootprint was to acquire evidence or to evaluate the
quality of the evidence already obtained. The bootprint evidence and the
implication by Hernandez were both acquired before the State Attorney's
office consulted with Louise Robbins to try to identify the evidence
118. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33 (emphasis added).
119. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2621 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 2621-22.
121. Id. at 2621.
122. Id. Justice Kennedy reiterates this point by quoting Imbler. He writes, "actions
in 'obtaining, reviewing, and evaluating' witness testimony . . . are a classic function of
the prosecutor." Id. (citations omitted).
123. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1234.
124. Id. Hernandez stated that he, along with Buckley, was present at a conversation
where the murder of Jeanine Nicarico was discussed. Id. There was never any mention of
the bootprint evidence. See id
125. This point is all the more realistic when it is noted that Hernandez was known to
be mentally disturbed and to have a criminal history of committing petty crimes. Id.
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positively.' 26 As a result, this attempt to identify the bootprint evidence
should have been classified as evaluative in nature and afforded the full
protection of absolute immunity. 27
The majority opinion is additionally flawed due to the fact that the
analysis proffered by the Court in its decision has the potential for diluting
the standard set forth in Imbler and Burns into nothing more than a mere
pleading rule. 2 ' If preparatory actions, like the ones undertaken by the
prosecutors in Buckley, are unprotected by absolute immunity, any criminal
defendant can institute civil proceedings against the prosecutor by simply
reframing a claim to attack the preparatory actions instead of those
prosecutorial actions that are protected by absolute immunity. 29 Allowing
the protection of absolute immunity to be avoided simply through a pleading
mechanism circumvents the protection that the Court found necessary to
establish in hnbler and Burns.3 '
This reasoning stems from the fact that almost every action which takes
place inside the courtroom requires timely and intensive preparatory
measures that have taken place outside of the courtroom. These out-of-court
measures include "substantial and necessary out-of-court conduct by the
prosecutor in evaluating the evidence and preparing for its introduction [at
trial]."'' Justice Kennedy referred to this reasoning as even more funda-
mental than that stated by the Court for rejecting Buckley's argument that
Imbler only applies to in-court conduct and to the commencement of a
prosecution. 112
In addition, the Supreme Court has looked to historical and common
law support as one of the factors needed for extending the protection of
absolute immunity to certain prosecutorial actions."' The common law
126. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1234.
127. This theory was not proffered by Justice Kennedy in his dissent, but it is indicative
of his attempt to show that consultations with expert witnesses at every stage of a judicial
proceeding should be viewed as evaluative in nature and ultimately as preparation for trial.
See Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2620-25 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 2620-21.
129. Id. at 2621; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.34.
130. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2621.
131. Id.
132. Id. The majority rejected Buckley's claim that the protection of absolute immunity
for a prosecutor's conduct in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case "only
extend[s] to the act of initiation itself and to conduct occurring in the courtroom." Id. at
2615.
133. Burns., Ill S. Ct. at 1941-42. In Burns, the Court refused to grant absolute
immunity to a prosecutor's act of giving advice to the police because neither the prosecutor
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immunized a prosecutor, like other lawyers, from civil liability for eliciting
false or defamatory testimony from witnesses.'34 Therefore, in light of
this common law support, the prosecutors in Buckley, by eliciting the
testimony from Louise Robbins, even if it was false, should have been
afforded absolute immunity for their alleged acts of falsifying evidence
through the use of false witness testimony. 135
Furthermore, the Court, in concluding that the actions of the prosecu-
tors in regard to the bootprint evidence were not protected by absolute
immunity, has superimposed "a bright-line standard onto the functional
approach that has guided" the Court's previous decisions.13 1 Imbler
created the well established principle that prosecutors were not subject to
suit for malicious prosecution.' 37 Yet, the Court has created the apparent
notion that a claim for malicious prosecution is no longer subject to
immediate dismissal on the grounds of absolute immunity where a civil
plaintiff is "clever enough to include [in the claim for damages] some
actions taken by the prosecutor prior to the initiation of prosecution."' 3
As a result, this "classic case" scenario that has consistently been afforded
the protection of absolute immunity may now fall on the unprotected side
of the Court's "new dividing line."' 39
The Court, in its decision, also criticized the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals' holding that when "courts can curtail the costs of prosecutorial
blunders ...by cutting short the prosecution or mitigating its effects,"' 4
"damages remedies are unnecessary.""' Therefore, "if the injury flows
from the initiation or prosecution of the case, then the prosecutor is immune
and the defendant must look to the court in which the case pends to protect
nor the lower court identified any common law or historical support for extending absolute
immunity to such actions. Id. at 1942.
134. See, e.g., Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 1941; Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 401-02 (2d Cir.
1926); Youmans v. Smith, 47 N.E. 265 (N.Y. 1897); Griffith, 44 N.E. at 1002.
135. Buckley claimed that the prosecutors specifically chose Robbins because they knew
she would testify, even if it meant testifying falsely, that Buckley made the bootprint on
Nicarico's door. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2615.
136. Id. at 2622. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy explains that the Court, in
it's majority opinion, has created a true anomaly by stating that a prosecutor should not
consider himself to be an advocate before he has probable cause to have anyone arrested.
Id.
137. Id. at 2623.
138. Id.
139. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2623 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
140. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1241.
141. Id. at 1240.
1938 Vol. 1 8
233
: Nova Law Review 18, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
1994]
his interests."'' 2 Thus, "prosecutors whose out-of-court acts cause injury
only to the extent a case proceeds" are entitled to absolute immunity."'
The Supreme Court called this theory "unprecedented" and contrary to the
Court's approach of focusing on the conduct for which immunity is
extended.' However, this "source of the injury" theory is consistent
with, and supported by, Supreme Court precedent.'45 This precedent was
established to ensure that the full spectrum of prosecutorial actions that are
intertwined and closely associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process are afforded the protection of absolute immunity. 46
Finally, the decision was flawed because of the damaging effects and
harmful ramifications the Buckley decision will have on a prosecutor's
ability to fully perform his duties. Prosecutorial immunity was created to
ensure that prosecutors "will be guided solely by their sense of public
responsibility"' rather than by a sense of fear of civil liability. 47 However,
the Court's decision in Buckley will have a chilling effect on those
prosecutors who may have been otherwise willing to be somehow engaged
in the full investigation of those cases that they will ultimately present at
trial. A prosecutor's concern about the potential liability arising from
pretrial consultations with witnesses could hamper his judgment as to
whether certain witnesses should be used. 48 This fear of liability during
the initial phase of a prosecutor's work "could interfere with his exercise of
independent judgment at every phase of his work, since the prosecutor might
come to see later decisions in terms of their effect on his potential liability."'
4 9
As a result, this lingering threat of liability may cause a prosecutor to
act with an undue sense of caution that will impede upon his independent
142. Id. at 1241.
143. Id. at 1242.
144. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2611.
145. Respondent's Brief at 20, Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993) (No.
91-7849).
146. Id. The respondent's brief notes that the prosecutor in Imbler allegedly had a
police sketch altered to more closely resemble Imbler after the investigation focused upon
him. Id. Respondent argues that this out-of-court preparation is more investigatory in nature
than the falsifying of evidence alleged in Buckley. Id. at 21. Yet, the prosecutor's actions
in Imbler were slill afforded the protection of absolute immunity, presumably because the
injury that Imbler attributed to the altered sketch occurred when it was used at trial in order
to aid the prosecution in convicting him. Id. This line of reasoning should have been
analogized to the use of Louise Robbins' testimony.
147. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 814 (1987);
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430.
148. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2621; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 426 n.24.
149. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2622 (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 343 (1986)).
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judgment. 5 ' The ability of an attorney to vigorously and fearlessly
perform his duties utilizing his own judgment is imperative to a state
prosecutor, whose position requires that he serve the public's interest in the
most competent way possible.' 5' This ability of a prosecutor to perform
his or her duties fully and without reservation is "essential to the proper
functioning of the criminal justice system.' 52
VI. CONCLUSION
The notion and belief that "no bad deed should go unpunished" is one
that has entrenched itself into societies throughout history. Yet, prosecutors
have been afforded immunity protection in certain situations. Even if they
do something wrong, the law has stated that they shall go unpunished. In
performing their duties as public servants and in performing their duties as
advocates for the State, prosecutors have been afforded the protection of
absolute immunity for those functions in initiating and pursuing a criminal
prosecution.' 5  However, since the dividing line between a prosecutor's
acts in preparing for those functions, some of which would be absolutely
immune, and his administrative or investigative acts, which would not,'54
has yet to be clearly defined, the question of what acts are protected by
absolute immunity is yet to be completely answered.
Nonetheless, the historical and common law tradition of prosecutorial
immunity, combined with state, federal, and Supreme Court precedent, have
established a standard by which the determination of what acts are to be
afforded the protection of absolute immunity is to be decided. Accordingly,
the standard that has been established is that those acts undertaken by a
prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or in
preparing for trial and that occur in the course of his role as a public servant
as advocate for the State are entitled to the protection of absolute immunity.
The attorneys in Buckley were functioning as prosecutors in eliciting the
testimony from Louise Robbins. They were preparing for the initiation of
criminal proceedings against Buckley. Even if the testimony they received
from Louise Robbins was false and maliciously utilized, the prosecutors'
150. Id.
151. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427.
152. Id. at 427-28.
153. Id. at 421.
154. Id. at 431 n.33.
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acts still should have been afforded absolute immunity because those acts
were prosecutorial functions.
Although such immunity leaves the genuinely wronged criminal
defendant without any civil redress against the prosecutor or prosecutors
who intentionally and maliciously deprived him of his liberty, the alternative
of qualifying a prosecutor's immunity would harm the public with which he
has a duty to serve. 155 "It would prevent the vigorous and fearless perfor-
mance of the prosecutor's duty that is essential to the proper functioning of
the criminal justice system . .. .""'
As a result of the Court's determination that the apparent preparatory
steps undertaken by the prosecution were not protected by absolute
immunity and because of the rationalization that they were more investiga-
tive in nature, a chilling effect on prosecutors will no doubt arise in their
willingness to fully involve themselves in a case. As Judge Learned Hand
emphatically stated in his frequently quoted passage regarding prosecutorial
immunity:
As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between
the evils inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it has been
thought in the end better to leave undressed the wrongs done by
dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the
constant dread of retaliation.'57
155. The immunity of a prosecutor from liability for damages in civil suits under 42
U.S.C. section 1983 does not leave the public without a course of criminal redress to assure
the public that this type of immunity does not place certain governmental officials above the
law. Title 18, section 242 of the United States Code is the criminal equivalent of 42 U.S.C.
section 1983 and provides:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute or ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or
penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color,
or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not
more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if death
results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988).
In addition, a prosecutor is also subject to disciplinary actions imposed by his peers.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 3.8 (1989).
156. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427-28.
157. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949
(1950).
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The Supreme Court in Buckley should have realized that they have now
subjected those prosecutors who are faithfully performing their prosecutorial
functions to this constant fear of retaliation.
Deborah S. Platz
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